


Bureau of Justice Assistance

Problem-Oriented Drug Enforcement

A community-based approach
for effective policing

MONOGRAPH



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October 1993

NCJ 143710

This document was prepared by the Police Executive Research Forum, supported by cooperative agreement number 88-DD-CX-K022, awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Bureau of Justice Assistance wishes to thank the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) for its help and guidance in compiling this document, in particular Deborah Lamm Weisel in North Carolina, Karen Allen in Oklahoma, Sandra Huguley Stone in Georgia, Joseph Perez in Florida, John Meeks in Pennsylvania, and Nancy McPherson in California.



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Problem-oriented policing is a process for approaching persistent community problems that require a police response. Traditional policing expects almost instant identification of problems, with little analysis and immediate response.

On a call for service at a notorious drug trouble spot, a traditional police officer might make an immediate arrest with little effort to measure long-term results. On a similar call, a problem-oriented officer might also make the same short-term response, but include an effort to determine why the scene was an almost constant trouble spot.

This officer might determine that poor lighting encouraged drug activity on the corner. Getting the lighting upgraded might accomplish more lasting results.

After early reports of success with this new approach to policing, the Bureau of Justice Assistance funded a five-city demonstration project in which problem-solving strategies were brought to bear on the Nation's drug-control problem. Part I of this monograph reveals that researchers who served BJA in that effort discovered that those agencies in which change came most easily had some person or persons, ranging in rank from police chief to patrol officer, who became strong symbols of commitment to the methods and who promoted problem-oriented solutions by widely sharing examples of successes with other police officers and managers.

Flexibility and Persuasion

In those police agencies that made change look easy, the lead staff were persuaders rather than dictators. They urged (and their colleagues willingly accepted) an experimental approach to each new challenge. The initiative appeared inclusionary rather than elitist.

In cities where implementation went smoothly, early participants met routinely in both formal and informal

settings to explore alternative approaches, share encouragement, and demonstrate mutual concern.

Effective spokespersons to promote the change will persistently emphasize its potential and devise strategies to surmount any roadblocks that develop. Personnel at all levels throughout the department should read about successes that problem-solving methods have enjoyed elsewhere; if possible, they should visit sites where implementation has already succeeded or be visited by officers from those other agencies. Attending national and regional meetings and conferences adds breadth to the local body of knowledge.

A concise and powerful statement of mission, frequently reiterated, can keep the agency's attention focused on its problem-oriented objectives.

Organizational Structure

Too-frequent changes in shift or beat can damage the officer-community cohesion so important to problem-oriented policing. If shifts and beats never change, however, officers may become so familiar with their communities they have difficulty retaining neutrality. A police agency should carefully consider how its organizational structure affects problem-solving approaches.

Closely related is the question of how much freedom and responsibility individual officers are to have in their relations with other municipal and private agencies. Developing a collaborative relationship with the community requires creativity and firmness.

In developing an implementation plan, a police agency must determine whether it wishes problem-solving to originate in a special unit or to implement it departmentwide. This decision is closely linked with another, that of identifying the target area. Whether

that area is to be a geographic unit such as a precinct, a type of neighborhood such as public housing communities, or citywide will depend on the individual city and its particular problems.

Introducing the Strategy

The implementation team must determine how problem-solving efforts will be documented, how rewarded, how supervised, and how they will be coordinated across various levels of the department organization.

A Realistic Timeline

Only after all these decisions are taken can a time be set for the problem-solving effort to begin. If an agency plans a departmentwide implementation, a several-year period may be required to set up such detail-oriented tasks as analysis and evaluation. Other agencies could set up special units and begin problem-solving operations quickly.

Every element of problem-solving policing, however, depends on reliable data about substantive problems. Sources will include community-based information such as hospital and census data, public housing statistics, and school dropout and truancy reports, as well as police data. Crime analysis units will be one of the first places for individual officers to start looking.

A creative marketing plan will be needed to win and keep the support of community leaders for the problem-oriented initiative. One way to market success stories is through vivid and true case studies. Let successes speak for themselves; they do not require exaggeration. Officers who were skeptical at first but have been won over to the new concepts are among the most effective marketers.

Even when problem-oriented policing is established and accepted in a police department, a training program is necessary to keep it successful. In every training session, someone is bound to bring up barriers to the success of such an initiative. Then the implementation team can work with them to identify methods for overcoming the difficulties.

The final goal—institutionalization of problem-oriented policing—is realized as it increasingly becomes an accepted response to community problems.

Part II of the monograph shows the problem-oriented approach in action, exemplifying the “SARA” model—scanning, analysis, response, and assessment—in case studies of drug-fighting efforts as recounted by the police officers who participated in them.

Introducing five San Diego cases is the story of the bankrupt apartment house that became a center for drug activity because the deceased owner’s brother ran a gambling hall in one of the few units he didn’t permit to remain vacant for use by drug dealers. Neighbors, the estate, and police all welcomed the changes resulting when a new management took over. In a Tampa case, traffic diversion and neighborhood cleanup helped residents themselves throttle drug sales in a low-cost housing area that was nearing notoriety.

Atlanta contributes other stories of how public housing developments were reclaimed from growing drug gang control. In Tulsa, imaginative police officers used agricultural activities and a 4-H Club to help lure urban youth away from a drug-raddled existence. Philadelphia cases center on a drug-plagued neighborhood that was nevertheless undergoing expensive “gentrification” and “urban pioneering.”

A selected bibliography, a glossary, and an appendix of problem-oriented policing report forms used by the San Diego Police Department complete the volume.

INTRODUCTION

Early successes of “problem-oriented policing” began gaining wide publicity in 1986. In the Spring of 1987, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) provided funding for early work on the innovative idea of applying problem-oriented policing strategies to the Nation’s drug-related problems. This demonstration project sought to refine the concept of problem-oriented policing and determine how effective police officers could be in tackling the underlying conditions linked to drug problems.

From this monograph the reader will learn that, within 3 years, the effort met with broad success and helped practitioners refine the concept of problem-oriented policing. More important, the demonstration project showed that officers, by carefully identifying and analyzing neighborhood crime problems, could make strides in restoring a better quality of life to neighborhoods beleaguered by drug activity and related crime problems. Readers who find the present volume useful may wish also to obtain a related BJA monograph, *A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their Environment*.

The demonstration project took place in five cities: San Diego, California; Tampa, Florida; Atlanta, Georgia; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Police managers in each of these cities targeted a portion of their cities for the elimination of drug-related problems. Four of the five cities selected areas dominated by public housing; San Diego, however, selected a large geographic area with a great deal of low-income housing. Each of the targeted sites shared high levels of criminal activity ranging from property crime to violent crime, high levels of fear of crime among residents, prevalent retail drug markets, and poor environmental conditions that indicated community disorder. Only one of the targeted areas had an active residents’ organization, and that group was characterized by internal strife and disagreement about its purpose. Police activity in the target sites had traditionally consisted of emergency responses to calls for service, without additional patrols or other police services.

By working with representatives from the sites, police developed an implementation plan to put the problem-oriented policing initiative into practice. One of the earliest efforts involved training the officers who would be engaged in targeting the problem areas. BJA provided each of the five cities with training and onsite technical assistance. The results from the technical assistance provided the newly trained officers included identification and analysis of specific neighborhood problems, development of mechanisms for tracking officers’ problem-solving efforts, and determining a means of evaluating the effectiveness of the problem-oriented police officers’ responses.

Perhaps the most important component of this process was the identification and analysis of problems. Officers were intimately familiar with the neighborhood problems in their assigned areas, but tended to use general and vague language to describe the problems. The training program guided the officers to define drug problems more specifically. After thinking more carefully, the officer would be able to articulate that the drug problem centered around a certain corner or among a few apartments and describe what types of drugs were sold, during what specific hours of the day, and by whom. It became apparent that officers had a wealth of untapped information about the specific nature of the drug problem on their beat.

The problem-oriented policing concept convinced officers of the need to gather even more information. For example, officers were encouraged to determine the identities and origins of the buyers and sellers of the drugs. Officers also tried to ascertain what physical and environmental characteristics made certain areas more appealing as open-air drug markets. They also tried to determine the relationship between drug activity, crime rates, and public housing occupancy rates. The purpose of this structured inquiry was to uncover information that would provide clues to developing a solution uniquely tailored to the individual problem. Some officers met with remarkable success in this effort.

The structured inquiry also led both researchers and police practitioners to refine the definition of a “drug problem” in a troubled community. In neighborhoods characterized by drug activity, it became clear that both officers and residents perceived virtually all crime problems as related to the sale and use of illegal drugs. This finding was an important breakthrough because it gave officers the latitude to address substantive problems ranging from car theft and domestic violence to juvenile delinquency and vandalized and littered properties within a drug-related context. Thus, officers understood drug sales and drug use as symptoms of a host of other problems rather than problems in themselves. Indeed, the existence of drug problems enabled officers to more easily identify deep-seated community problems. Once officers were able to analyze the components of the drug problem, they often realized that criminal justice sanctions were not necessarily the most appropriate mode of intervention. The various manifestations of drug problems often needed more innovative police responses than arrest and required the police to break the traditional cycle of responding to calls for service and arresting suspects.

Three years of work on this project have yielded several important conclusions:

- Line officers can develop close involvement with the public to actively address the needs of citizens.
- Police can tap diverse public and private resources in a cooperative effort to address common problems.

- Police can develop and implement innovative responses to long-standing problems in the community.

- Police can be more effective in dealing with drug problems by addressing the underlying conditions associated with drug activity.

It is important to note, however, that some police agencies had greater success in applying the concept than others. A number of organizational issues may have affected the level of successful implementation, and a continuing effort was made to identify which specific organizational characteristics helped or hindered these efforts. This monograph, therefore, is derived from the experience of monitoring and evaluating a variety of implementation strategies over a period of time.

Part I of this monograph provides guidelines to police managers who are trying to implement, expand, or refine their department’s approach to problem-oriented policing. It is not prescriptive, but it does identify key elements that may serve as an implementation checklist.

Part II, the case studies, shares actual experiences in the problem-oriented approach to drug enforcement. In each case, the studies were written with the assistance of the officers who implemented the approach. Street addresses have been altered, and names of individuals appear as initials.

PART I: IMPLEMENTING PROBLEM-ORIENTED DRUG ENFORCEMENT

PROBLEM SOLVING AS A PROCESS

At the most basic level, problem-oriented policing is a process for approaching persistent community problems that need a police response. The process involves several components:

- Careful identification of specific problems.
- Analysis of the problem through the collection of information and the formulation of several responses.
- Development and implementation of a customized solution to the problem.
- Evaluation of the impact of the solution on the problem.

Each problem-solving model encompasses these four stages, although several different versions of this process are used by different police agencies.

Two of these stages can pose difficulty for line officers. Police are accustomed to readily identifying community problems; their usual reaction is to respond immediately. Police also usually conduct little analysis and rarely measure results. For example, when a traditional police officer responds to a call reporting drug activity at a notoriously troublesome location, he or she might make a misdemeanor arrest for drug dealing upon arrival. Thus, in this non-problem-solving model, the officer identifies the problem and responds quickly, almost instinctively.

A problem-oriented police officer might become aware of the problem in the same manner—through a call for service. Upon arrival, the officer might also have a similar short-term response—a drug arrest. The problem-solving officer, however, would most likely look at the situation more analytically and try to determine why the area was the scene of almost constant drug activity. He or she might review the calls for service to the location or analyze the patterns of arrest to identify the demographic and temporal characteristics of arrests, asking, “Are the arrestees youth who are truant from school?” “Are the arrests occurring predominantly during the day, at dusk, or late at night?” The officer might even interview

arrestees in an effort to determine why the site was selected for drug-related activity. If the problem impacts on a residential neighborhood, a business community, or other area of citizen interest, the officer might talk with residents, small-business owners, or other key individuals to gain insight into their perspectives.

The officer might also try to analyze the environmental attributes of the location to identify conditions that may be linked with the drug activity (see the companion volume, *A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their Environment*), asking, “Is lighting inadequate?” “Are grounds littered and buildings vandalized?” “Are vacant apartments available to foster drug activity?” “Do abandoned automobiles provide convenient drug stashes?” Analysis of this sort provides a clearer picture of the precise nature of the particular drug problem.

The results of this inquiry do not suggest that the officer has sole responsibility for solving the problem. The analysis is conducted to illuminate what factors can be addressed to help alleviate the problem. Only after completing careful analysis can an officer determine what resources are needed or how they can be tapped. For example, if lighting on a certain corner is inadequate, the officer may be able to marshal the resources to have lights repaired or wattage upgraded. Thus, although the officer does not actually do the work, he or she must ensure that the response is implemented. Once the response is applied, the officer should continue to monitor the situation to see if the response makes an impact on the problem.

In the course of addressing drug-related problems in this project, officers refined the basic concepts of problem-oriented policing. These concepts include the following:

- A problem is something that concerns or causes harm to citizens, not just the police. Issues that concern only police officers are important but they are not community problems.

■ A problem demands a different level of police effort than does a crime, a case, a call, or an incident. A problem is a group or pattern of crimes, cases, calls, or incidents.

■ Problems must be described precisely and accurately and broken down into their specific elements. Problems often are not what they first appear to be.

■ Problems must be understood in terms of the various interests at stake. Individuals and groups of people are affected in different ways by a problem and have different solutions. Police must be aware of these competing interests.

■ The analysis of problems must be thorough, although it need not be complicated. Problems must be routinely and systematically analyzed before a response is implemented.

■ Police must understand the way in which the problem is currently being handled and recognize the limits of its effectiveness before developing an effective new response.

■ All possible responses to a problem should be considered to avoid overlooking an innovative or potentially effective response. Responses to problems should logically follow what is learned during the analysis stage. Solutions should neither be limited to nor rule out the use of arrest.

■ Responding to a problem means more than providing a quick fix; it means dealing with the underlying conditions that create the problem.

■ The department must systematically determine what does and does not work by evaluating the effectiveness of new responses so these results can be shared with other police officers.

■ Police officers must have the freedom to make or participate in important decisions about problem response. At the same time, officers must be held accountable for their decisionmaking.

This list of reminders is useful for officers who have learned through years of traditional police training and experience to respond quickly to a call for service, handle it fast, and get back into service. Gradually, they will get used to the idea. For example, some officers working on problems identified in their communities for this project developed their own language to describe their activities, referring to their "POP" (problem-oriented policing) project. Other officers would say they were "problem solving" or "popping" when they were addressing a problem on their beat. In this way, officers began to take ownership of identified community problems.

Over time, it became clear that officers could accomplish the four objectives of the demonstration project:

■ To increase the effectiveness of police in battling local drug problems by addressing the underlying community problems that spawn them.

■ To increase the reliance on the knowledge and creative approaches of line officers to analyze problems and develop solutions.

■ To encourage police to tap diverse public and private resources in a cooperative effort to solve community problems.

■ To develop a closer involvement with citizens and let them see that police address the needs of the public.

These broad objectives guided the implementation effort of the problem-oriented approach to drug enforcement.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

Many organizations resist change. This resistance is particularly common among hierarchically structured organizations whose operations are guided by a proliferation of rules and procedures. These characteristics describe many American police agencies.

Conversely, organizations more receptive to change are often somewhat decentralized, with employees accountable at all levels of the organization. Organizations that can accommodate change smoothly typically have a more participative management style (versus an autocratic, horizontal organization) and open and frequent communication patterns (Kanter, 1983).

Indeed, these latter characteristics are typical where police agencies are exploring new options for responding to community problems by embracing change, such as adopting problem-oriented policing strategies. If street-level police can improve effectiveness by developing more proactive, collaborative responses to persistent problems, police organizations must in turn be flexible and cooperative to support these efforts.

After nearly a decade of working with police agencies to implement new approaches to police work, researchers have discovered that some organizational characteristics appear to be linked with organizational capacity to integrate and institutionalize change. During the course of implementing problem-oriented policing, BJA grantees dealt with major leadership transitions; major crises within the community requiring vast and immediate police resources, some for extended periods of time; rotations, promotions, and retirement of key staff; and major staff reductions. Any of these changes had the potential to derail the implementation effort. In some agencies, these events blocked or slowed implementation efforts; in other agencies, the same types of events created only a momentary pause or no discernible impediment to implementation. It became clear that where certain organizational characteristics existed in police agencies, successful implementation of problem-oriented

policing was more likely; in their absence, successful implementation was more vulnerable to setbacks and may have required alternative implementation strategies.

In agencies with greater success in the implementation of problem-oriented policing, one important milestone was achieved early in the effort: the meaningful support of some key individual or individuals. These "lead staff" varied widely from one agency to another, ranging in rank from police chief to division commander to patrol officer. These individuals provided a strong symbol of commitment to the implementation effort, and their activities included both marketing and insulating components. Marketing activities included promoting problem-oriented policing by sharing examples of successes with other police officers and managers. Insulating activities included dedicating adequate resources to problem-solving efforts to ensure successes. In the early days of implementation, both of these functions were vital.

The agencies in which officers engaged in problem solving most quickly and fully were characterized by a number of different organizational or managerial attributes detailed below.

Experimentation. The police agencies and lead staff in successful implementation efforts were experimental. They were not averse to or troubled by the idea of "making it up as we go along" or refining concepts over time. This open-ended, flexible structure was an advantage rather than a disadvantage. Commonly, these agencies would try one approach to implementation; if it did not work well, they would develop another and not dwell on past failures. The more resistant organizations tended to search for rules and procedures to follow rather than ideas to explore.

Persuasion. Lead staff were persuaders rather than dictators. These staff members were typically energetic and encouraged officers rather than ordering them to perform certain functions. They recognized that change is not easily forced on officers by top-down dictate.

Communication. Good communication also characterized the more successful agencies. Communication was very open within successful organizations and included varied communication media. Newsletters, staff meetings, and memoranda disseminated information about implementation activities and early successes to all members of the agency, resulting in more staff wanting to learn about the initiative and become involved. Effective communication helped portray the initiative as inclusionary rather than elitist.

Collaboration. Networking and collaboration, both within and outside the organization, were also typical of the more successful agencies. Tapping internal and external resources was one method of involving more people in the problem-solving process. The technique sold the concept to a larger audience, including the affected community and the city population. Efforts to reach outside the organization were more successful when the agency had strong leadership and direct input. Networking efforts were less successful when external organizations brought their own personal agendas to the initiative.

Nurturance. Successful agencies were willing to nurture the initial efforts of officers by providing some degree of insulation from the volatile nature of police work. Early participants in the initiative were given some latitude in terms of addressing problems and accessing resources, including exemption from the demands of the 911 system. This insulation, however, was limited even in the most successful implementation efforts. Agencies that insulated problem-solving efforts entirely from other demands created a new set of problems that hampered institutionalization without furthering the cause.

Participation. Successful implementation appeared easier in more participative organizations. In the more successful agencies, officers, supervisors, and command staff met routinely in both informal and formal settings to discuss problem-solving efforts, explore alternative approaches, and troubleshoot organizational roadblocks. Supervisors took an active interest in the problems officers identified and offered assistance as necessary.

Commitment. The most successful implementation efforts featured an articulated and demonstrated commitment to the concept of problem-oriented policing. This commitment included a sufficient dedication of resources to ensure that the crisis orientation of police work would not derail the overall

implementation effort. The support ranged from public statements about the department's commitment to problem-oriented policing to top-level inquiries about an officer's or a division's problem-solving activities.

Thus, seven organizational and managerial attributes were linked with easier implementation. These characteristics are:

- Experimentation.
- Persuasion.
- Communication.
- Collaboration.
- Nurturance.
- Participation.
- Commitment.

Some of these organizational characteristics may reflect the organizational culture or leadership dynamics that exist in a police agency or in a discrete part of an agency. However, it is important to note that these characteristics are not requisites for the successful implementation of problem-oriented policing. Rather, they should be viewed as merely descriptive of successful implementation efforts. Other agencies and individuals have different characteristics that may be equally useful in successful implementation efforts. Any of these characteristics are a dynamic for overcoming the organizational challenge of resistance to change.

This section has described organizational characteristics of the effective implementation of problem-oriented policing within the context of an agency's resistance to change. Note that resistance is a natural response to implementing any new idea; the more far reaching the concept, the greater the potential resistance.

This resistance to problem-oriented policing results because it is a new concept to many police officers who have much of their careers invested in more traditional approaches to police work. Problem-oriented policing is also a concept or an approach, with a variety of possible manners of programmatic institutionalization; therefore, there is no single set of programmatic steps or directives for officers or supervisors to follow. This absence of a defined structure can be somewhat threatening because employees are unclear about what behaviors are

expected. Problem-oriented policing is also antithetical to the training most police officers undergo, which promotes the ideas that fast response, random patrol, getting back into service quickly, and making arrests likely to result in convictions are the ultimate goals of policing.

Given these realities, organizational resistance to problem-oriented policing should be understood as part of the implementation process, identified, and addressed. Resistance, however, should not be considered a barrier to implementation. Indeed, certain key elements of implementing problem-oriented policing are developed specifically to address the potential for resistance. The next section of this monograph discusses the key elements to address during the implementation stage of a problem-solving initiative.

CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF IMPLEMENTING PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

This section outlines the elements of the problem-oriented policing approach that police agencies should consider in the early stages of implementation. These elements are not mutually exclusive; some elements overlap. Nor are the elements presented in rigid chronological order; most of these elements should be addressed concurrently within the agency. A department might, for example, develop a Gantt chart to allocate time periods and target dates for planning the overlapping components of the implementation effort (see exhibit 1). Use weeks or months as time increments, based on the needs of the police agency.

This type of complex planning structure is necessary to implement problem-oriented policing because every police agency is different. Rather than forcing the agency to conform to a programmatic concept of problem-oriented policing, it is important to develop a specific implementation plan that accommodates the needs of the individual agency. The critical elements are designed to assist in this effort and serve as a guideline for discussing critical implementation issues. The critical elements are:

- Identify a spokesperson for change.
- Research the concept.
- Develop a mission statement.
- Review the current organizational structure.
- Develop a method of collaboration.
- Develop an implementation procedure.
- Identify the target area.
- Determine how to introduce the strategy.
- Decide when the problem-solving effort will begin.
- Develop data collection resources.
- Develop a marketing plan.
- Develop and carry out training.
- Identify barriers to implementation.
- Institutionalize problem-oriented policing.

Promoting the concept. “Any new strategy, no matter how brilliant or responsive, no matter how much agreement the formulators have about it, will stand a good chance of not being implemented fully—or sometimes not at all—without someone with power pushing it” (Kanter, 1983). This statement reflects the experiences many police agencies have had with implementing problem-oriented policing. The first step in implementation, therefore, is to recognize a person or group of people who can create change in the organization.


All new strategies need someone to serve as their advocate and nurture their acceptance within the organization. This spokesperson is needed whether the organizational environment is a private business organization or a public police agency. In police departments, the spokesperson for change will often be the chief of police. Such a spokesperson can also come from elsewhere within the organization or even from outside the police agency in the person of the mayor or county commissioner. The advocate’s role can also be entrusted to a group of individuals, such as a team of officers charged with the mission of implementing the strategy.

The role of these spokespersons is to persistently encourage and reinforce the adoption of the problem-oriented policing strategy. Some methods of persistence include consistently emphasizing the problem-solving concept and promoting it in person with those in the power structure. The spokesperson exhibits and verbalizes the commitment of the organization to the initiative, making intentions clear through signals to all members of the organization, such as praising commendable efforts. The spokesperson also monitors the implementation process, which might include visiting officers and supervisors engaged in problem solving and asking probing questions.

The spokesperson can also help by identifying roadblocks to or difficulties in implementing the problem-oriented policing concept, devising strategies to attack the problems, and guiding efforts to overcome them.

Exhibit 1

Sample Implementation Planning Guide



Research the concept. Members of the police agency, including those in leadership positions, will have widely varied levels of knowledge about problem-oriented policing. Before an agency begins developing an implementation procedure, it is important that decisionmakers have a minimum level of exposure to the theoretical and applied concepts of the problem-solving approach.

A variety of approaches will enable police managers to become exposed to the ideas and to develop a basic foundation of knowledge about problem-oriented policing to use as a framework for making implementation decisions. Reading about the characteristics of the approach and the theoretical base that led to the development of the concept provides a solid base. This document contains a selected bibliography that provides an excellent list of resources for those interested in adopting this approach.

Another option to expand the agency's knowledge about problem-oriented policing is to make site visits to other agencies currently using problem-solving strategies. A list of some agencies using this approach is included at the end of this document. It is important to note that every police agency adapts the concept to its unique organizational circumstances, so problem-oriented policing may look quite different from one city to the next. It may also be called by a different name. The basic foundations, however, will be similar and will incorporate the problem-solving model described in this monograph. Agencies or individuals may call their efforts problem-oriented approaches, but there are varied levels of sophistication in using the strategy. Site visits should therefore include both information gathering and critical assessment of the agency's relative implementation success. Visits should not be viewed simply as an opportunity to replicate a program or model an approach after an existing initiative.

If time or budget constraints make visiting an implementation site difficult, consider bringing experts on problem solving onsite to share ideas and information about issues related to implementation. Experts with valuable experience can brief key police managers and facilitate a discussion of issues that concern the agency. These experts may be officers or administrators from other departments or trainers from nonprofit groups. Like the site visits, problem-oriented policing expertise should be viewed critically. Advice should be given within the context of helping an agency develop its implementation plan according to its own

unique organizational culture. Experts should share their experiences derived from challenges and successes with other agencies. Within this context, the shared expertise can contribute significantly to the dialog about implementation issues.

Attending national and regional meetings and conferences about problem-oriented policing is another way to develop and refine the agency's knowledge about the subject. Because of the growing interest in the problem-oriented strategy as a response to persistent problems—particularly those related to drugs—many groups and organizations are sponsoring workshops and meetings to discuss key issues related to problem-oriented policing. Attending these meetings provides an opportunity to listen to new ideas, explore challenges to the concept, and ask specific questions.

Learning about problem-oriented policing should not be restricted only to top command staff. Others throughout the department will be interested in learning about this concept, although they may not have previous exposure to the ideas. Encouraging informal learning throughout the department and making more staff familiar with the ideas will smooth implementation later.

In summary, there are four primary ways to become more familiar with problem-oriented policing:

- Research the theoretical and applied concepts.
- Make site visits.
- Bring in experts.
- Attend meetings and conferences.

Any combination of these activities can help agency staff become more knowledgeable about, and more comfortable with, problem-oriented policing.

Develop a mission statement. When police agencies adopt new programs or strategies, employees commonly want to know, "Why are we doing this?" This question is a valid one and points to the need for developing a mission statement that embodies statements of operating principles and long-term objectives to provide a structure for implementing problem-oriented policing.

The term "mission statement" can be used alternatively with other terms, such as "departmental philosophy," "statement of operating principles," and "governing principles." The primary objective is to

articulate the basic values and goals inherent in the new policing approach. The statement should also include a formal definition of problem-oriented policing specifically linking the approach to broader organizational value statements.

A department's mission statement is commonly a reflection of the agency's chief of police. Goldstein argues that good leaders "must have a set of values—a commitment, goals and governing principles." He cites others who suggest that a chief "must build a sense of purpose into the structure of the enterprise" (Goldstein, 1990:153). Thus, in agencies with strong leadership, the mission statement may primarily articulate the vision and policies/principles of the chief or top command staff. Other agencies have organized core teams or management teams to develop organizational mission statements in a participatory management style. In addition, some agencies have used mission statements to develop slogans or symbols that incorporate the objectives. The precise nature of this articulated set of policies/principles varies; the existence, pervasiveness, and reinforcement of those policies/principles are more important than their form.

The mission statement has significant value in implementing problem-oriented policing. As a form of internal communication, it can be a vehicle for establishing the foundation for problem-oriented policing. The statement can also articulate what will and will not happen during implementation, address benefits that may accrue to the careers of employees, and specify how results will be measured. In this form, the statement is a vehicle for managing the expectations of employees by closing the gap between their imaginations and reality. If employees are given realistic information, they can use this to judge and set their own goals accordingly, overcoming some of the fear associated with implementing change in the organization.

In the demonstration of problem-oriented approaches to drug enforcement, mission statements were not formalized but were represented by written project goals and objectives, including statements highlighting the principles of problem solving. In other cities, including Madison, Wisconsin, a mission statement designed by a departmental team helped employees discuss, sort through, and identify common views (Couper and Lobitz, 1991).

The mission statement can serve a variety of purposes in the organization committed to implementing

problem-oriented policing. However, it must be constantly reiterated and reinforced by actions taken by the agency, from hiring and promotions to communications with the public. In this way, the approach becomes part of the way the police agency conducts business.

Review the current organizational structure.

Although the organization of police agencies is similar in many ways, some striking organizational and operational variations can be found from one agency to the next. Some of these organizational characteristics have an impact on the way problem-oriented policing should be implemented. Police agencies should carefully review the organizational structure to determine organizational compatibility with problem-oriented approaches.

One agency variable that impacts problem-oriented policing implementation is shift rotation. Agencies with fixed shift arrangements have generally been more successful with implementation efforts. Problems frequently vary based on the time of day. The visible population changes from one shift to another; therefore, police have more difficulty establishing relationships with the community when they are staffed on a rotating shift basis. Agencies with rotating shifts that wish to implement problem-oriented policing will have to make a serious effort to ensure communication among officers who rotate shifts together. This kind of communication system might enable officers to work on problems more effectively.

Beat rotation is another important organization issue. It is easier for officers to identify and analyze persistent problems when they are familiar with the community. When officers are unfamiliar with an area, they must invest the time to gather additional information about community-specific problems. Of course, a disadvantage to fixed shifts and fixed beats is the danger that police may become too familiar with the communities they serve and have difficulty maintaining neutrality.

Another issue linked with implementing problem-oriented policing is the level of centralization. Some highly centralized agencies have had difficulty implementing problem-oriented policing, citing as obstacles the rigidity of the chain-of-command structure, centralized policymaking, and unrealistic managerial expectations. Centralization of some police functions, however, can benefit officers engaged in problem

solving. For example, a centralized, accessible crime analysis unit can quickly provide officers with important, reliable data. Conversely, centralized narcotics squads may prevent officers from responding to the neighborhood drug problems they detect.

The relative flexibility of management style also impacts the success of implementation. Organizations that have more participatory management implement problem-oriented policing strategies more easily. For example, a police agency that has the ability to manage loose or unstructured initiatives without the traditional hierarchical rigidity will not be frustrated by the challenges of implementation. Flexibility must not only describe the style of current managers but also characterize the organizational culture of a police agency.

The type of performance indicators used and the degree of reliance on those indicators as a true measure of officer performance also have significant implications for problem-oriented policing. Implementation will be more problematic in agencies where officers and supervisors are routinely monitored for indicators such as the number of calls handled, arrests made, or tickets written. Some agencies are able to both monitor traditional performance indicators and encourage officers to solve problems, but this approach sends mixed signals to officers. Agencies that include more subjective measures to evaluate officers' work may have less difficulty implementing problem-oriented policing.

Closely related to the issue of performance evaluation is the agency's definition of the role of the supervisor. When the supervisor's role is narrowly defined as ensuring that officers meet quantifiable performance standards, he or she may have difficulty accepting the more challenging demands of supervising officers engaged in problem solving. For example, supervisors who implement problem-oriented policing are commonly described as "running interference," shielding officers from peer pressure, freeing up time to allow officers to handle problems, permitting officers to work flexible hours to achieve their objectives, conferring with officers on analysis of problems, encouraging officers, and serving as an advocate for officers up the chain of command. These roles are inherently more difficult than the somewhat routinized scrutiny with which traditional supervisors normally review the work of their officers.

The term "organizational culture" refers to the set of expectations and norms that guide employee behavior. The culture of a police agency can have a major impact on its ability to change by reflecting employees' willingness to try new ways of doing business. Organizational culture is largely based on the historical experiences of employees in the agency, reflecting organizational structure, leadership, and methods of handling change in the past. The police culture is transmitted in a variety of ways. New employees are acculturated informally through stories and legends and formally through orientation sessions, employee handbooks, and other means. The culture of the police organization represents the shared norms and values about appropriate actions within the agency. It is imperative to carefully evaluate the organizational culture and realistically assess its impact on implementation before proceeding.

Officer workload and staffing should be reviewed within shifts and among key officers. This review is critical because resistance to implementation consistently comes from those claiming that officers do not have enough time to engage in problem solving. In other words, those opposed to implementation assert that officers have to run from one call to the next. Prior to implementation, workloads should be reviewed carefully to determine if some officers' time is restricted. Police managers can make this determination by reviewing officers' patrol logs or assessing the uncommitted time of a shift's most productive officer (using the agency's standard performance indicators or some other method). If the workload is so heavy that officers have no uncommitted time, the timing of implementation may need to be reconsidered with the availability of additional resources. If officers do have periods of free time, however, this information is valuable in overcoming initial resistance to problem-oriented policing and avoiding roadblocks.

Develop a method of collaboration. A basic tenet of problem-oriented policing is relying on line officers to tap the wide variety of resources, both within and outside the police department, that may be necessary to resolve an identified problem. Tapping external resources may range from making a referral for a service to enlisting the assistance of another agency in a cooperative manner. If police have identified a service gap in the community, the collaboration required may be significant.

Identifying available and appropriate resources is a first step toward improving the cooperative relationship among police, other public and private agencies, and the community. Some problem-oriented police departments have developed resource books listing agencies, contact persons, and brief synopses of the services offered by the agencies; criteria for participation; or costs of services. Other police departments routinely invite outside agencies to make presentations to police staff, informing officers about services and offering tips on how to access services. These same meetings offer an opportunity for officers to inform agencies about the problem-solving approach and facilitate the agency's involvement in problem-oriented policing.

Before encouraging collaborative relations, the police department may need to review its own policies and standard practices for handling outside contacts and interaction. In some police agencies, line officers have authority to make routine, direct contact with other public and private agencies to collect information and develop responses to identified problems. The officers' supervisors will usually have knowledge of this contact. In most cases, the supervisor will not become involved in the interagency interaction unless the officer needs his or her leverage or assistance.

In other police agencies, direct contact between officers and other agencies is discouraged, either by the police agency or certain public agencies. Under these circumstances, supervisors may need to serve as the liaison with other government agencies or ask a commanding officer to make the contact.

The variation in the type of collaboration depends on the police agency and the political structure of the city or county. If political leaders such as mayors or council members are knowledgeable and have supported the concept of problem-oriented policing, other public agencies may be more receptive to contacts from police officers and participate in collaborative efforts. Indeed, several cities have routinely used advisory or management groups whose members include representatives from the community, public and private agencies, and government to assist with developing and implementing problem-oriented policing. Police leaders in other cities have conducted regular briefings at city council meetings and for other departmental heads to facilitate cooperation and collaboration.

Collaboration with private agencies may be more or less difficult than with public agencies. Again, the police agency implementing problem-oriented policing should review procedures for making organizational contacts and consider whether procedures will assist or deter officers in their problem-solving efforts.

Collaboration with the community is an equally important issue. Many police agencies now routinely encourage officers to interact with the public. Developing a collaborative relationship with the community, however, requires creativity and firmness. The word "collaboration" implies obtaining assistance from the public; managing this assistance may require officers to work closely with members of the community, at least initially. Therefore, officers will need to refine their interpersonal skills, communicate expectations clearly and directly, and provide regular feedback to members of the community. Supervisors may want to develop a method for monitoring and assisting officers in handling collaborative relations with the community.

Collaboration is an important part of problem-solving efforts. Because officers will need to collaborate with others on a regular basis, the agency should develop guidelines for improving cooperation and monitoring progress.

Develop an implementation procedure. Two groups of individuals will be involved in the early stages of implementing problem-oriented policing: the group guiding the implementation and the individuals doing the work. These groups may be distinct or may overlap significantly. The agency must clearly assign roles and responsibilities to those who will be held accountable for the implementation.

Police agencies have successfully used management or implementation teams to guide the implementation of problem-oriented policing. These teams have variously consisted of command staff, cross-rank groups with members ranging from officers to the chief, groups including key individuals from the community such as political leaders or agency heads, and working groups of officers and supervisors engaged in addressing community problems.

These management or implementation teams can serve a variety of purposes, such as:

- Promoting the problem-oriented policing concept.
- Insulating the group implementing the concept from competing demands.
- Reviewing the progress of the officers working on problems.
- Offering feedback, ideas, and encouragement.
- Facilitating the collection of data and contacts with other public and private agencies.

The group should be charged with developing an implementation plan identifying goals and including a timetable for the implementation schedule.

The other component of this element is deciding who will do the work. Many police agencies have started implementation by working with a core group of officers trained in problem-solving techniques and freed of their regular workload. Some agencies have tapped broader segments of the agency's staff resources. Other variations include elements of both of these options.

There are two primary choices for implementation: employing a special unit or instituting a departmentwide approach. Each of these choices has its own merits and drawbacks that vary depending on the characteristics of the police organization. Agencies should consider both the advantages and disadvantages of each option prior to implementation.

If the agency's long-term objective is to have a special unit engage in problem-oriented policing, the task at hand is to create the unit, either by assigning officers or recruiting volunteers. Similarly, an agency with a long-term goal of implementing problem-oriented policing throughout the department can create a special unit, but plan for the expansion of the problem-solving effort into departmentwide practice.

Special units can be self-selected core groups varying in size from as few as three or four to as many officers as are manageable. The group normally consists of officers open to the new strategy.

The work of this core group should be isolated from the potentially negative reactions of the agency so

that it can produce visible results in a relatively short timeframe. However, a disadvantage to having a self-selected core group implement the approach is that the rest of the agency may be stripped of individuals supportive of change. Without the benefit of having these individuals in the mainstream of the department, the rest of the agency may become more rigidly resistant. Tensions may develop between the core group and the rest of the agency, especially if the existence of the group causes an increased workload for the rest of the staff.

Assigning a special unit to participate in the initiative can mitigate criticism that the unit consists of only the agency's best officers. This approach is likely to include some reluctant participants. If the agency can overcome the initial skepticism of these reluctant participants, the officers can become highly credible advocates of problem-solving efforts.

A departmentwide or divisionwide introduction to problem-oriented policing is a more ambitious undertaking than the special-unit approach. This type of implementation effort should be scheduled over a longer period of time because it requires greater resources up front (such as training all members of the police agency) and a more comprehensive implementation plan.

Agencies can employ any of these described approaches to implementation or use a combination of strategies. For example, a department could launch a special unit with the intention of expanding it into a departmentwide policy, make a concerted effort to integrate the special unit's work with that of the other officers, rotate line officers through the special unit, and rotate unit officers out of the unit to spread word of its successes.

Identify the targeted area. Given physical limitations, implementation of problem-oriented policing more commonly occurs in stages rather than instantaneously. Most agencies seem to prefer this developmental process, seeing it as an opportunity to refine and monitor the agency's progress.

Determining the initial scope of the problem-solving initiative is the first step in this planning process. Three primary choices are available:

■ In a specific geographic area, such as a precinct or division.

■ In targeted neighborhoods, such as high-crime areas, business districts, or public housing communities.

■ Throughout the city's precincts and neighborhoods.

Each of these territorial options has benefits in the early stages of a problem-oriented policing initiative. For example, implementation in a specific geographic area, such as one defined by a police reporting area, provides the following benefits:

■ Officers trained in problem-solving methods work in the area on a daily basis.

■ Communication can be achieved efficiently.

■ Outcomes for a reporting area can be monitored more easily than for larger implementation areas.

■ Human resources can be used more flexibly when work is occurring in a single police district or area.

The primary benefit of targeting specific neighborhoods—particularly those that may share a common problem—is that officers have an opportunity to capture impact data more directly and make comparisons to similar problem areas where problem-solving approaches are not used. Working on several target neighborhoods also gives officers an opportunity to compare and contrast gathered information, brainstorm about alternative responses, and build enthusiasm for handling the problem areas.

Finally, implementing problem-oriented policing in a citywide initiative gets the entire agency involved in the effort early in the process. If officers are well trained, their problem-solving efforts will not be diluted by a citywide strategy. On the contrary, their efforts have the potential to be both numerous and diverse. The difficulty in managing a citywide implementation effort is likely to vary depending on the size of the agency and the severity of the problems in the city.

Determine how to introduce the strategy. One of the most important elements of implementing problem-oriented policing is having a clear understanding of how things are going to happen in the agency—a kind of battle plan. Thinking through the process and developing a clear vision of how different elements will work together gives those overseeing the concept a way to answer frequently asked questions.

Most of these questions deal with how the implementation will occur. Commonly asked questions include:

■ Why are we doing this?

■ How will progress be monitored?

■ How will the work of officers be rewarded?

■ How will officers be supervised?

■ What will supervisors do?

■ How will the effort be coordinated?

■ How will time be made available?

■ How much paperwork will there be?

It is important to recognize that answers to many of these questions will not be available in the early stages of the initiative. In fact, this lack of answers is evidence of the flexibility of the problem-solving approach. Rather than developing forms and procedures without practical experience, those guiding the implementation should anticipate getting feedback on the needs of officers actively engaged in the initiative. However, this developmental approach, with its absence of a rigid structure, may be alarming to those officers accustomed to working within a bureaucracy. To overcome some of the officers' apprehension about the new process, the implementation team should alert officers to the issues under consideration, describe how the officers' feedback will be incorporated into the development of reporting forms, and provide a general timetable for the field-testing and refinement of the various strategies.

Major issues that should be considered and discussed (although not necessarily resolved) early in the implementation process include:

■ Documentation.

■ Reward structure.

■ Supervision.

■ Coordination.

Documentation of problem-solving efforts is essential, but it should be streamlined to prevent imposing an excessive amount of paperwork on officers. In the early days of implementation, good recordkeeping will ensure that the implementation team can modify the initiative as it develops, troubleshooting any difficulties that may arise.

At a minimum, recordkeeping should keep track of the specific problem an officer is working on (by geographic area or type), the type and kind of resources tapped for information in the analysis stage (including names, dates, and a summary report of contact), community contacts, and other activities conducted during analysis. Recordkeeping can be as simple as a summary sheet listing progress to date with informal attachments of various correspondence, notes from telephone calls, information sheets, and other supporting materials used in the problem-solving effort. (Several samples of problem-oriented reporting and tracking forms are included as attachments to this monograph.) It is also extremely helpful to write up the work in a narrative form so that it can be used in an agency newsletter or departmental memorandum on accomplished work. These narratives or stories become examples of successful problem-solving efforts and help spread the word throughout the agency.

The agency's current reward structure or performance evaluation system is likely to be inconsistent with the performance objectives suggested in a problem-oriented policing initiative. This is an important issue for agencies with quantitative evaluations that document, for example, the number of calls handled or arrests made during a certain period of time. Officers will want assurance that time spent on problem-solving activities will not adversely affect their evaluations, and that the department will recognize and reward their initiative in addressing problems. Although many officers find intrinsic value in solving community problems, a more formal reward structure is also necessary.

It is unlikely that the evaluation system for the entire agency can be modified in the early stages of implementation. Officers who engage in problem solving should be assured that their work will be recorded in the subjective portions of their evaluations and will be considered in any promotional examinations. They should also be kept informed about progress made in refining the performance evaluation system.

Supervision and how it occurs is another important issue in implementation. Both officers and supervisors need to have a basic idea about how supervision will occur. In the more successful implementation initiatives, supervisors played a critical role. First-line supervisors served as "coaches" to officers, working with them on individual problems and suggesting alternative resources or approaches.

Supervisors also help officers to manage their available time to handle problems. Sometimes they are able to authorize "flex time" that allows officers to alter their work hours as necessary and balance their demands between calls for service and solving problems. Supervisors can also intervene on behalf of officers when necessary, routing problems up the chain of command and facilitating contacts within the police department or with other agencies. The supervisor's tasks are crucial to officers' success in solving problems.

Coordination of problem solving requires planners to work out a method of assuring that information is effectively communicated within the organization. Implementation of problem-oriented policing should include a review of the department's organizational chart to involve each level of agency personnel in the coordination effort in a thoughtful and substantive manner.

Early in the implementation process, the department should designate an individual or group of individuals to coordinate the implementation effort. Among the questions this individual or group should address are:

- How do we get started?
- How will officers identify problems?
- Where shall we begin?

By reviewing each of the critical elements in this monograph, the team or individual will be on track toward implementing problem-oriented policing.

Decide when the problem-solving effort will begin.

Implementing problem-oriented policing is an ambitious effort that will not be accomplished quickly. The agency's implementation team should carefully review the critical elements for implementation and develop a calendar schedule or timeline with realistic predictions for target dates and objectives. Using a Gantt chart, as shown on page 7, is an effective way to plot implementation stages and requirements.

Be certain to allow sufficient time for planning, training, application, and monitoring of progress. Although the basic concept of problem-oriented policing is simple, the nuances are subtle. These subtleties and the detail-oriented nature of problem solving—particularly in the analysis and evaluation stages—are components that should not be overlooked. Over time, officers develop their own expertise in using the

problem-solving model. There is some risk, however, that too much attention paid to the mechanics of problem-solving will deteriorate its effectiveness. Supervisors should continue to work with officers and monitor their actions to guard against this possibility.

A realistic timeline for implementation may be a several-year period if an agency plans a departmentwide implementation. Conversely, agencies can set up special units and begin problem-solving operations fairly quickly.

Develop data collection resources. Every component of the problem-solving model—problem identification, analysis, response, and assessment—depends on reliable data or information about substantive problems. Quality data can help officers identify the problems that need to be addressed. These sources typically include police data or community-based information. Various other sources of information are vital to problem analysis, including hospital data, public housing statistics, school dropout and truancy information, and census data. The more rigorous the inquiry about the nature of the problem, the more sources of information the police officer will use.

Data sources are also important in developing responses to problems. To implement responses, officers must be aware of the strategies employed by other public or private agencies to address the problem. For example, they would need to know that the local social service agency was providing resources to deal with a particular problem, or that a new treatment facility for drug problems was opening in the problem area.

In evaluating responses, officers must also be able to access data to ensure that their response achieved the desired result. They may want to track participation in local recreation programs and evaluate their impact on truancy or juvenile delinquency or monitor light bulbs replaced in street lamps to assess the impact on levels of resident fear.

To access such diverse data sources, officers must be aware of the range of data sources available and know how to use the information. Crime analysis units of police agencies should be one of the first places for officers to start.

The ability of some police agencies to link line officers with crime analysis information is somewhat dependent on the sophistication and location of the crime analysis unit. Some agencies have crime analysts close to the ranks; others have more sophisticated, but more centralized, units. Officers need to know:

- What data are available from the crime analysis unit and in what form.
- How they can tap this information.
- Time parameters for information requests.
- Method for making data requests.

Officers also need to know how to read and interpret computer reports or have access to personnel who do. Orientation sessions on using the crime analysis unit or printed tips on how to do so will be helpful.

Police will also need to access data from other sources within the police agency, particularly if specialized units handle specific problems. Some agencies have specialists ranging from officers who handle abandoned automobiles to those who focus on domestic abuse. Problem-solving officers need to know what information these specialists have and how they can obtain it.

Accessing data sources outside the police agency may require a little more ingenuity. In some police agencies, implementation coordinators have surveyed the community to identify agencies and organizations that police may need to access. These agencies include community groups, treatment facilities, social service agencies, public housing agencies, and others. Officers can be kept informed about these data resources via inservice programming, information sessions during rollcall, or newsletters and memoranda. Agencies can also develop a resource book for officers or hold orientation sessions to introduce officers to agency representatives and services.

It may also be useful for officers to become familiar with other police agencies' responses to problems similar to the ones they are investigating. Agencies may wish to contact other police departments and facilitate interaction to share information about problem-solving efforts.

Develop a marketing plan. Winning the support of the critical individuals involved in the problem-oriented policing initiative is an important element in implementing the concept and moving toward institutionalization. Key individuals vary for each agency but can include both those within the police department (line officers, first-line supervisors, mid-level managers, and command staff) and those external to the police agency (the community as a whole, community groups, the media, and local politicians or government officials such as a city manager or mayor).

One way to persuade key persons to buy into the initiative is to develop a creative marketing plan. To win the support of the upper ranks, one successful implementing agency employed the help of the media. Officers and area command staff were proponents of the approach, so the implementation coordinator facilitated news coverage of their innovative problem-solving efforts. The coordinator also let other agencies across the country know about the agency's work in problem-oriented policing. Subsequently, the local media, the national media, and other police agencies began requesting information from the department. The high-profile coverage alerted the upper ranks to the importance and merit of the officers' work. The following is a list of other tips for a successful marketing strategy:

- *Tell true stories.* One way to market problem-oriented policing is through the use of case studies, or stories about successful problem-solving efforts. These stories provide vivid examples of problem-oriented policing. They also serve to overcome resistance because they illustrate that anyone can address problems, stress the importance of addressing modest (versus overwhelming) problems, and interest other members of the police agency.

- *Avoid overselling.* It is important not to oversell problem-oriented policing. Do not promise that such a strategy will solve the city's drug problems or vow that the agency will change in a finite period of time. Instead, convey that officers plan to tackle persistent neighborhood problems and that problem-oriented policing is a long-term approach to refining the way police do business. Problem-solving activities require careful and thoughtful approaches and a realistic view of the timeframes necessary for achieving lasting objectives.

- *Be clear on the concept.* The media and public officials frequently confuse problem-oriented policing with community-based policing. Keep the concept

simple and reiterate key points. Problem-oriented policing addresses the underlying conditions that cause the problems that trouble the community.

- *Identify some good marketers.* Some agencies find that officers or supervisors who were initially resistant to the concept of problem-oriented policing make great salespersons once they are sold on the concept. The testimonials of these officers sometimes have more credibility with their fellow officers than do officers who jumped on the bandwagon early on in the process. A street-smart, traditional supervisor who has good rapport with the troops would be the perfect advocate.

- *Maintain good communication.* Let people within and outside the agency know what implementation tasks are occurring and when; accurate information can overcome resistance to an unknown new concept. In particular, members of the community should be kept well informed so that they have realistic expectations about police service. This information also enables the public to bring problems to the agency's attention and assist in their resolution.

- *Track progress.* The marketing plan should be dynamic and fluid, continually reevaluating difficulties as they arise and plotting strategies to address those difficulties. Do not lock the agency into a plan if it does not seem to be achieving the desired result.

Develop and carry out training. It is unrealistic to expect officers to engage in problem-solving activities unless they have been fully trained in the concept. Therefore, a training program should be developed and carried out fairly early in the implementation effort. The implementation plan should include a methodology for training specifying who gets trained first and how.

Determining who and when to train are issues that police managers should address early on in the planning stages. Eventually, everyone—from line officers and supervisors to command staff—should receive problem-oriented police training; even support staff and communications staff should be trained in the concept. All members should become familiar with the approach and understand their roles and responsibilities in implementation performance.

Several different training approaches are available. Agencies can contract out for training sessions delivered at the agency. The most effective training curriculums for problem-oriented policing provide officers with background on police methodology, an

overview of research leading to a problem orientation, and a discussion of the problem-solving model and its components. The training relies heavily on the case study method commonly used in professional business schools. This case study approach gives officers hands-on practice in addressing problems. Training should also include a description of the implementation plan so that employees are clear about their roles.

The next issue is how to maintain and continue training after the initial sessions in the agency. Some agencies have been successful in training officers to be trainers themselves, either using them for inservice training or conducting special training sessions on problem-oriented policing. Other agencies have incorporated problem-oriented policing into their training of new recruits at police academies.

Training need not stop with the police agency. Some agencies have held orientation or minitraining sessions with city officials and community leaders. These sessions can also serve as part of the marketing element of the implementation plan.

Identify barriers to implementation. In every training session, some officers are quick to point out why the problem-solving approach will not work in their agency. Lack of adequate time is often cited as a barrier to implementation. The following reasons are also on the list of commonly encountered barriers:

- Difficulty getting middle management to buy into the program and provide support and encouragement to officers.
- Concern that rewards are not truly tied to performance.
- Previous experience with new programs indicates they are short lived.
- Negative attitudes of first-line supervisors.
- Concern about receiving proper training for the entire agency.
- Doubts that efforts can be coordinated within the department.
- Concern that politicians and other government agencies will not be fully aware or supportive of the concept.
- Belief that the volume of calls for service will prohibit use of the approach.

- Cynicism on the part of traditional officers.
- Resistance to change from veteran officers.

These identified barriers represent the impressions of individuals in different agencies; not all barriers arise in every agency. Indeed, upon closer inspection of the agency, some of the barriers may simply be found not to exist. However, giving agency members an opportunity to identify barriers and verbalize their concerns is a useful way to identify potential problems and lays the groundwork for developing a participative approach to implementing problem-oriented policing.

Even individuals quick to identify barriers are able to point out the benefits of becoming a problem-oriented police agency, such as increased job satisfaction, more effective use of police time, better morale, decreased workload (in the long term), resolution of long-standing problems, and better service to the community.

Once barriers to implementation are identified by those engaged in addressing problems, the implementation team can work with officers to develop a method for addressing the difficulties. This process gets line officers engaged in a participative way in solving implementation problems—practical experience for addressing substantive problems in communities.

Institutionalize problem-oriented policing. If problem-oriented policing is to outlive the tenure of the current chief and current political administration, it must become institutionalized or fully integrated into the organizational culture of the agency. Any introduction of a new approach or change in practice may be followed by a regression to the old pattern of doing business unless the structure of the police agency, including its policies and procedures, has been fully revamped to support the new approach.

Organizational theorists suggest that institutionalization occurs when the structures surrounding a new concept change to support it. The new idea thus becomes a legitimized part of an ongoing practice supported by the organizational values and other parts of the system. To ensure that problem-oriented policing continues, the concept must be linked to the rest of the department through recruiting, training, reward structures, and consistent reinforcement messages from top command staff. New recruits, for example, should be assessed for their analytical or

interpersonal skills. Academy and inservice training should include methods of analyzing problems, including tips for reading computer printouts or ideas for working with other agencies and cities. Reward structures should ensure that performance appraisals reflect the quality of an officer's problem-solving work. Communication about problem-solving activities should contain reinforcing messages, new ideas for applications of problem solving, and affirmation of completed work. An effort to institutionalize problem-oriented policing should also include a method of routine monitoring for the process so refinements can be made over time.

These types of support structures within the police department will ensure that problem-oriented policing is not viewed as experimental or as an isolated effort, but rather becomes part of the established organizational culture. One caution is to avoid overloading the department with other major organizational changes while problem-oriented policing is implemented or institutionalized. Although its concepts are simple, its implementation is quite detailed. Many officers and supervisors need practice and encouragement in using the approach before it becomes a natural response to community problems. Indeed, with practice and support, officers can use varied problem-solving approaches, such as organizing teams of officers, working across shifts, or using more officers to work on persistent problems. Providing some level

of insulation to these officers by avoiding other major organizational changes as they become more familiar with problem-oriented policing may assist the institutionalization process.

A good way to track the institutionalization of problem-oriented policing is to conduct surveys of officers' attitudes both to determine their level of familiarity with the concept and to assist in evaluating their level of satisfaction with their work. One major benefit to problem-oriented policing is its intrinsic rewards to officers, including greater control over their work, more autonomy and responsibility, and increased levels of participation in police agency decision-making. Each of these factors is associated with improved job satisfaction.

The long-term costs and benefits of operating as a police agency with a problem-solving orientation to community issues have not been assessed. There are costs associated with adopting this approach—costs of training, planning, resources, and time. The return on the investment, however, is large: increased job satisfaction throughout the ranks, increased community satisfaction with police service, elimination of persistent community problems, prevention of problems that might have developed, and adoption of a more rational and effective way of conducting the business of policing.

PART II: CASE STUDIES IN PROBLEM-SOLVING DRUG ENFORCEMENT

SOLUTIONS BEYOND ARRESTS

The enduring nature of the drug problem in U.S. cities in the 1980's caused professionals to question the efficacy of their drug-fighting methods. As the following case studies documented, while officers often initially increased the number of their arrests, they found that arrests alone did not solve the problems. The studies further documented how officers innovatively used the problem-oriented approach to address the illegal drug problem. Some efforts were more ambitious than others—tackling drug dealing in a large multiunit public housing complex versus handling a situation of two family members selling drugs out of a single-family home. Although the studies did not document all problems faced by officers in the five cities, they did paint a vivid picture of the problems addressed.

The case studies also portrayed varying degrees of compliance with the problem-solving process. Developed in Newport News, Virginia, as a guide for officers, the problem-solving process is also known as the SARA model after its four steps—scanning, analysis, response, and assessment. While SARA should not be construed as the only method of problem solving, its sequential steps can remind officers of a logical progression to follow in tailoring their approach to fighting crime. The model also provides a benchmark for evaluating the quality of problem-solving efforts.

All problem-solving efforts require analysis and assessment. The level of analysis may vary depending on a problem's complexity. While analysis can entail sophisticated data compilation and interpretation or only routine deduction, it must be used to reduce a problem to its basic components. Problem-solving initiatives also require some measure of assessment to determine the value of the effort.

While less attention may have been shown to the analysis and assessment components of the problem-

solving approach in these case studies, it is understandable when considering that this approach presented police with an entirely different avenue for addressing community issues.

Some case studies exemplified certain aspects of the problem-solving model. For example, Officer A.'s efforts in Philadelphia to control thefts from parked cars showed thoughtful and detailed analysis. The Atlanta Police Department's efforts to eliminate problems presented by low-strung clotheslines as impediments to officers' pursuits of drug dealers in public housing communities illustrated a successful attempt to tackle a modest problem by gaining the housing authority's cooperation. Officer A.'s decision to wait outside the convenience store from which her department had received numerous repeat calls enabled her to create a response specifically tailored to the problem that she subsequently uncovered.

Officers will become more comfortable with aspects of analysis and assessment as they continue to use problem-solving methods. Nevertheless, these case studies represented a significant departure from incident-driven policing that has so limited police effectiveness in the past.

Although these studies supplemented other reports describing this project, they also stand alone. They offer valuable information to professionals and to students of the problem-oriented approach. They can be used as a training tool to illustrate how theoretical concepts can be converted into practical approaches and thereby used to attack common and enduring problems facing police. Once versed in the subtleties of the problem-solving model, officers will be able to critically evaluate the methods used by officers in these case studies and use that information to develop more enduring strategies for tackling the problems of illegal drugs and related crime.

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, CASE STUDIES

A Drug Problem at 1234 Maple Avenue

Scanning. The building located at 1234 Maple Avenue was a three-story commercial-residential structure that sat on one of the busiest streets in southeast San Diego. Each floor housed five small, self-contained apartments. Operated under a transient motel-type license, apartments were rented by the night or for several weeks at a time. Of 15 apartments, 10 were vacant in 1988. The apartments contained no cooking facilities, and each floor's residents shared a communal bathroom and shower. The ground floor had an illegal gambling room on its west side and a Mexican fast-food restaurant on its east side.

During the summer of 1988, the San Diego Police Department began receiving increased complaints about drug use and sales in and near 1234 Maple Avenue. According to reports, drugs, mostly crack cocaine, were being sold in the hallways, in vacant apartments, and in front of the building. Buyers would usually stay in the area, which generated complaints from local residents and business owners who feared for their property and personal safety. Consequently, police focused their attention on this area.

In September 1988, eight members of the Walking Enforcement Campaign Against Narcotics (WECAN) detail began working the area on Maple Avenue. Between September and late November 1988, WECAN officers made 134 narcotics-related arrests on the block, including charges of possession of crack cocaine and drug paraphernalia and of being under the influence of an illicit substance.

After several months of selective enforcement, it became evident that the large volume of arrests had done little to reduce the presence of drugs at the site. Users continued to congregate by the building, provoking complaints from area residents and business owners. Furthermore, signs of drug use were still evident inside the building, with vacant apartments

containing used drug paraphernalia. To combat this problem, WECAN officers decided to try problem-oriented policing techniques.

Analysis. Officer W. assumed the lead role in the WECAN detail. Through street interrogations of suspects and witnesses, he learned that most of the drug users and dealers did not reside at 1234 Maple, but were attracted to that location by the availability of drugs and the presence of other illegal activities, such as gambling. In addition, because two-thirds of the building's apartments were vacant, buyers had a convenient location in which to use their drugs.

In November 1988, Officer W. learned through a computer check that the building's owner had been murdered 2 years earlier. From gas and electric company billing statements, he discovered the whereabouts of the owner's sister, Ms. C. When he contacted Ms. C. by telephone on December 16, 1988, she was uncooperative and referred Officer W. to the attorney handling her brother's estate.

Officer W. learned from the attorney that the property, as well as the rest of the estate, was in bankruptcy; no money was available for repairs and the building was for sale. He also learned that an onsite manager, Mr. B., was responsible for maintaining the building, although efforts to contact him proved unsuccessful.

On December 23, 1988, Officer W. arranged for the fire marshal and the housing inspector to conduct a formal investigation of the property, which determined that major renovations were needed to bring the building into compliance with city codes. Further attempts to contact Mr. B. failed; however, 1 month later, Officer W. discovered that Mr. B. had been arrested at the property for selling 2 ounces of cocaine to an undercover Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) operative.

Officer W. acted as an intermediary for communications among the estate, the lawyers, the housing and fire inspectors, and the police department, ensuring that all parties were informed of related activities. The

Great American Bank contacted Officer W. and announced that it was foreclosing on the building, which was in default of a \$400,000 loan.

Response. The principal problems at 1234 Maple, as far as WECAN and the community were concerned, were the dealing and use of narcotics occurring in and around the property. Beyond that, the gambling operation, found to be operated by Mr. B., the building manager, also presented a problem because it was a major stimulant to the drug activity. The officers suspected that the property was being used by a major drug trafficking ring in which Mr. B. was involved. To solve the problem of open-air drug dealing, it was necessary that the overall environment become less attractive to drug dealers.

WECAN's options were limited. The estate had no money to repair the property. Secondly, the onsite manager was an alleged major drug trafficker who was unlikely to work with officers to keep drug dealers and users away from the property. Initially, therefore, the officers simply continued to make arrests at this location.

In contact with the vice unit, Officer W. found that it was planning to infiltrate the gambling ring inside the building with an undercover officer. Officer W. later learned that a joint task force including San Diego narcotics officers and DEA were also investigating the property. However, the joint investigation targeted the cocaine ring inside the building and had little direct relationship to the open-air dealing outside.

On April 21, 1989, Great American Bank foreclosed on the property, naming Hallmark Management Association as receiver for the estate. Officer W. contacted Hallmark and learned that it was experienced in dealing with problems similar to those on Maple Avenue and would cooperate with police cleanup efforts. Hallmark immediately began serving eviction notices. It also removed the pay telephone in front of the building that was used by drug dealers to conduct business, and hired full-time security guards to patrol the property.

Assessment. On August 19, 1989, Officer W. reported that street drug dealing had ceased at 1234 Maple Avenue, while noting that the same dealers, and possibly the gambling operation, were operating two blocks away in a residential area. Hallmark was

making repairs to bring the building up to code and had agreed to further cooperate with police to forestall further criminal activity at this location.

Drugs and Guns at 5678 Maple Avenue

Scanning. Located in the southeast section of San Diego in a residential neighborhood of mostly apartment buildings, the privately owned three-story complex at 5678 Maple Avenue contained more than 75 units. The complex was divided into four buildings with a small, grassy commons area between the buildings. An onsite manager, employed by the buildings' management company, was responsible for maintenance. Shortly after the complex opened in June 1988, serious drug using and dealing problems became evident.

Combating narcotics activity in this area proved difficult for patrol officers. Once such activities become established, a complex gains a reputation for easy access to drugs. Ridding the complex of the reputation is often more difficult than actually ridding it of the drug use and sales.

Police faced many obstacles in fighting the drug problem on Maple Avenue. Initially, they focused on making arrests, but suspects often evaded police by running into the apartments or by running through a canyon on the north side, an open field on the east side, or a row of apartments on the west side. Police determined that drug users and dealers congregated in and around two laundry rooms located at the east and west ends of the complex because officers had found small plastic bags, glass pipes, and used matchbooks—all signs of crack cocaine use—in these rooms. Police considered each of the locations "an easy place to make an arrest" as there was usually someone around who was either in possession of drugs or under their influence.

By October 1988, gunfire and gang-related violence had become common occurrences at the complex during evening hours. During one 3-week period, police records indicated nightly shootings. Police learned through an informant and confirmed through undercover surveillance that the complex had become a major supply source of crack cocaine for several area gangs.

Officers A. and W.'s beat included 5678 Maple Avenue. Working with other officers, they applied selective enforcement and converged on the area with large groups of officers at random intervals, making arrests. However, because this approach provided only temporary relief, the officers decided to implement problem-oriented policing.

Analysis. Officers first determined that they needed additional information. Knowing that apartment managers sometimes were coerced into helping drug dealers or even volunteered to assist traffickers in exchange for money and drugs, the officers spoke with the apartment manager and suggested that he adopt the security measures of placing locks on the laundry room doors and installing additional lighting in the center of the complex. Two weeks later, the suggested improvements had not been made.

The officers next evaluated their arrest and field-interview data. From this information, which included suspect interviews, they could identify many dealers, gangs, and tenants collaborating with dealers. Evidence indicated that the manager had been dissuading residents from contacting police, saying he would deal with the problem.

The officers then contacted the complex's management company and requested a key to a vacant apartment so they could observe the drug dealers in action. Noting that some dealers carried guns, the officers later uncovered a gun-running operation, and in a subsequent investigation seized a large weapons cache of mostly handguns, an Uzi machine gun, a MAC-10 automatic pistol, and several sawed-off shotguns.

Officers A. and W. sought search warrants for the apartments where they had observed drug dealing. When they informed the management company of their findings, its representatives offered to cooperate, agreeing to evict problem tenants and install security doors on the laundry rooms.

Response. On the evening of December 12, 1988, with the assistance of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit, five search warrants were executed simultaneously in the complex. Numerous guns and large quantities of drugs and drug paraphernalia were seized, and with the assistance of the San Diego County Marshal, numerous eviction notices were immediately served on the problem tenants.

During the legal eviction process, Officers A. and W. continued to work with the private management company and maintain their surveillance, but drug users and sellers continued to congregate on the apartment grounds and in the general vicinity. Although arrests at the complex declined during this period, they remained high relative to other neighborhoods.

In January 1988, the patrol officers went for the first time directly to the owner of the complex and learned that he was unaware of the situation. Once informed, he fired the apartment manager and subsequently replaced the management company. The new company hired security guards, improved the apartment grounds, and initiated a new tenant screening process.

Assessment. At the time of this report, the complex was virtually drug free. Residents were mostly families with children, and the security guards reported no drug or gang activity.

Drugs and Gangs in a Private House

I can remember back in 1971, when I was in patrol, we would take rocks, bottles, and gunfire from that address. We tried everything to shut that place down. I can't believe it is still a problem.

—Detective, San Diego Police Department

Scanning. The house at 4321 Market Street in southeast San Diego had been a problem for many years. Records indicated that during the previous two decades, occupants of the house and their associates had been arrested on charges including homicide, robbery, possession of illegal narcotics, and loitering. In recent years, a police walking patrol had applied "saturation enforcement" methods in the area, hitting the house every week or two and making numerous arrests for narcotics violations. However, the arrests had little effect on the criminal activity.

In January 1988, San Diego Police Officer H. was killed several blocks from Market Street while apprehending a fugitive wanted by Federal agents on drug conspiracy charges. The suspect had fled to 4321 Market, where he was apprehended within minutes.

The incident prompted several southeast patrol officers to initiate a strategy to end criminal activity at that address.

The officers, D., W., and K., had worked in the southeast area of the city for several years and were well acquainted with the house on Market Street. From their own experiences and from discussions with other police officers, they initially determined that the repeat complaint calls for loitering around 4321 Market stemmed from illegal narcotics activities, specifically sales of rock cocaine, by the house's occupants and visitors.

Analysis. Officers D., W., and K. collected information that included the results of a door-to-door survey of all households on the 4000 block of Market Street. The survey confirmed that the block's drug problem emanated from 4321 Market and further revealed that although the area residents were willing to cooperate with officers in ridding their neighborhood of its drug problem, they feared retaliation from the house occupants.

The officers visited the house while off duty and spoke with its owner, a 71-year-old disabled woman dependent on Social Security benefits who told them that her son, daughter, and two grandsons lived with her. The officers knew from reviewing arrest records and from their own experiences that dozens of people frequented the house at all hours. The male occupants were known to be involved in the Lincoln Park Piru street gang, and the house had become the center for its activities. Although the owner told officers that she was willing to assist the police, she refused to evict her relatives or move out of the house. While the officers found it difficult to believe that she was unaware of the drug dealing and use, they did not want to accuse her unjustly. In anticipation of having the property condemned or cited by the zoning board, the officers asked for and were granted the owner's consent to take pictures of the interior and exterior of the house.

The officers next spoke with the owner's granddaughter, who told them that she had tried unsuccessfully to move her grandmother out and board up the residence. She claimed that her grandmother required care because she was physically disabled, and the live-in children and grandchildren provided that care. When officers explained their plan to eliminate illegal drug activity at the residence even if it meant confis-

cating the property, the granddaughter said she would again try to convince her grandmother to move from the house.

To assess the grandmother's ability to care for herself, the officers contacted her physician. Although reluctant to reveal patient information, the physician stated that as of her last visit the owner had appeared mentally competent.

At about this time, the owner's son was arrested for a parole violation and sent back to prison for several months.

Continuing to gather information, the officers conducted a computer analysis of all arrests made in the area that revealed a highly disproportionate number of drug arrests made in and around 4321 Market Street. Furthermore, many of the arrestees claimed the address as their residence.

As part of their analysis, the officers requested a printout of police radio calls to the property. They discovered this information did not exist, because police operating procedures do not require keeping records of calls for service to a specific address unless a request is made in advance.

Response. The officers were convinced that the drug problem could be eliminated only if the drug dealers operating in the house were removed. Two solutions were apparent. The grandmother could evict the live-in relatives who were causing problems, or the officers could initiate proceedings to seize control of the house through the city's nuisance abatement program, which would force the entire family to vacate. The officers subsequently initiated abatement proceedings, anticipating that it would persuade the grandmother to evict.

The officers contacted San Diego's abatement task force, which consisted of representatives of the city attorney's office, the fire marshal, building and code inspectors, the city manager's office, and the police department. However, because interactions with the task force were complex and Officers D., W., and K. believed that officers might be deterred by the bureaucracy, they recommended to their supervisors that the police department assign a liaison to the task force to assist officers in utilizing an abatement strategy. Detective S., experienced with abatement laws from his work in narcotics, was assigned as the full-time abatement task force liaison.

Shortly thereafter, Officers D., W., and K. placed the property on the task force target list. The house was then inspected by representatives of the housing, fire, and zoning offices, who discovered numerous violations and informed the owner of her rights and responsibilities. These zoning violations allowed the officers to secure a judgment stipulating that the city would repair the house if the son, grandsons, and their friends stayed away.

The officers explained to the owner's granddaughter that the city would claim the house if the problem relatives did not vacate, but that if the grandmother agreed to evict them, the officers would help repair the house. The owner agreed to these terms, and on August 6, 1989, the problem relatives moved out.

On that same date, Officer D. and several other officers from the southeastern patrol division helped to clean up the house and make necessary repairs. They installed a security door donated from a local hardware store and repaired the damaged porch and broken windows. The owner's granddaughter agreed to move in to ensure that the problem relatives did not return.

Assessment. The house at 4321 Market Street remained in substandard condition. The occupants continued to use gas burners from their stove to heat the house. In late 1989, the San Diego Police Department applied to have the house condemned; however, the owner appealed, and the issue was scheduled to go before the courts.

In May 1990, the owner's son was arrested for violating the court order that forbade him to enter the residence. In December 1990, two of one grandson's acquaintances (members of the Lincoln Park Piru gang) pleaded guilty to a violation of the same court order. They each received 6 months' probation.

Police believed that the problem occupants had moved to a new location in the area and would continue their illegal activities. Nevertheless, the house at 4321 Market Street would no longer serve as a sanctuary for members of the Lincoln Park Piru gang.

Repeat Calls at First and Third Avenues

Scanning. The intersection of First and Third Avenues was considered one of the busiest in southeastern San Diego. The only gas station and convenience store in the area occupied two corners of the intersection. In 1988 radio calls concerning belligerent panhandlers and drug-related activity at this corner increased dramatically.

Analysis. The gas station was the site of heavy pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and the liquor store across the street attracted gang members and panhandlers. Initially, patrol officers believed that the numerous police radio calls resulted from traffic in and around the gas station.

Officer A., a veteran of the area, had responded to many calls for service from the gas station, but had seldom observed evidence of illegal activity. Other officers responding to identical calls at the station confirmed her observations.

A call to the crime analysis unit for a breakdown of the area's calls for service revealed that more than 100 radio calls had been dispatched to the gas station location in the previous month, yet no arrests had been made. Officer A. became suspicious and decided to investigate more closely.

Response. While on patrol a short time later, Officer A. responded to a radio call that reported panhandlers harassing customers at the gas station. When she arrived, however, the station clerk told her the panhandlers had just left the parking lot. The officer then drove across the street to observe the store while writing her report.

While Officer A. observed the activity around the gas station, a second radio call was dispatched that again reported panhandlers harassing customers. When she saw no panhandlers, however, she drove across the street to speak with the manager. She learned from their discussion that the station's clerks were afraid of its clientele and thought that if the police were called on a regular basis (whether needed or not), the station's owner might be compelled to hire full-time security guards.

Officer A. explained that initiating false calls was illegal and that police would not participate in any scheme to manipulate the station's owner. She encouraged the clerks to discuss their fears with the owner, and she stressed that they must not call for police assistance unless it was really needed.

Assessment. The radio calls to the property decreased to only a few per week. When she was in the vicinity, Officer A. occasionally stopped by the store to check on the clerks.

A Drug Market at 10th and Ivy

Scanning. Early in 1988, a neighborhood resident told San Diego Patrol Officers S. and A. about drug dealing on the southwest corner of 10th Street and Ivy Avenue, where, upon investigation, they discovered dozens of people selling and using drugs. Officers had previously been unaware of any illegal activity at that location.

Preliminary investigation revealed that the activity centered around three corner houses—320 and 322 South 10th Street and 1995 Ivy Avenue. The three houses shared a common yard and patio with a fourth residence, 1999 Ivy Avenue. With the assistance of other officers, Officers S. and A. applied selective enforcement to the properties, using groups of officers at random intervals to make arrests for drug-related activity. More than 100 arrests were made during April and May 1988.

Analysis. Officers initially believed that the residence at 320 South 10th Street was the center of drug activity and executed a search warrant at that address. Although the tenant, Ms. K., age 55, was arrested and jailed for sale of crack cocaine, drug activity increased. Field interrogations revealed that relatives and friends of Ms. K., as well as transients, lived in the house and used it to sell illegal drugs.

Response. In July 1988, Officer S. located the owner of the properties, Mr. W., age 80, who lived in Perris, California, about 85 miles north of San Diego. Officer S. called Mr. W.'s house and left a message with Mrs. W., explaining the problem and suggesting that the owner visit the site.

Officers S. and A. contacted the city zoning and building inspection departments and arranged for inspectors to view the property. A list of housing code violations was sent to Mr. W., who drove to San Diego the next day to meet with the officers. Mr. W. had drawn up 30-day eviction notices for the residents of 320 South 10th Street and 1995 Ivy Avenue, but reported that he had been chased off when he had tried to serve them. Three days later, Officers S. and A. and two uniformed officers accompanied Mr. W. back to the property.

Ms. K. moved out of 320 South 10th Street 1 week after she was served with the eviction notice, and the owner immediately boarded up the property. Ms. F., the tenant at 1995 Ivy, was more reluctant to leave. She explained that Section 8, a federally subsidized housing program, had extended her rental agreement for 1 week. When officers contacted the housing commission's Section 8 office to confirm Ms. F.'s assertion, they were informed that Section 8 could not assist in tenant evictions.

Upon learning from the county marshal's office that he had to sue Ms. F. to get her out of the residence and that the process could take 60 to 90 days, Mr. W. retained legal counsel. Meanwhile, drug activity on the property increased. Officers S. and A. discovered that Ms. K. had moved back into the area and into a house at 322 South 10th Street, where crimes such as burglaries and purse snatchings began to occur. The officers considered declaring the property a public nuisance and seizing it, but rejected the idea because the owner had been cooperative.

In September 1988, Officers S. and A. and their sergeant arranged a meeting with two supervisors from the Section 8 division of the housing commission and the special assistant to the city council member who represented the Ivy area. During the exchange of information, the officers discovered that Section 8 program policies hold owners, rather than the tenants, responsible for any illegal activity that occurs on the rented property. Tenants arrested for possession, use, or sale of illegal substances are not in violation of Section 8 program policies and can continue to receive benefits. The Section 8 supervisors said their office could assist in educating owners about the importance of screening prospective tenants and in monitoring the physical conditions of Section 8 housing. The officers agreed to meet again with the housing commission when more information was available.

Ms. F. vacated 1995 Ivy, and the house was boarded up. Officers S. and A. persuaded Mr. W. not to rent the two vacant houses until they had dealt with the residents of 322 South 10th Street, where they discovered the lessee had moved out and left her boyfriend, Mr. L., who had a history of arrests, occupying the premises.

Officer S. contacted the county marshal's office to determine Mr. L.'s legal status. He learned that because Mr. W. had "full knowledge" that Mr. L. had been residing on the property and he had not asked Mr. L. to leave, the man could legally be considered a tenant of that address and had to be formally evicted.

While Mr. W. filed the necessary eviction paperwork, Officers S. and A. continued patrolling the area and making arrests. Officer S. took copies of Mr. L.'s arrest record to the city attorney's office and arranged for his court dates to be expedited. In November 1988, 5 days before his formal eviction, Mr. L. voluntarily moved out.

During the tenant eviction process, monthly meetings were held between housing commission representatives and officers from the San Diego Police Department. The officers learned that housing commission staff were equally frustrated with the system because it allowed criminals to receive subsidized housing benefits. The two agencies resolved to work together to address this problem. Housing commission staff drafted a letter to the regional representative of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, recommending specific changes in the laws that govern certification of Section 8 recipients.

Assessment. In July 1989, Officer S. reported that new tenants had moved into the three houses at 10th

and Ivy and that no drug activity on or near the property had been reported. He further reported that in January 1989, the police department received a complaint of drug activity at 744 Abby Street, the new residence of Ms. F. Officer A. met with the owners of that residence, who were reluctant to evict the tenants without evidence that they were dealing drugs. Officers S. and A. arranged for a probation search of the residence, which uncovered more than 3 ounces of cocaine. The officers noted that numerous people were living in the residence with Ms. F. Under Section 8 regulations, recipients of such benefits cannot house other individuals. Once that information was disclosed to the housing commission, Ms. F. was disqualified from the Section 8 program and evicted from her residence.

The police department and Officers S. and A. received favorable attention and support in their efforts to eliminate neighborhood narcotics problems. Two articles on specific problems addressed by Officers S. and A. appeared in the *San Diego Tribune*.

The San Diego Housing Commission instituted a vigorous training program to inform landlords of their responsibilities in tenant selection and in maintaining control of their properties. The commission also lobbied for changes in housing legislation that would provide local offices with greater authority to evict recipients of Section 8 benefits engaged in illegal activities. The San Diego City Council was supportive of the commission's efforts.

The police department has since trained commission staff to identify drug problems in apartment complexes and in housing units. Conversely, the housing commission has trained officers in the operations of the commission and its regulations.

TAMPA, FLORIDA, CASE STUDY

College Hill Homes

Scanning. The College Hill Homes low-income housing complex was home to more than 2,600 residents who occupied approximately 650 out of 710 apartments. The complex had long been considered a high-crime area by the Tampa Police Department, particularly with regard to traffic in illicit narcotics, and the problem had worsened in recent years. During 1988, 4.1 percent of narcotics arrests citywide were made at College Hill, which housed slightly under 1 percent of the city's population and occupied less than 1 percent of Tampa's geographic area.

The drug most frequently sold throughout the complex was crack cocaine. Marijuana and powder cocaine were also readily available, as was heroin. Sales of the latter, however, were usually conducted in only a few locations at the complex. Other drugs, including LSD, mescaline, amphetamines, and barbiturates, had been seized in drug arrests at College Hill, but were less common.

The high volume of illicit drug traffic at College Hill had been accompanied by an increased level of violence. Half of all 1988 narcotics-related homicides in Tampa were committed in the complex, as were 10 percent of all non-narcotics-related murders. The high incidence of drug use by College Hill residents had contributed to 36 times as many narcotics-related deaths per capita as the remainder of the city (3.05 per thousand versus .085 per thousand), representing more than 25 percent of all 1988 cocaine-related deaths in Tampa. College Hill also led the city in newborns addicted to narcotics, with 4.8 percent.

In June 1988, the Tampa Police Department concluded that its enforcement techniques were unsuccessful in reducing the magnitude of the drug trade, and a new strategy was needed. Therefore, a team of six field officers, each trained in problem-oriented policing, was assembled under the supervision of Captain S. and Lieutenant N. The unit, composed of

Officers D., G., N., P., and Q. and Sergeant M., was assigned to patrol the College Hill area and work with residents to expose the area's drug dealers.

A management team composed of representatives of the mayor's office, the State's Attorney's Office, the judiciary, the Tampa Housing Authority (THA), and the police department was formed to assist the field officers. The management team was designed to help develop strategies to combat the drug problem at College Hill and to facilitate the unit's interaction with government agencies, when necessary. The managers of College Hill and the Ponce de Leon Apartments, which were adjacent to the target complex, also served on the management team.

To implement the project at College Hill, the police department and the management team set four goals:

- To gain support from the community to combat the sale of illicit narcotics.
- To educate and motivate the community to attack the problems of illicit narcotics and crime in their neighborhood.
- To reduce the fear of violence associated with the sale and use of illicit narcotics.
- To return control of the community to its law-abiding citizens.

Analysis. The first phase of the project involved collecting data on the nature and scope of the drug problem. Accordingly, the officers conducted a 71-question resident survey during July and August 1988 that pertained to the environmental and crime problems in College Hill (see companion volume for details of community and environmental surveys). A modified random sample designed for the survey selected every fourth address to participate, with only adult, permanent residents being eligible.

Survey results confirmed police suspicions that fear of victimization plagued the residents, with 88 percent reporting staying in at night to protect themselves,

and 70 percent noting that they avoided certain areas altogether. Officers also learned that 92.7 percent of those surveyed believed drug dealing to be the community's most serious problem, and 88 percent were concerned about their children becoming involved in drugs. Few respondents (25.8 percent), however, had called police within the previous year to report any type of illegal activity. Fewer still (19.2 percent) had done so within the previous month. Officers who conducted the survey determined that the tenants lacked a positive sense of community, which diminished their willingness to work with police in fighting drugs in the complex.

The officers next looked at the police department's arrest statistics and learned that 52 percent of those arrested on narcotics charges at College Hill resided outside the complex, although nearly half lived within 10 blocks.

Officers also collected information as they patrolled the area, either on foot or bicycle. They quickly identified many of the persons selling drugs in the complex and began calling them by name. The various dealers were particularly well entrenched, many having obtained apartments in the complex to use as illegal workstations. In such cases, they either paid the leaseholders for use of the apartments to store or sell drugs or coerced them with threats of violence. The most frequent victims of these tactics were black, female heads-of-household. As this group constituted more than 90 percent of the heads-of-households at College Hill, dealers had a large field from which to choose. Dealers usually formed a network of apartments in a particular location, which always included several possible escape routes.

In addition to the high incidence of drug-related activity in College Hill, officers were struck by its dilapidated appearance. Sidewalks were lined with trash and debris, as were the courtyards and the playground. The trash dumpsters always overflowed with garbage before the city collectors could empty them. In addition, a large adjacent area of vacant land was a dumping ground, littered with broken bottles, old carpet, and automotive parts. Team members believed that these conditions contributed to the poor sense of community among the residents.

The officers also observed that the drug trade generated a tremendous amount of vehicular traffic in the community. Many individuals entering the complex by car drove at excessive speeds, making the streets

unsafe for the numerous children who played in them or nearby. The officers believed this traffic also contributed to residents' fears about drug traffickers, as strangers were always entering and leaving the area.

Still another problem noted by the patrol officers was the inadequate street lighting. Many areas in the complex that were in total darkness after sundown were havens for criminal activity, particularly drug dealing. While the number of street lamps was adequate, bulbs were missing and not quickly replaced. In some cases, bulbs were shot out.

Response. Given the nature and extent of the problem at College Hill, it was obvious to the field unit that any response had to involve increased enforcement. Drug dealers operated with impunity throughout the complex, and the officers wanted to demonstrate to the residents that the dealers were not untouchable.

Accordingly, members of the management team met with representatives from the vice control and selective enforcement bureaus, all agreeing that those two units would be available for special requests from the College Hill patrol. Joint operations such as buy-busts and reverse stings resulted, which pressured dealers to leave the area. The patrol officers, in turn, worked with College Hill's management to evict problem tenants they determined were connected to the drug trade.

The team determined that increased police presence was also an important part of the project. After the patrol officers had noticed no police cruisers patrolling during the several months they had spent in the complex, they notified the management team, which arranged for a regular patrol by the "X-Ray Squad," one of several vehicular patrol squads in the area. In addition to these patrols, foot or bicycle patrol officers were in the complex daily, working to identify problem areas and tenants and trying to forge positive relationships with the law-abiding residents.

In December 1988, after several months in the complex, the problem-oriented policing officers focused on the street lighting situation. Officer Q., assisted by Officers G., D., and N. and a representative of the Tampa Electric Company, conducted a survey of the lighting conditions. Locations of each street light and pole in the area were plotted on a

map, and each light pole was recorded by its specific pole number and location. The lighting survey determined that the wattage (100) of all existing lights was inadequate.

Once the survey was completed, Officer Q. contacted an electric company representative. During their discussions, Officer Q. discovered that, while the electric company owned and operated all city street lights, the housing authority paid for their use in its low-income housing developments. Officer Q. immediately contacted THA representatives and included them in the discussions. Working together, they formed a proposal to upgrade light fixtures to 400 watts and to install an additional 50 light poles in the complex. On March 15, 1989, the proposal was approved by the city council and the new and improved fixtures were quickly put in place. Officer Q. made an informal agreement with the electric company that all inoperative lights would be replaced within 48 hours of notification by police.

The officers next turned their attention to the vehicular traffic in the complex. They observed that most of the drivers were white, drove expensive cars, and usually stayed for only a short period of time.

Officers Q. and N. suggested to the management team that traffic diverters, or speed bumps, be installed throughout the community to reduce the heavy vehicular traffic and, after consideration, the team approved this suggestion on March 22, 1989.

Officers Q. and N. then contacted the public works division of the city's department of transportation and arranged for the issuance of a work order. The public works supervisor initially seemed reluctant to install the speed bumps but was convinced with the help of the mayor's office. As a result, the work was completed within 2 weeks.

In January 1989, the officers addressed the parking problem at College Hill. Cars were parked on the grass and against traffic and were driven on sidewalks and lawns; others were disabled or abandoned and served as drug caches for local dealers. The officers suspected that many of the vehicles were owned by nonresidents who may have gone to the complex to buy drugs. In an effort to limit parking to residents and their guests, Officers N. and P. implemented a parking decal program.

Each person who could show legal residence in College Hill and could produce identification and a valid Florida vehicle registration was given a decal for his or her vehicle. A housing authority employee installed the decals on each vehicle's inside rear windshield. Each apartment was entitled to two decals.

Nonresidents were entitled to a renewable 3-day visitor's permit once they disclosed names and addresses of residents being visited and provided vehicle information. Four-hour visitor parking was also available.

Following installation, parking decals and visitor's permits remained the property of THA. If a decal or permit was lost or stolen, the owner was required to file a report, or if a registered vehicle was sold, to remove the decal. Any person found in possession of a missing or stolen decal was to be prosecuted under Florida theft statutes. Additionally, vehicles found parked without proper decals or permits, or found parked in a visitor's space for more than 4 hours, were subject to impoundment by the city at the owner's expense.

The next step in implementing the parking program was to improve the parking facilities and designate the parking areas. The signs and markings division of the department of transportation was contacted by Officer P. to assist the College Hill officers in painting stripes to designate the various parking categories within the parking area. City workers also installed "Handicapped Only" and "No Parking" signs. Officer N. also arranged for each space to be labeled either "Permit Only" or "Visitors Only."

Fliers informing residents of the new parking regulations were distributed to each apartment and were posted at the management office. No resident complaints or grievances were received. After the program went into effect in mid-April, approximately 150 resident decals were issued. Because there were 650 rented apartments, it appeared that most of the complex tenants did not own cars.

Shortly after the parking program was implemented, College Hill patrol officers scheduled a neighborhood cleanup day. The event, planned and coordinated by Officers P. and N., was intended to boost community involvement, enhance resident self-esteem and cooperation, and improve the physical appearance of the complex. The cleanup was held April 29, 1989.

Officers P. and N. contacted numerous organizations, both public and private, to solicit donations and participation in the cleanup. Several local businesses agreed to donate food and beverages. Others donated such items as records, radios, and sports equipment that were given away as prizes. The executive director of THA and the manager of College Hill, who provided rakes, brooms, shovels, hedge trimmers, and a tractor and assisted officers in the selection of cleanup areas, both volunteered to participate. WTMP, a local radio station, provided a mobile disk jockey who played music throughout the day's activities and gave away donated prizes. The event received favorable coverage from local press and radio stations, but more importantly, judging from the high turnout, the residents appeared to enjoy the event.

Several areas in the complex were targeted for cleanup. The playground and basketball courts were cleared to improve recreational opportunities for youth in the complex. The nursery building and most common areas were cleaned, and litter in the large vacant field adjacent to the complex was picked up and the field secured.

The vacant field was the subject of a subsequent College Hill team project. Following the neighborhood cleanup, Officer Q. contacted representatives of the housing authority and arranged for THA maintenance staff to mow the field. Officer Q. next obtained used telephone poles from the electric company. He borrowed a garage wrecker and a generator from the city to place the poles, which were arranged to divide the property into two sections. The first section was for additional resident parking, and the second served as a recreational area. The patrol officers also solicited contributions from local businesses to purchase and install a set of football goal posts and a baseball backboard.

Assessment. After 1 year, patrol officers reported significant accomplishments at College Hill. While drug dealing continued, it was less visible than in the past. The vice unit also continued to conduct undercover operations in the complex.

The street light project was successful. Ninety-four percent of residents questioned in a followup survey reported being either "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with the brighter lights and the frequency of replacement for inoperative lights. The remaining 6 percent who

reported being "unhappy" complained that the lights were too bright, and they had difficulty sleeping. At this reporting, only a few street lights had become inoperable, and, in each case, it was the direct result of someone's shooting out the lights, which were replaced immediately.

Traffic in the complex slowed dramatically with the introduction of traffic diverters. Speed reduction made the area safer for residents, particularly children, and allowed officers to record license plate numbers of frequent visitors. By checking plate numbers, they could verify whether the drivers were local residents and whether they had criminal records. Such information might be useful for future operations in the complex. Officers reported that the height of the speed bumps deterred some visitors from entering the complex. Results from the followup survey indicated that 87 percent of the tenants were satisfied with the diverters.

The parking strategy was also favorably received, although problems developed. While 99 percent of residents surveyed believed the program was a good idea, 39 percent indicated a need for improvement. Tenants suggested that police be more vigorous in their parking enforcement, and others requested that the 3-day period for visitor's permits be lengthened. Nevertheless, the system was helpful to police in distinguishing between resident and nonresident vehicles and in ridding the neighborhood of abandoned cars. The patrol officers addressed specific complaints of residents.

Perhaps the most successful police department action was the neighborhood cleanup, which officers described as the turning point in their relationship with tenants. Following the cleanup, neighborhood children began following patrol officers through the complex, offering encouragement, and seemingly looking upon them as a positive force in the community. Residents became more willing to approach officers to relay information about criminal activity. When drug dealers were arrested, witnesses applauded police instead of berating them, which had occurred in the past. The atmosphere changed from one of distrust to one of increased cooperation, and police believed a community spirit was developing among the residents.

Although not all the project's goals were met, great strides occurred. Officers described their relationship with residents as much improved, but said that

organized community support had not yet developed. Tenants were working more diligently to halt the influx of drugs into their community, and they were increasingly willing to inform police of illegal activities they witnessed. Residents, always aware of the problems of the drug trade, were more knowledgeable about how they could fight it. Fear remained a serious impediment to change, but better lighting, heightened police presence, and a reduction in blatant street dealing had a positive effect. Residents were less reluctant to leave their homes at night and tended to avoid only the few remaining problem areas. Violence, while still high relative to most parts of the city, was greatly reduced. The journey toward the goal of ridding College Hill of drugs and drug dealers had begun.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, CASE STUDIES

Ridding Public Housing of Organized Drug Gangs

Scanning. John Hope Homes and University Homes are two large Atlanta public housing complexes adjacent to one another and to the Clark-Atlanta University Center that essentially comprise one community of more than 1,200 units and housed about 2,100 residents. In the spring of 1988, the Atlanta Police Department, the Atlanta Housing Authority, and the residents identified the community as a problem site for drug trafficking, as street gangs were selling drugs in and around the housing units.

In the latter part of 1987 and early 1988, the community experienced a sudden surge in crime. According to patrol officers assigned to the area, the greatest increases were attributable to drug trafficking, specifically sales of crack cocaine. Drug-related violence also increased, including reports of gunfire.

Police believed that most of these incidents resulted from turf battles between rival drug gangs. While shootings had usually ceased by the time police arrived, spent shell casings collected by officers at the scene indicated that semiautomatic and automatic weapons were being used. Questioning of residents and suspects helped police identify three groups involved—locals operating independently, locals operating as a gang known as the Terry White Boys, and a third group known as the Miami Boys.

The Miami Boys were quickly identified as the most dangerous of the three groups because, unlike neighborhood-based gangs, the Miami Boys' operation appeared similar to that of organized crime. They ran a citywide criminal enterprise composed of several different factions, which operated essentially independent of one another but were loosely linked and known to cooperate on occasion. Seven factions of the gang were identified as operating in the Atlanta area.

Intelligence data provided by Atlanta narcotics officers revealed that each faction was organized in a hierarchical, military fashion. A captain served as the liaison between each faction and the supply source, which was presumed to be in south Florida. Two lieutenants were responsible for the distribution of drugs and collection of monies. Each lieutenant controlled two sergeants, who in turn controlled street workers who fell into one of four categories—lookouts, couriers, enforcers, or dealers. Length of time in the organization appeared to determine member assignments. Members were recruited from neighborhoods in southern Florida and relocated to Atlanta.

The Miami Boys were considered particularly violent—weapons of choice were the Ingram MAC 11 machine pistol and the Intratec automatic rifle. Within a short time, they had come to dominate the drug market at John Hope and University Homes. Their success was achieved by intimidation of competitive drug dealers, including murder if necessary. Murders were usually carried out by members of one of the factions not operating out of the John Hope and University Homes complexes. Because the shooters did not originate from the neighborhood, they were almost impossible to identify.

Analysis. Officer T., assigned to the neighborhood evening watch, began gathering information on the Miami Boys. He talked with area residents; questioned arrestees and suspected dealers; and conducted surveillance by hiding in bushes, trees, or vacant apartments and videotaping his suspects. Officer T. discovered that the gang openly displayed firearms (including machine guns) to intimidate residents and other rival narcotics dealers while they conducted sales of crack cocaine, which occurred virtually 24 hours a day in 12-hour shifts. Gang members gained access to apartments to sell and stash their wares through several methods—by supplying users living in the buildings with cocaine, through romantic liaisons with tenants, and by force. Higher level gang members even paid residents to let the group store large amounts of cocaine in their apartments.

Because the gang was a tightly knit group, it was difficult to gather information about its inner workings, particularly with regard to higher ranking members. In addition, the gang appeared to control area residents, who became visibly nervous when officers approached them. Residents were threatened and often too frightened to even come out of their apartments because they feared gang retaliation. As a result, they rarely provided any information about the gang.

Response. In April 1988, in response to increased street-level drug dealing and associated violence, the Atlanta commissioner of public safety established a new street-level strike force, the Red Dog Squad. Officer T. was assigned to the squad, where he continued to work on the Miami Boys' case. Based on his analysis of the gang's operations, he devised a two-part plan to break them up. The first part of his plan called for gathering information. Officer T. and the Red Dog Squad wanted to determine who was controlling the Miami Boys' operation at the complex. Because they hoped this information could be secured from the gang's underlings and from those residents whose apartments the gang used, they decided to make strategic arrests of gang members and collaborating tenants. The plan's second phase involved seizing control of the community from the drug dealers through numerous arrests. By disrupting the drug dealing and ridding the complex of some of the dealers, he hoped to send a message to the gang that they did not own the community. Even more importantly, visible police presence in the area would show residents that the Miami Boys were not as fearsome as they appeared.

Officer T. and his partner, Officer A., conducted military-type reconnaissance missions in the community. At times they would lie in the bushes for hours, waiting for an opportunity to move into an abandoned apartment to conduct direct surveillance of the group. When it rained, they would take advantage of the weather to move undetected around the area and position themselves to observe the dealer's operation and literally "appear from nowhere" to make surprise arrests of group members. These tactics accounted for some attrition among group members and psychologically demoralized gang members because they were unaccustomed to losing members through arrest.

Arrests and seizures also resulted from undercover buys, informant buys, and search warrants. Most of the low-level dealers arrested could not make bail and

consequently remained off the street. Others returned to Florida as part of a plea agreement. Officer T.'s tactics were depleting the Miami Boys' Florida-born labor pool.

In October 1988, a male known initially as "Gap" and later identified as G.P. was arrested for narcotics violations. Originally thought to be a low-level dealer, interrogations of Miami Boys and local suspects revealed that G.P. was in fact the leader of the Miami Boys faction at John Hope and University Homes and had been acting as a seller only because of the arrests of his street workers. Officer T. also learned through a Florida records check that G.P. had been released from prison only recently.

The apartment in John Hope Homes in which G.P. stored his crack cocaine shipments was identified through surveillance and intelligence information. G.P. paid the resident \$75 per day for use of the apartment. After a search warrant was issued, police seized a large amount of money and more than 2 ounces of narcotics. Faced with a long jail sentence, the tenant provided information that not only confirmed that G.P. was an upper-level member of the Miami Boys, but also enabled prosecutors to obtain a grand jury indictment against him for trafficking in cocaine.

Out on bond, G.P. and the few persons left in his operation moved their business from John Hope Homes into two other apartment complexes in north-west Atlanta. However, G.P. was followed by police and later arrested on the indictment warrant while he was transporting 15 bags of crack cocaine.

Assessment. Due to successful enforcement activities, the Miami Boys gang in John Hope and University Homes was completely shut down. Residents, housing authority staff, and police officers noted a subsequent decline in street-level drug dealing at the complex.

Resident fear was also substantially reduced. Tenants began to walk through the complex at night and children began to play in the playgrounds during the day, unheard of occurrences when the Miami Boys were in charge.

During the latter part of the Miami Boys' crackdown, residents began to demonstrate visible support for the police. For example, during police raids, residents

came outside and praised the officers and offered words of encouragement. They also began providing information about the drug situation in their area, which surfaced initially in the form of whispers and confidential telephone calls. Eventually, as trust grew, residents began to openly volunteer information and gave their names freely.

Partially because area residents began to understand their role in ridding the area of drug dealers, no other Miami Boys factions or other organized drug gangs were able to establish a foothold. Detective T. and his partner, Detective P., continued to monitor the situation at the complex.

Lighting, Clotheslines, Cops, and Crack Dealers

Scanning. John Hope Homes and University Homes, two densely populated Atlanta public housing complexes, were hot spots for crack cocaine dealing. The two-story brick buildings, some in rows and others forming a square around an interior courtyard, created large areas of interior space that were inaccessible by car and unobservable by police. Such areas constituted prime locations for the drug dealing that proliferated in and around these two complexes.

Analysis. Several factors made it difficult for police officers to apprehend the dealers. Lookouts along the sidewalks and the stairways leading into the courtyards and spaces between the buildings alerted the dealers when police were coming, giving them enough lead time to disappear between buildings, around corners, and into apartments before police could make arrests. Dealers often shot out street lights in and around the spots where they conducted business to prevent police observation of their activities. In addition, clotheslines were improperly strung at neck and shin height to trip pursuing officers.

Police and housing authority officials met to discuss strategies to combat drug dealing in the area. The lighting problem was raised, and Mr. R.P., security director for the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA), informed the group that lighting fell primarily under the purview of the Georgia Power Authority. Ms. C.D., property manager for the community, was responsible for reporting inoperative lights to the power authority, which was then responsible for repairs. Mr. P. said

that Georgia Power had always replaced damaged light fixtures within a few days of receiving notification.

Police and housing authority officials agreed to cooperate in determining which lights were inoperative and having them quickly replaced. Dr. A.P., director of planning and evaluation in the public safety department, was present at the meeting and agreed to contact representatives of the power authority to ensure their continued cooperation.

Response. In March 1988, Police Officers D. and T., the two morning watch officers assigned to the area, conducted a survey of the lights with the help of the housing authority staff. They reported the information to Ms. D., who reported it to Georgia Power. There was some initial delay in replacing the lights because Georgia Power requested that the officers provide pole numbers. During a second survey, the officers discovered that many of the numbers had been removed. When Georgia Power was informed of this situation, it assisted AHA in identifying the poles, then replaced the lights.

Dr. P. spoke with Mr. D., vice president for corporate affairs for Georgia Power, and discussed the police department's efforts to combat drugs at John Hope and University Homes. Mr. D. assured her that Georgia Power was supportive and would cooperate fully with police, and he offered to intervene if any problems were encountered in having the lights replaced. That offer was relayed to the housing authority staff, who reported no problems.

In July 1988, Officers D. and T. conducted another survey of the lights, relaying the information through Ms. D. to Georgia Power, which quickly replaced the inoperative lights. Police supervisors were satisfied that this system was workable, and they intended to continue with it.

Although replacement efforts were successful, officers found that many of the repaired lights were quickly shot out. While the problem had not yet been resolved at the time of this report, officers hoped that if they continued working with the housing authority to regularly survey the lighting situation and to replace damaged fixtures, the vandals would grow discouraged and cease damaging the fixtures.

As for the clotheslines problem, officers discovered that neither complex was equipped with dryers. Clotheslines were required to be strung parallel to the

buildings at a height that allowed average-sized adults to pass beneath them. To disrupt police chases, some tenants or drug dealers restrung the clotheslines at neck height or at shin level to increase the officers' likelihood of tripping.

When brought to the attention of AHA, representatives stated that maintenance staff were responsible for the clotheslines. Lt. R., daywatch supervisor for the area, arranged for Officers H. and P. to survey the clotheslines in the complex with the help of maintenance staff. Improperly strung lines were subsequently either removed or restrung. The police department and AHA informally agreed that maintenance staff would be assigned to check for improperly strung clotheslines.

Assessment. The system appeared to be working, since officers no longer complained about problems with the clotheslines.

Cleaning Up Public Housing

Scanning. John Hope Homes and University Homes, both public housing communities in Atlanta, were situated across the street from one another. The two projects were densely populated and hosted a large amount of pedestrian and vehicular traffic. According to patrolling officers from the Atlanta Police Department, the area was poorly maintained, with an unusually large amount of garbage.

Analysis. Litter presented a problem for several reasons. Not only was it unsightly, but it included broken glass, discarded hypodermic needles, and broken objects with sharp edges—all constituting a health and safety hazard. In addition, children were unable to use the playgrounds safely. Drug dealers also used the garbage as camouflage, hiding their drugs in brown paper bags among the debris.

Although cleanup was required, police and housing authority officials believed the litter indicated a larger problem because workers had cleaned up litter in the past, only to have it quickly reappear. The larger problem was the tenants' lack of pride, and until they began to care about maintaining their community, efforts to improve its appearance would remain temporary. Consequently, police and housing officials decided to involve residents in efforts to clean up the area.

Response. Lt. R., the dayshift supervisor for the police zone, and Ms. D., the housing authority property manager, decided to host a neighborhood cleanup day. This idea had been discussed previously at tenant association meetings and interagency council meetings, but no definite plans had been formulated. Lt. R. and Ms. D. set the date for the cleanup for May 20, 1989, beginning at 9 a.m.

The plan called for participants to spend about 4 hours collecting garbage and making small improvements to the area's appearance prior to a community cookout. Ms. M., tenant association president, supported this plan and agreed to help organize the cleanup activities and solicit donations for food. The plan was announced at the interagency council meeting on April 26, 1989, and attending agencies relayed the message to their staffs. The parks and recreation department offered to bring a tent and sound system; maintenance staff would provide tools and garbage bags for the volunteers; and the police bureau would provide security. The public works department agreed to supply a sanitation truck to haul away the collected trash. The parks, recreation, and cultural affairs department would assist in cleaning the playgrounds and repairing damaged equipment.

Planning and coordination continued through the first 3 weeks of May, with Ms. D. and Lt. R. communicating regularly. Ms. M. mailed written invitations to the two mayoral candidates, the area's city council representatives, and the State representatives and senator from the district. She also established a committee of tenants to collect donations of food and drink. Ms. H., director of public affairs for the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA), arranged for media coverage. Lt. R. and Ms. D. distributed fliers to tenants in both complexes. In addition, six police officers were recruited to provide security on that day.

On the morning of May 20, several tenants and their children gathered at the designated area where maintenance staff would distribute supplies and tools. Suddenly, a black cloud appeared and a heavy rain began to pour. Most adults soon became discouraged by the rain and left, but the children stayed. When the rain eased up, the officers and the remaining adults accompanied the children to various areas in the complex and began to collect trash.

About 20 trash bags were filled, significantly improving the appearance of parts of the complex. After about an hour and a half, the children began to tire,

and the participants enjoyed a lunch of hamburgers and hot dogs. Neither the public officials nor the media had appeared, presumably because of the rain. The playground repair staff did not appear, and the housing authority canceled the sanitation truck because the small amount of trash collected did not require an entire truck. However, the parks and recreation staff did set up their tent and sound system after the rain had stopped.

Assessment. Although participants were disappointed by the weather after all the work put into planning, organizing, and conducting the cleanup, the day was successful in that the appearance of much of the complex was improved by the pickup of trash. Moreover, the cooperation among police, the housing authority, and participating tenants set the groundwork for future interactions.

After the day's activities were reported to the inter-agency council at its May meeting, the council chair and the tenant association president discussed the possible scheduling of another cleanup day in the near future.

Abandoned Cars

Scanning. The target area for Atlanta's problem-oriented policing project included two adjacent public housing developments, the Atlanta University complex, a few small businesses, and several residential properties. One problem identified by project team members was the large number of abandoned cars on local streets and in the area's parking lots.

The patrol officers who worked with Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA) staff identified the abandoned cars as a persistent problem. In fact, a computer check revealed that, with the exception of drug activity, abandoned cars generated more calls for service than anything else. The cars created a problem for several reasons. They were an eyesore, and became more so the longer they sat and decayed; they were a danger to children, who tended to play around them; they were breeding grounds for rodents and other pests; and they served as shelters and hiding places for vagrants and drug addicts and as a convenient place to stash illegal drugs and weapons.

Analysis. Two patrol officers working on the abandoned cars problem faced two obstacles to the cars'

speedy removal. First, while ticketing and removing vehicles parked on city streets presented no problem, ticketing on housing authority property might create legal difficulties. Streets and parking lots within the community were owned by AHA, with police having only limited jurisdiction. Any effort to address the problem would have consequently required a coordinated effort between the police department and the housing authority. The second obstacle to speedy removal was that adequate warning had to be given to the car owners prior to removal because some of the cars might have been stolen rather than abandoned, thus requiring a license check. Working with housing authority representatives, the officers set out to create a system that would speed up removal of these cars.

Response. In January 1989, an aggressive campaign to deal with abandoned cars was initiated. Routine checks of the streets and lots within the housing community were conducted by housing authority staff. If a car was observed to be in the same place for several days, was inoperable, or was reported to management as abandoned by a tenant, a dated tag was affixed to the vehicle. The tag instructed the owner that the car would be impounded if it was not moved within 2 to 4 days; the time period allowed for removal depended on the condition of the car. If the vehicle had not been moved after the specified time period, a private towing service was called to impound the car. A police officer also ran a license check to determine whether the car had been stolen, and if so, it was towed to the city lot.

As for streets outside the housing complex, they were routinely checked by officers on all three shifts. Using the same identification methods as housing authority staff (observation, citizen complaints, and condition of the car), officers worked to identify the abandoned vehicles in their patrol area. Upon identification, a license check was conducted, and if the car had been reported stolen, it was towed immediately. Otherwise, a dated sticker was attached to the car window giving the owner a 5-day deadline to move the vehicle before it would be impounded. If the car was not moved by then, the vehicle was towed to the city lot.

Reclaiming an impounded vehicle could be costly for the owner. As of August 1989, the charge for towing was \$45, plus a \$5 per day storage fee. Extra costs were assessed if special equipment was required to remove the car. If the car was not claimed within 30 days, it could then be sold.

Assessment. Within a short period of time, 87 abandoned cars were removed from the target area. According to patrolling officers, the area improved visually. In the 4 months following the program's inception, dispatchers reported no citizen complaint calls regarding abandoned cars. Although abandoned cars in the area were likely to be a continuing problem for police, officers and housing authority representatives continued to use the system.

Corner of Fair and Elm Streets

Scanning. The liquor store on the corner of Fair and Elm Streets posed a problem for Atlanta police officers for many years. A hangout for inebriates and vagrants, the corner was the site of repeat disturbance calls. Patrons bought liquor, consumed it outside the store, and harassed passersby. They also waved down cars to talk to friends, acquaintances, and even complete strangers, resulting in traffic-flow problems at this busy intersection. The corner crowd grew larger in the evening, and drinkers often became rowdy and noisy, and frequently started fights. In recent years, the problem had become more serious as drug dealers began conducting their business on the corner.

A row of abandoned buildings perpendicular to the liquor store created an additional problem for police. The buildings, which had deteriorated and were strewn with garbage, were an eyesore to the community and structurally unsafe. Drug dealers often hid their drug stash amid the rubble and debris, drug users used the buildings for a place to get high, and women addicts often traded sex for drugs there.

Analysis. In the past, police officers assigned to patrol the area attended to these problems as time permitted. Unfortunately, only one officer was assigned to this beat, and the corner of Fair and Elm was only a small part of the total beat area. The Fair and Elm beat, plus two other beats, comprised a sector. The three beat officers assigned to this sector, along with one "umbrella car," handled all the sector's calls. This particular sector was responsible for 40 to 50 percent of the calls for service within the general service area. The remaining calls for service were spread among 10 other beats (2 other sectors), leaving officers insufficient time to focus on the problems existing at the corner of Fair and Elm.

Whenever possible, the officers patrolled the area around the liquor store, dispersing the crowd and sometimes making arrests. However, once the officer(s) departed, the crowd generally returned.

The area surrounding Fair and Elm was densely populated. Fair Street bisected a large public housing project, University Homes. Another housing development, John Hope Homes, was a few blocks south. Together the projects contained more than 1,200 apartments, housing approximately 2,100 people. In January 1989, the Atlanta Police Department, working in conjunction with the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA), opened a miniprecinct in the University Homes complex to better address the area's increasing drug problems. The miniprecinct, staffed by one officer from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., Monday through Friday, was located in a building across the street from the liquor store at Fair and Elm. The first task assigned to the miniprecinct's Officer E. was to address the problems on that corner.

Response. Officer E. visited the corner at different times throughout the day, dispersing loiterers and, when appropriate, making arrests. Charges ranged from disorderly conduct to possession of a controlled substance. Officer E. had a perfect view of the corner from the miniprecinct's front door. When someone was drinking in front of the store, harassing passersby, or otherwise causing a disturbance, Officer E. walked over and handled the situation. He also monitored the store's liquor sales, and on one occasion arrested the owner for selling alcohol to a minor. When Officer E. was absent, other beat officers increased their visibility in the area.

Officer P. was assigned the task of resolving the problem of the abandoned buildings. He first determined who owned the abandoned properties. He found a faded notice attached to one of the buildings citing it as uninhabitable and giving the owner 30 days to bring it up to city code. The notice, dated November 30, 1988, included a telephone number of the city office that issued it. When Officer P. called to inquire about the property, he was told that a hearing on its disposition had already been held, and that the buildings were on the city's demolition list. The buildings would come down once the city renegotiated its demolition contract.

While Officer P. continued to address this problem, a deacon from the Providence Missionary Baptist

Church contacted him. The church was located in the middle of the two housing complexes, and the deacon, Mr. W., wanted to purchase the abandoned property and develop it into an attractive commercial plaza to serve area residents. Officer P. gave Mr. W. the name and address of the owner.

Assessment. Within 4 months, the situation on the corner of Fair and Elm improved. Area residents, housing authority staff, and police officers stated that the corner was cleaner than it had been in years. Although vagrants and drug dealers still frequented the area, they seldom remained for long during the afternoons and were no longer causing regular disturbances. Problems persisted somewhat at night,

but were less troublesome than before police efforts began. The police department planned to extend the ministration's office hours to include evenings. Officer E. planned to continue to monitor liquor sales, and if the owner continued to violate the law, his license would be revoked.

Positive change came relatively quickly to a corner that had long been a source of complaints. Residents and housing authority staff were pleased with the progress, and expressed their thanks to the police. The police were also pleased with the support they received from the residents and housing authority staff, and planned to continue their efforts at this location.

TULSA, OKLAHOMA, CASE STUDIES

Drug Trafficking Among Juveniles in Low-Income Public Housing

Scanning. Throughout the 1980's, North Tulsa experienced consistently higher crime rates than the rest of the city. Tulsa Police Department (TPD) statistics for the first three quarters of 1988 revealed that 48 percent of the city's crimes of violence (homicide, rape, robbery, assault, and weapons violations) occurred in the city's northern section. Drug arrests were greater there than in the southern and eastern sections.

North Tulsa had long been regarded as a depressed, low-income area, with virtually no social services or industrial activity. In 1969, the Tulsa Housing Authority (THA) was established, supporting the city's low-income public housing. During that same period, additional low-income apartment complexes, several of which were located in North Tulsa, were built by the Federal Government through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). At the time, these affordable units were considered an ideal accommodation for the needs of the poorer residents. Unfortunately, home values fell in areas near the complexes and crime rates soared, with drug trafficking becoming a problem.

In June 1988, a special management team of Tulsa police officials conducted a study of North Tulsa's drug problem and decided that to reduce the illegal drug activity, the police department should focus its efforts on five of the area's public housing complexes—Morning Star, Vernon Manor, Seminole Hills, Comanche Park, and Osage Hills—that were chosen based on their high crime rates and the blatant street dealing reported by area police officers.

Analysis. A resident survey, conducted by patrol officers in each of the public housing complexes (see *A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their Environment*), revealed that 86 percent of the occupants lived in households headed by single females.

Although 54 percent of heads-of-households had graduated from high school, only 11 percent worked full time. More than half of the residents were living below the poverty line, and roughly 90 percent received some form of government assistance in addition to subsidized housing. When asked what they considered to be the biggest problem in the complexes, 60 percent responded "drugs."

Police officials also collected drug-related data from various city agencies, as well as drug arrest information from police records that revealed a sevenfold increase in male juvenile arrests for drug violations between 1978 and 1988. Officers working in North Tulsa confirmed these figures, noting their observations of an increasing number of juveniles involved in criminal activity, especially drug trafficking. In 1978, blacks, who accounted for 11.6 percent of the city's population, represented approximately 15 percent of Tulsa's drug violators. By 1988, that figure had climbed to 43 percent.

Officers assigned to the target area noticed large groups of school-age youth in the housing complexes who appeared to be selling drugs during school hours. These observations led police to compare the dropout and suspension rate in North Tulsa schools to those in other areas of the city. The city's northernmost high school, McClain, serving most of the high school-age youth in the five complexes, had the highest suspension (4.4 percent) and dropout rates (10 percent) of any school in the city. McClain also reported the highest number of pregnant teenagers in the school system.

The officers suspected that few of the juveniles observed in the complexes had legitimate jobs. It seemed that most of them came from underprivileged backgrounds and appeared to be attracted to drug dealing by the easy money, as well as the material possessions the money could buy. "Why should I work for minimum wage at McDonald's," asked one youth interviewed on a local television program, "when I can make \$400 to \$1,400 a day selling dope?"

In October 1988, the TPD requested 10 volunteer officers to address the underlying conditions that spawned drug trafficking in the 5 target complexes. The officers were told to investigate the drug problem using the problem-oriented policing approach (see Part I of this volume for detailed discussion of the approach). They were supplied with data compiled in the drug-problem inventory and advised to use their own observations to help accomplish their assigned tasks.

Supervisors at Uniform Division North arranged volunteers into two-officer foot teams assigned to the complexes on 8-hour tours. The teams were expected to visit and establish a rapport with residents to assure them that police were present to ensure their safety.

Within a month, officers verified juvenile involvement in drug trafficking. As officers approached drug hangouts within the complexes, young lookouts (aged 12 to 16) would call out, "Rollers!" to alert the dealers to discard their drugs and disperse. On those occasions when officers surprised the dealers, a foot chase usually ensued and frequently resulted in an arrest. However, when arrests were made, the youth often reappeared in the complex the next day.

The officers found that the Oklahoma State juvenile system presented a problem for them when dealing with youth engaged in drug trafficking. The State legislature had forbidden the institutionalization of juveniles except in the most serious cases, and as a result, three State incarceration facilities were closed. The Lloyd E. Rader Diagnostic Center in Sand Springs housed only the most serious juvenile offenders. The facility held only 25 youth, with the remaining offenders put on probation and returned to their parents. Even drug trafficking resulted in only 1 or 2 days in a youth detention center. Because they frequently rearrested many of the same juveniles, police believed that the lack of incarceration facilities and the obstacles to incarceration minimized the effect of deterrence on juvenile offenders.

The five target housing complexes were located within a 2-mile radius of one another, and each had a high concentration of young people. Only one city park and one recreation facility were available in the area, and the few programs offered by the recreation facility were poorly attended. The foot patrol officers believed that the paucity of recreational activities contributed to youth involvement in drug trafficking.

Therefore, they developed a strategy to provide programs to deter youth from selling or using drugs.

Response. Officers S. and N., assigned to the foot patrol at the Morning Star Apartments, believed that the youth needed programs that would improve their self-esteem, teach them values, and impart decision-making skills. Eighty-six percent of the boys came from homes without fathers. To provide positive role models for the young men, the officers started a Boy Scout troop in the complex for boys between 11 and 17 years of age. Officer N., a qualified Boy Scout leader, and Officer S. began meeting with the boys on Saturdays in a vacant apartment provided by Morning Star's management.

Officers J. and E. also organized a Boy Scout troop in Comanche Park. In addition, they started a group called SHARE (Stand, Help, and Rid Evil), which worked to raise money for needy residents and police-sponsored youth activities. As a SHARE representative, Officer J. spoke at civic group meetings and local churches throughout the city to solicit donations and increase awareness of the needs of young people on the city's north side. Those receiving help from SHARE agreed to participate in programs geared to improving life and job skills. Volunteers came from the churches and the civic groups where Officer J. spoke.

Officers B. and F., foot patrol officers at Vernon Manor, developed plans for unemployed young people. Officer B. organized one such group called "The Young Ladies Awareness Group" that hosted weekly guest speakers invited to come and teach different job-related skills. Programs instructed young women in how to dress for job interviews and employment, with role-playing officers demonstrating proper conduct during interviews. The women were also instructed in resume writing and makeup, hair care, and personal hygiene. The program included several of the other housing complexes to reach as many women as possible.

Officer F. worked with a government program called the Private Industry Training Council (PITC) that sponsored sessions on goal setting and self-esteem building to prepare young people to enter job training programs, also offered by PITC. Officer F. helped area youth apply for birth certificates, which were required to enter the PITC program, and he arranged for volunteers from the Oklahoma Highway Patrol and a local school to help teach driver's education.

Officers even provided funds for some young people who were unable to pay the fees to obtain birth certificates or driver's licenses.

Officers F. and B. also tried to explain the value of an education and persuade youth in their complex to return to school. Unfortunately, too often parents appeared unconcerned when their children were missing classes.

The foot patrol officers became involved in a day camp project conducted at the "Ranch," a 20-acre north side property confiscated by police from a convicted drug dealer. The project, jointly developed by the police department, the school system, and the urban 4-H Club, used the property as a day camp for disadvantaged youth recruited from the target projects. Tulsa's mayor and chief of police came to the Ranch to meet with the youth, as did psychologists, teachers, ministers, and celebrities, including sports celebrities. Guests tried to convey the value of productive and drug-free lives, among other ethical values.

Officer M. initiated an agricultural project, giving 10 youth from the complexes, aged 11 to 16, individual garden plots in which to plant, cultivate, and harvest vegetables. Three times weekly, Officer M. and community volunteers met with the youth to listen, encourage, and provide a positive influence. The highlight of the program was an overnight campout at the Ranch in the summer of 1989.

Officers in the target area handed out fliers about the mayor's summer jobs program and PITC's job fair. The officers wanted to learn more about alternative school programs available in the city, such as the Student Training and Reentry (STAR) program and Job Corps, and invited program representatives to attend their squad meetings. Officers encouraged youth to enter these programs, to finish their education, and to learn job skills.

Master Patrol Officer M., the leader of the Police Explorer Scouts, planned for the Explorers to start the first U.S. Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) Program ever offered to youth in public housing. Sergeant M., head of the DARE Program in Tulsa, assisted with this project.

Uniform Division North also planned to develop a course of action to work with McClain High School to combat its dropout and suspension problems. A

program called "Adopt a School" would involve police officers patrolling the schools during classes in its later phases—not to make arrests, but to establish rapport with the students. The program was intended to improve student perceptions of the police and reduce the likelihood of student involvement in illegal activities.

Major R., a member of the police department, met with the editor of the *Oklahoma Eagle* in late May 1989 to discuss the needs of young people living in North Tulsa. Plans included getting the city's north side business owners to unite for the cause of youth to help deter them from drug involvement. Major R. also secured funding to send 60 young people from the Morning Star Apartments to a summer day camp at the north side Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA).

Assessment. The police noted a decline in street sales of illegal drugs in the five target complexes. Youth reacted positively to the officers' efforts to help them, and the programs seemed to deter them from drug involvement. The police department continued to address the problems of poor youth in North Tulsa. Foot patrol officers met with the Task Force for Drug Free Public Housing to inform the different city, county, and statewide officials of the needs of youth in public housing. Other social service agencies began working with the police department, establishing satellite offices on the north side of the city, scheduling programs, and requesting police support in their efforts.

Drug Dealing in the Seminole Hills Public Housing Complex

Scanning. The Tulsa Housing Authority (THA) was established in 1969 to provide low-cost, government-subsidized housing in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The Seminole Hills Apartments, built in 1969, was the first of 20 THA housing complexes constructed in Tulsa. Seminole Hills I and the Seminole Hills II Annex, two blocks away, contained approximately 145 units, mostly garden apartments.

Since the mid-1980's, reported crime within the complex increased significantly. Police statistics for the first three quarters of 1988 revealed that 48 percent of all violent crimes (homicide, rape, robbery,

assault, weapons violations, disorderly conduct, and miscellaneous threats) reported in Tulsa occurred in the northern section of the city. In that same year, the complex had the highest crime rate of all subsidized housing in the area, making it one of the city's most crime-ridden areas. In the first 10 months of 1988, the following crimes were reported at Seminole Hills Apartments: 3 homicides, 35 felony assaults, 18 robberies, 32 burglaries, 43 drug violations, 114 auto thefts, 5 misdemeanor assaults, and 15 larcenies.

Until the mid- to late 1980's, occupancy at Seminole Hills had averaged nearly 100 percent. By 1988 the occupancy rate fell to 65 percent.

The management at Seminole Hills and the Tulsa Police Department (TPD) believed that the complex's high crime rate was related to an increase in drug trafficking. Consequently, in October 1988, the TPD assigned two uniformed police officers to a foot patrol in the complex. Officers C. and V. volunteered for the assignment under the supervision of Corporal L.

Previous efforts to combat crime in and around Seminole Hills had been unsuccessful. When officers had made arrests, crowds had gathered, shouting at and antagonizing the officers, sometimes throwing rocks and bottles and occasionally damaging police vehicles. Foot patrol officers were assigned to a neighboring complex in 1987, but the assignment was discontinued after 3 months due to concerns for the officers' safety.

Analysis. The foot patrol's first task was to better understand the drug problem in Seminole Hills. Officers C. and V. knew that undercover narcotics officers and informers could easily buy drugs in the complex. Visible signs of the drug trade were everywhere. For example, groups of loiterers in the area ran at the sight of uniformed police officers and discarded small packages of drugs, usually crack cocaine, as they ran. The officers' task was to uncover why drug trafficking had become so prevalent at Seminole and determine how to reduce the problem.

The officers conducted a resident survey and learned that while only 19 percent of the tenants owned their own vehicles, a constant flow of traffic was present at the complex and the parking lots were usually full. Sixty-one percent of the tenants believed that the drug dealers were not residents but used the complex to conduct business. A computer analysis of arrest records confirmed these suspicions—70 percent of

those arrested at Seminole did not reside there. The dealers were using vacant units, apartments of friends, and streets in the complex to sell drugs.

The officers further noted that the pay phones located in the courtyards of Seminole II usually had crowds waiting to make or receive calls. Undercover surveillance confirmed officers' suspicions that many of these people were using the phones to buy and sell drugs.

Officers C. and V. were convinced that many residents were afraid to use the pay phones, especially to report on drug deals they had observed. They were also afraid to walk about the complex freely, particularly at night. Most importantly, they were afraid to cooperate with police.

The officers set a long-term goal of eliminating drug trafficking at Seminole Hills. To do this, they needed to identify both resident and nonresident dealers and the tenants who assisted the dealers by allowing them to use their apartments. They also needed to devise a means to permanently remove these persons from the complex. Both steps required cooperation from the manager and the tenants.

Response. The officers met with the Seminole Tenant Association and informed them of their plans. Although the tenants seemed reluctant to help, their willingness increased when they learned the officers would be a permanent addition to the complex. Residents became more active in identifying dealers and, within a few months, they frequently reported illegal drug activity.

The two officers assigned to Seminole Hills were in the complex daily, speaking with tenants and soliciting their help, and arresting violators when necessary. They knocked on doors and helped tenants with personal problems by referring them to social service agencies, medical care units, and job training facilities. Eventually, residents would identify apartments where drugs were being sold.

Seminole Hills management provided a vacant apartment for officer drug-surveillance activities. Information gathered was delivered to narcotics unit investigators, who assisted in obtaining and serving warrants.

Management worked with Officers C. and V. to evict people arrested on drug charges. If just one family

member or a guest was involved in drug dealing, the entire family was evicted. The officers believed this policy would send a strong signal to people who were aware of family members selling drugs. To enhance the likelihood of evictions being upheld by the courts, the officers received courtroom-testimony training by the city prosecutor.

The officers also received training from the Tulsa Regional Automated Computer Information System (TRACIS) on how to collect data, which also helped them collect information on drug suspects. Using TRACIS, officers could quickly check for criminal histories or outstanding warrants and also crosscheck for known aliases of people involved in the drug trade at Seminole Hills.

Additionally, Officers C. and V. were trained to use the Scott Reagent Modified G Test to field test seized drugs, specifically crack cocaine. The test had to be performed before a suspect's preliminary hearing; however, the department's drug lab was frequently too backlogged to perform the test for each drug arrest. Field officers speeded up the process of obtaining a criminal indictment and relieved some of the pressure on the department's drug lab by performing these tests themselves.

Through an agreement between THA and the phone company, the officers had the pay phones removed from the Seminole Hills II annex to eliminate their use by crowds gathered to sell drugs. Officers requested management to post "No Trespassing" signs on the premises. Once the signs were in place, the foot patrol officers and other district officers could write citations to people who appeared to have no relationship with the residents but had come possibly only to sell or buy drugs. The management again cooperated with the police by accompanying officers to court to testify against trespassers.

Dealers quickly determined the officers' shift schedule and refrained from dealing when the officers were on patrol. Drug activity slowed down before the 2:30 p.m. shift began and resumed when the officers went off duty at 10:30 p.m. Officers C. and V. asked for permission to vary their hours so they could keep the dealers offguard.

During their first 30 weeks in the complex, the officers made 178 arrests, 95 for misdemeanors and 83 for felonies (75 percent of which were for drug violations). In addition, they served 70 search warrants; assisted

in 30 evictions; and issued 89 tickets for loitering, trespassing, and interfering with police operations. Along with increased enforcement, Officers C. and V. helped plan three parties for children in the complex. At Christmas, 65 children were given toys; on Valentine's Day, the officers helped bring in a church group to speak with Seminole's young people; and for Easter, they helped organize an egg hunt.

Assessment. The officers believed that residents' fear was alleviated. For example, when the foot patrol project began, residents were reluctant to talk openly with police for fear that the dealers would retaliate. Officers C. and V. reported that people now approached them not only to visit, but to report any new drug activity.

The district officers who patrolled the Seminole Hills area reported that drug activity had markedly decreased. The street crimes unit noted that informants sent in to buy drugs now returned empty-handed. One officer remarked that the apartments seemed like a "dust bowl" because there was so little drug activity. A computer analysis conducted in May 1989 that compared violent crime activity in the first 6 months of the city's foot patrol with activity during the prior 6 months confirmed a 73-percent decrease in reported violent crime at Seminole Hills.

Though most of the area supervisors expected the activity to resume, Seminole remained quiet. The occupancy rate, which dropped considerably in the first months of the project due to evictions, was up to 90 percent by July 1989. The district officers, the street crimes unit, the foot patrol officers, and the management had made a concerted effort to eliminate drugs and crimes of violence at the Seminole Hills Apartments. As a result, the complex went from having the highest to the lowest crime rate of all area housing complexes.

Normandy Apartments: A Strategy for Deterring Drug Trafficking

Scanning. The Normandy Apartments were located 5 miles east and 4 miles south of the central business district in Tulsa, Oklahoma. They were garden apartments that had been privately developed in 1968 using a below-market interest rate loan. The Tulsa Department of Housing and Urban Development had

control over Normandy Apartments and set the rental rates for the 212 units.

The complex was located amid mostly middle-income homes and low- to middle-income apartments. Interstate Highway 44 was adjacent to the apartments on the east and several large and small businesses bordered the complex along the service road. Two major shopping centers were located within five blocks of the apartments.

The apartments, upon first glance, appeared to police to be in relatively good repair, and the manager reported occupancy at 90 percent. However, the condition of the complex had actually deteriorated—the playground was empty, completely bereft of swings and other recreational equipment; the basketball hoops sported no nets; the grounds were littered with trash and broken glass; disabled vehicles filled the parking spaces in front of the buildings; and the brick planters flanking each apartment doorway were empty, even in the spring and summer.

Tulsa police officers from the Ida squad of Uniform Division Southwest were familiar with Normandy because they responded daily to its numerous calls for service. Police had long considered the apartments a haven for local criminals—during chases, suspects frequently fled into the apartments to escape police. Officers rarely patrolled inside the complex, generally entering it only in response to specific calls for service.

In late 1988, due to successful efforts to shut down drug trafficking in low-income North Tulsa apartment complexes, police anticipated the displacement of drug dealers into housing complexes in the city's southern section. Officer S. was familiar with the problems at Normandy and aware of the increased police enforcement in public housing on the city's north side. He suspected that the Normandy apartments would experience an influx of drug dealers and other criminals moving south to evade the north side crackdown. Officer S. hoped to prevent this eventuality.

Officer S. had recently learned about problem-oriented policing (see Part I of this volume) and wanted to try this approach at Normandy. He explained his idea to his supervisors, both of whom shared his apprehension that drug dealing might be displaced southward. They granted Officer S. permission to use a problem-oriented approach at

Normandy, and he began patrolling the apartments on foot in January 1989.

Analysis. With assistance from one of his supervisors, Officer S. designed an instrument to survey residents in the complex. He and two other officers surveyed door-to-door and received responses from 70 of the 192 occupied apartments. While conducting the tenant survey, the officers explained their intention to build a strong and secure environment at Normandy.

The survey revealed that, although 70 percent of the residents had graduated from high school, only 40 percent were employed full time, with nearly half living below the poverty line. The survey also indicated that no more than half of those interviewed had lived in the complex for more than a year.

Officer S. next obtained a computer printout of crimes reported in the Normandy area, mostly larceny, auto theft, and burglary. He learned that nearly 50 percent of the residents had been crime victims in the past year. The printout also revealed that many of the large and small businesses surrounding the complex were frequent targets of vandalism, auto theft, burglary, and shoplifting. When arrests had been made, suspects were often found to live in the Normandy Apartments.

Officer S. developed a three-pronged strategy to stave off increased drug-related crime. First, he hoped to eliminate many of the existing crime problems through high-profile enforcement. Second, he wanted to establish rapport with the tenants and organize them into a community actively involved in keeping its complex safe and crime free. Third, he wanted to enlist the aid of local businesses in working on problems in the community.

Response. The complex manager provided Officer S. with a vacant apartment that he used to write police reports and maintain a visible police presence. The manager also identified 5 residents with leadership potential and 15 problem tenants she suspected of involvement in criminal activities such as drug dealing. Officer S. described the manager as “streetwise,” and he believed that her information was accurate. Running record checks on the 15 problem tenants and finding that 3 had outstanding warrants, he promptly served the warrants with the help of other police officers.

The officers believed that one tenant who had been served with an outstanding warrant could assist Officer S. in his efforts to help the community. When Officer S. explained his intention to this woman to rid Normandy of drugs and build a strong community there, she offered to help and soon became a source of intelligence for the police, sharing information on those tenants who received a large number of daily visitors. In addition, as a result of a court-ordered community service work program, she began volunteer work at the local Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA). Subsequent to working off her fines, she was hired as a full-time YWCA employee.

Officer S. turned his attention to the remaining 12 problem tenants identified by the manager. Through surveillance, he determined that 1 of the 12, a local high school student living at the complex, was indeed selling drugs, Officer S. sent an informant to make a drug buy from the suspect's apartment. After the buy, he obtained an arrest warrant and a search warrant. When he and the other officers executed the warrants, only the suspect's uncle was at home. They arrested the uncle on a possession charge and told witnesses to spread the word that people selling drugs would not be tolerated. The next day, Officer S. encountered the young dealer in the complex. "Who told you I was selling drugs?" the boy asked. "Everybody knows," the officer replied, adding, "If you don't stop, you'll be arrested, too." The boy heeded the officer's warning, and no further drug sales were reported from that apartment. Officer S. believed the boy was selling drugs only to make extra money, and when confronted by the officer, he became scared and stopped dealing.

Officer S. next met with one of the residents identified by the complex manager as having leadership potential. The man was a truck driver and part-time minister who taught Sunday school to young people in the complex. The man agreed to work with Officer S. to establish a community organization at Normandy. The resident explained to his friends in the complex and to his Sunday school students that the police were trying to help the residents, and he solicited their cooperation.

Officers began to patrol Normandy regularly, visiting with residents and explaining that with the community's help, they could rid the complex of drug dealers. Residents came to appreciate the police presence and helped patrol officers identify criminal activity. On one occasion, when a robbery suspect

entered the complex, witnesses pointed out where the suspect had gone and even offered words of encouragement as officers escorted their prisoner to the patrol car.

Officer S. met with area businesses to gain their support and involve them in his efforts. He approached the executive director of a local fraternal order whose building had experienced break-ins. The executive director agreed to allow the newly formed Normandy Resident Association to use the building to conduct its meetings. Officer S. convinced a furniture store just north of the Normandy complex to donate backboards for the basketball courts. He also encouraged two nearby convenience stores to donate 20 swing sets to the Normandy playground.

In late March, Officers S. and V. held the first resident association meeting in the Scottish Rite auditorium. Seventy-five residents attended. Officer V. distributed teddy bears, donated by a local restaurant, to children as an incentive for their parents to attend. Area movie theaters donated 30 free tickets, and a drawing was held to give away stuffed Easter bunnies. Officer S.'s area commander welcomed the residents to the meeting and offered the support of the police department in the effort to make Normandy a safe community. A representative of the Citizen's Crime Commission gave a presentation on safety tips. Officer S. also invited a case worker from the Private Industries Training Council (PITC) to speak to the residents, 40 percent of whom were unemployed, about job training and placement programs.

Officer S. next focused on providing recreational opportunities for youth living in the complex. He held a contest in which copies of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution, supplied by the Police Sertoma Club, were distributed to older youth who were challenged to write an essay on "What These Documents Mean to Me" and to younger children who were asked to draw a picture of "What Freedom in America Means to Me." Contest prizes were donated from area businesses and organizations. One store donated a \$25 gift certificate. Two sporting goods stores donated basketballs. The general manager of a minor league baseball team donated 80 complimentary tickets to bring the children of the Normandy Apartments to a June baseball game. A local women's club dedicated to assisting low-income apartment residents donated games and puzzles, and one member also offered to buy flowers for the complex and to help residents plant them.

Assessment. Officer S.'s efforts did not solve all of Normandy's crime problems, but he was convinced that significant improvements were made. Tenants improved the physical appearance of the complex, and most of the disabled vehicles were towed or moved by their owners.

Crime in the area decreased considerably. An analysis of incident reports, comparing the first 3 months of 1988 with the same period in 1989, showed a 129-percent decrease in criminal activity. Crime statistics revealed a 50-percent reduction in two particular

crimes—"beer runs" (a slang for shoplifting beer) and gasoline pump drive-off thefts at two nearby convenience stores. The owner of the Toyota dealership adjacent to the complex told Officer S. that since the improvement program began, vandalism and break-ins at his business had ceased. In addition, a letter received on May 24, 1989, from the owner of a local insurance company stated that vandalism, break-ins, and other criminal activities had decreased in his shopping center in the previous 2 months. Officer S. believed the reduction in criminal activity was due largely to improvements made in the complex.

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, CASE STUDIES

Cleaning Up Queen Village

Scanning. The police officers involved in this project, along with concerned residents of Queen Village, agreed that crime and drug trafficking were high-priority problems in the neighborhood. They also agreed that the neighborhood's physical condition and appearance had an impact upon such problems as crime, drug trafficking, and fear in the community. Neighborhood residents and patrolling officers believed that improving the physical environment could reduce crime in Queen Village.

Analysis. Using an environmental survey (see *A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their Environment*), patrol officers assigned to the 3d Police District ministration conducted a physical assessment of the neighborhood. The survey assisted officers in identifying and collecting descriptive information on the physical environment, such as environmental problems, sometimes described as "quality of life" concerns. These problems included litter, graffiti, unkempt lots, abandoned or dilapidated buildings, and abandoned vehicles. Through the surveys officers identified 20 abandoned vehicles, 20 abandoned or dilapidated buildings, 7 blocks with serious litter problems, 11 blocks with serious graffiti problems, and 5 littered vacant lots. Officers also noted that six blocks had poor overhead street lighting because lights were either broken or concealed by overgrown trees.

Although patrol officers in Philadelphia routinely conducted similar environmental surveys (known within the department as "Sunday surveys" because they were conducted on Sundays when calls for service were less frequent), they rarely addressed the problems themselves. Traditionally, patrol officers documented the problems and forwarded the information through the chain of command to the responsible individual or outside agency. However, this practice had proven to be neither efficient nor effective at

solving many of the neighborhood problems. Patrol officers rarely used the surveys as a data source or tool for identifying, analyzing, or explaining other neighborhood problems such as drug hot spots, crime-prone areas, disturbance locations, and fear among neighborhood residents.

Response. Patrol Officer B., an 8-year veteran of the department assigned to the 3rd Police District ministration in Queen Village, was placed in charge of addressing many of the problems identified by the environmental survey. Officer B. began working on removing abandoned vehicles, securing and demolishing abandoned or dilapidated buildings, and cleaning up vacant lots.

Officer B.'s first task was to remove abandoned vehicles from the neighborhood, which he believed created a problem for several reasons: they detracted from the neighborhood's overall appearance; they tended to collect litter, trash, and other junk; they attracted rodents and other animals; they took up valuable parking space; they provided drug dealers with a place to hide their drugs; they were a safety hazard for children; they were considered a nuisance by residents; and they conveyed a lack of community concern, pride, and control over the neighborhood.

To initiate the process to remove these vehicles, Officer B. recorded their identification numbers and locations and reported them to the abandoned automobile officer of the 3rd Police District, who examined the vehicles and identified the owners through the State's Bureau of Motor Vehicles. He then notified the owners by certified mail that the vehicles had to be removed or repaired within 30 days from the date of the notice. If a vehicle was considered a safety hazard, it could be removed before the 30-day deadline. If the vehicle went unclaimed, the officer placed a work order requesting its removal by one of several private salvage companies contracted by the city. He then sent the owner a summary ticket (via certified mail) for abandoning the vehicle; the ticket amount covered the city's related expenses.

Between December 1988 and April 1989, Officer B. and another officer identified and removed 32 abandoned vehicles from Queen Village. Although the removal process often took up to 60 days, it was expedited when the officers made followup calls to the vehicles' owners and to the salvage companies.

Officer B. also addressed the problem of abandoned and dilapidated housing at Queen Village. One such house was located in the middle of a litter-strewn, drug-infested, and crime-ridden block, where large crowds gathered almost daily to hang out, drink alcohol, and buy drugs.

The house had become so dilapidated that it presented a safety hazard to passersby and to playing children. The front door had fallen from its hinges, bricks were falling onto the sidewalk, and the inside floors and walls had collapsed. Officer B. often observed children running from the house as he drove by in his patrol car. He also noticed evidence of drug use inside the house, such as burned bottle caps, broken glass vials, and marijuana cigarette butts.

On January 13, 1989, Officer B. reported the problem to the city's licenses and inspection (L&I) department, which inspects buildings and enforces building code violations in Philadelphia. L&I concluded that ordinary measures such as sealing the building with tin or bricks could not make it secure and that demolition was the only safe course. L&I first attempted to notify the building's owner because owners were generally given 30 days to respond before action was taken against a property. However, the owner could not be located, and L&I's subsequent records check showed that the owner owed nearly \$3,000 in real estate taxes dating back to 1981.

Because the house had to be demolished, L&I referred the situation to the city's contractual services department, which hired wrecking companies. As a followup measure, Officer B. contacted the director of contractual services, who informed Officer B. that his department was required to seek bids from several wrecking companies before a building could be demolished. On March 15, 1989, the department accepted a bid, and by March 20, the wrecking company had begun work. Within 1 week, the building was demolished and the lot cleaned of most of the debris.

Officer B. also asked L&I to investigate a vacant litter-strewn lot located on the same block as the

abandoned building because the lot was an eyesore and a nuisance to the community. L&I examined the lot in January 1989 and agreed that it needed to be cleaned. When L&I's records check revealed that the lot was owned by the city, it referred the problem to the city's "clean and seal department." In March, Officer B. followed up by contacting that department's director, who informed him that, because the lot posed no immediate danger to the community, the city's schedule might not allow it to be cleaned for up to 8 to 9 months. Officer B. eventually asked area residents to participate in the cleanup.

Assessment. Although no formal survey or evaluation was conducted, Officer B. reported that residents were pleased with the physical improvements in their neighborhood. He continued to monitor environmental problems in Queen Village.

The "Pipe House" at 940 Dove Street

Scanning. Located within Queen Village, the 900 block of Dove Street was a residential street with 22 homes. The street was one of the most recent blocks in the neighborhood to undergo gentrification. Many of its 18th-century homes were purchased and renovated either by developers or young married professionals, and subsequently sold for up to \$400,000.

Analysis. Homes on Dove Street were either occupied or undergoing renovation, with the exception of 940 Dove, which was vacant. Unsecured, the house became a crack den or "pipe house." Between January and March 1989, the police department received thirty-seven 911 complaints from area residents about sanitation problems, abandoned vehicles, narcotics use, and disturbingly loud noises during the night. Residents expressed concern that the crack smoking might be a fire hazard and they feared for their personal safety. Many reported that they were afraid to leave their homes because of the drug users at 940 Dove. Area businesses suffered from the reputation of the pipe house as well. One restaurant, located on the corner of Dove Street, experienced a sharp decline in patronage, which the owner attributed to residents being afraid to leave their homes and dine at his restaurant.

Response. Sergeant C. of the 3rd Police District investigated the problem in February 1989. He

immediately arrested two area drug dealers, but this had little impact on the problem. Sergeant C. soon turned his attention to the vacant house and discovered that its owner had recently died and left the house to family members. Further inquiries revealed that the decedent's daughter was anxious to cooperate with police to solve the pipe house problem. She had been trying to sell the house, but two local real estate firms had dropped their listings because their agents were afraid to go onto the property to show the house to prospective buyers.

The daughter agreed to have the property secured, although she had done this twice before. With Sergeant C. present for protection, a construction crew secured the vacant house. The officer, along with block residents, contacted a realtor. Sergeant C. provided increased patrolling to the area, and area residents vigilantly monitored the boarded-up property.

Assessment. The house was listed for sale by a realtor, and its sales potential greatly increased. Dove Street residents were no longer afraid to leave their homes, and many said that the quality of life on their street had dramatically improved.

Thefts From Vehicles in Queen Village

Scanning. Thefts from vehicles increased substantially in Queen Village during the past few years. In 1988, 142 thefts from vehicles were reported, comprising 35 percent of all serious Uniform Crime Reports (Part I) crimes in the neighborhood. From January through May 1989, the number increased to 116, representing an 87-percent increase from the same period in 1988. The average dollar loss from property stolen during a theft was \$613, and by the end of 1989, the yearly figure exceeded \$240,000, exclusive of damage done to the vehicles.

Analysis. Officer A., assigned to the area, was responsible for addressing the problem of thefts from automobiles. Officer A. initially plotted crime patterns by the time of day, day of week, week of month, and location. She interviewed car-theft victims to gather additional information about method of entry, type of property stolen, security measures taken, and reasons for parking in a particular location. She then

accumulated information on likely offenders and interviewed a local repeat offender.

From her analysis, Officer A. learned that most thefts from vehicles were committed on Monday nights. However, a sizable number were committed on other days and at times other than night. She noticed that many thefts were committed during the third week of each month and believed this could be either a coincidence or a result of available money running low by the middle of the month. She found that the location of thefts varied from day to day, week to week, and month to month. However, over time, all areas in the neighborhood experienced thefts from vehicles.

Response. Officer A. thought that offenders might be targeting certain vehicles. She looked for patterns by vehicle type, vehicle characteristics, method of entry, and type of property stolen. She found that vehicle type varied widely. As for victims, there appeared to be no connection among the age, race, or sex of the owner. Of the 116 thefts from vehicles, all but 40 involved local neighborhood residents. Those 40 victims were either visiting family or friends or shopping in neighborhood stores. None of the victims worked in the area.

The Queen Village neighborhood experienced a tremendous amount of daily traffic from its 7,200 residents and several thousand daily visitors. Most vehicles were parked on the street, with few parked in private driveways or garages.

Although many victims interviewed by Officer A. reported having left their property in plain view, most wanted additional police protection. Few vehicles had security alarms. The type of property stolen varied, with mostly clothing stolen during the winter and mostly tools stolen during warmer months, when neighborhood construction was underway. Other stolen property included radios, stereos, auto parts, cameras, briefcases, and small change.

Method of entry was most commonly through breaking a window, generally the sidewalk-side car window. Break-in tools were never recovered from the scene.

It appeared that most thefts from vehicles were merely crimes of opportunity, with few patterns or clues to suggest a likely time, area, or target where officers could direct their attention.

Officer A. discussed the problem with her supervisor, who suggested that she interview an offender. With her supervisor's support and the approval of her captain, she interviewed a long-time neighborhood offender who had been arrested three times in April of that year for thefts from vehicles. The offender was a 37-year-old male resident of a large neighborhood public housing complex, Southwark Plaza, where he lived with his mother and siblings.

With a promise of immunity, the offender agreed to discuss his methods for committing thefts from vehicles. He also shared with Officer A. his reasons for committing the crimes—stealing from vehicles was the only way to support his \$1,500-a-week crack cocaine habit. Approximately 4 years prior to his addiction, he had held a steady, well-paying job with the city's sanitation department. In 1987, after 10 years of service, he was fired because his crack addiction caused him to miss too much work. His criminal record showed that he had been arrested on 13 occasions since 1970 for various types of property offenses and drug charges.

The offender revealed his typical procedure for breaking into cars. He would walk around the neighborhood almost daily looking for possible targets. One reason he preferred committing thefts from vehicles over other types of crimes, such as burglary or robbery, was that he knew in advance what he would be getting for his efforts—most of what he stole was visible through the car's window. He used a screwdriver as a lever to break the window because it created little sound. Within seconds, he could complete a theft and be on his way. He would not commit more than one theft at a time; rather, he would make only one "hit" and then run. He routinely committed between 15 and 20 such thefts per week. The time of day, day of week, week of the month, location, type of car, and type of property did not matter much to him. When questioned about deterrents, he confessed that nothing really mattered except witnesses—he would not commit a theft if someone was outside watching.

The offender disposed of the property in several ways. He would sell it on the street for 50 percent of its value to someone looking for a good buy, generally neighborhood residents, some of whom became regular customers. Or, if he was unable to sell the stolen property on the street, he went to drug dealers, whom he considered a last resort because they gave him only 10 percent of the merchandise value. The

dealers would then either resell the stolen property or keep it.

The offender told Officer A. that he would stop committing thefts only if he kicked his addiction.

Assessment. Officer A. developed responses to the problem of thefts from vehicles in Queen Village, some of which included targeting repeat offenders for probation and parole violations; conditional release into a drug treatment program; community crime prevention workshops; a media campaign; and a coordinated patrol between the police and the neighborhood "townwatch."

Narcotics Anonymous in Queen Village

Scanning. In the late 1980's, Queen Village experienced a serious increase in crime and disorder when drugs infested the neighborhood. In 1988, 407 serious Uniform Crime Reports (Part I) crimes were committed there—56 serious crimes per 1,000 residents. Twelve of every 100 households were victimized by the perpetration of at least one serious crime. Although it was impossible to determine how many of these crimes were drug-related, data from the National Institute of Justice Drug Use Forecasting study showed that 70 percent of the offenders arrested for a serious crime in Philadelphia tested positive for cocaine use.

Analysis. As part of the police department's problem-oriented policing project in Queen Village, Officer P. saw an opportunity to use a novel approach to address neighborhood crime and drug abuse problems. Because he believed drug treatment programs could be used to help reduce crime as well as other drug-related problems in the neighborhood, Officer P. conducted research and learned that few such programs were available to residents in Queen Village. One nearby treatment center, a 66-bed private facility, provided treatment for mental health, drug, and alcohol abuse problems. The only other neighborhood drug treatment facility was a 20-bed unit in a nearby hospital. Like many treatment programs, these two facilities were expensive and had long waiting lists and, consequently, were not accessible to many area residents.

Officer P. defined the problem in the community as the prevalence of drug abuse and the lack of drug treatment programs. He decided to lobby for an accessible drug treatment program tailored to this particular community's needs. In November 1988, with support and encouragement from his supervisor, Officer P. outlined a strategy. To better understand community-based drug treatment programs, he spoke with an Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) counselor who supplied him with books and pamphlets describing AA and other community-based programs.

Officer P. also researched within the police department to discover what community-based drug treatment programs were available. Although none were available, officers in the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) helped him define criteria for a successful program: based upon a successful program model; easily accessible and open to all neighborhood residents; requiring only modest funds for startup costs; and self-supporting. It also needed to provide a positive and lasting effect on the community. Narcotics Anonymous (NA) seemed to fit these criteria.

Response. Officer P.'s next task was to enlist NA's support. He called a number listed in the local service directory, which turned out to be a hotline. The hotline operator was unable to direct him to an NA representative, nor was he able to find a local address.

Contacting EAP for assistance, he subsequently reached a local NA counselor who was interested in his idea and agreed to start a community NA program

if Officer P. arranged for the meeting place. In December 1988, in response to Officer P.'s request, Southwark Plaza's housing authority manager provided a room adjacent to the 3d Police District's ministration.

The first NA meeting was held on January 7, 1989. Fifteen people attended, which was reasonable since the meeting was advertised only by word of mouth. Three attendees were Southwark Plaza residents and 12 were from the surrounding neighborhood. Meetings were held each Saturday night, and within the first month, attendance grew to 25. After 5 months, attendance had grown to 53 regular members. Members offered to pay the Philadelphia Housing Authority for use of the meeting room.

Although Officer P. was not responsible for overseeing the program, he monitored its progress each week. At this reporting it was too early to say whether the program had reduced the community's crime and other drug-related problems, but it had a positive impact on the lives of the 53 neighborhood residents who attended its meetings. Officer P. planned to establish an AA program in the neighborhood after he had located a willing counselor and secured an available meeting room.

Assessment. Although Officer P.'s personal satisfaction was sufficient reward, his captain and the community believed that his accomplishments merited an additional acknowledgment. On May 25, 1989, he was named Law Enforcement Officer of the Year by the Philadelphia Optimist Club.

SOURCES FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

For more information on the BJA Problem-Oriented Approach to Drug Enforcement Program contact:

Law Enforcement Branch

Discretionary Grant Program Division
Bureau of Justice Assistance
633 Indiana Avenue, NW.
Washington, D.C. 20531
202-514-5947

Many of the agencies that participated in the BJA Problem-Oriented Approach to Drug Enforcement project are accessible for questions and site visits from other police department officials. In particular, the San Diego Police Department has demonstrated its willingness to assist other agencies. For more information, contact:

Neighborhood Policing Programs
1401 Broadway, M/S 776
San Diego, CA 92101
619-531-2158

Other agencies that have experimented with problem-oriented policing and have frequently accommodated visits and questions include the police departments in the following cities:

- Baltimore County, Maryland.
- Jacksonville, Florida.
- Newport News, Virginia.
- New York City, New York.
- Oxnard, California.
- Santa Barbara, California
- Santa Ana, California.
- Savannah, Georgia.
- Reno, Nevada.
- Madison, Wisconsin.

Many of the publications cited in the selected bibliography as well as other information on problem- and community-oriented policing are available through the Bureau of Justice Assistance Clearinghouse. Contact:

BJA Clearinghouse

Box 6000

Rockville, MD 20850

Telephone: 800-688-4252

FAX: 301-251-5212

EBB: 301-738-8895

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GLOSSARY

beat: the neighborhood, community, or general area that is the regular responsibility of a police officer or officers. An area consistently traveled by a police officer, resulting in his or her familiarity with the location and its residents.

beat rotation: periodically reassigning police officers to work in different beats.

buy bust: a purchase of illegal drugs by an undercover officer with the subsequent arrest of the seller.

command staff: top-level police administrators with decisionmaking and policymaking power.

crime analysis unit: division of a police agency that compiles, stores, and interprets valuable crime-related data that officers can obtain and use.

environmental conditions: symptoms of disorder and decay in a community or neighborhood that can breed criminal activity, such as poor street lighting; vandalism and graffiti; litter; vacant, abandoned, or condemned buildings; and broken-down or abandoned automobiles.

Gantt chart: visual depiction of overlapping components and target dates.

informant buy: similar to buy bust, the purchase of illegal drugs by a cooperative individual or police informant, who is not a police officer but who is helping the police make the arrest of a seller subsequent to the purchase of drugs.

institutionalization: process of making a concept or initiative part of the established structure and daily routine and legitimizing the new approach as part of the organizational culture.

lead staff: individual or group that spearheads the new problem-oriented policing initiative for a police agency by offering meaningful support and encouragement.

marketing: developing the potential or projected market for products, services, or information within a given environment.

mission statement: closely related to “departmental philosophy,” “statement of operating procedures,” and “governing principles,” providing a technical expression of specific objectives. The mission statement is often couched within a police department credo that articulates its basic values and goals. In a problem-oriented policing initiative, the mission statement should include a formal definition of the approach linking it to larger departmental values.

open-air drug markets: outdoor places where drug dealers and users consistently gather to conduct their illegal transactions. Often these sites are attractive to this criminal element because of a combination of environmental conditions and include parking lots, alleys, and streetcorners, thus facilitating sales to drive-by customers.

organizational culture: the set of expectations and norms that guide employee behavior. In a police agency, the common perceptions and beliefs about policing based on past experience.

Part I crimes: crimes of murder, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, aggravated assault, or larceny as classified in the FBI-managed Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system.

participative management: decentralized style of management that emphasizes accountability at all levels and open communication. May be characterized by a horizontal structure contrasting with the rigid vertical hierarchies typical of more centralized organizations.

problem-oriented policing: the process of approaching persistent community problems that need police response with detailed research into the underlying causes and formulation of unconventional police

responses, often drawing on a variety of police agency, private-sector, and community resources.

public housing: conventional low-income rental housing for poor families and elderly. Rental payments are based on ability to pay and are subsidized by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

reverse sting: a situation in which undercover police officers pose as drug dealers and arrest the drug buyers upon completion of the transactions.

shift rotation: periodically reassigning police officers to work different shifts.

traditional police approach: often characterized by a focus on random preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service, with arrests of suspects used as the primary measure of success. Contrasts with problem-oriented policing, which involves proactive efforts to identify recurring problems, evaluate those problems, and develop alternative responses, including but not limited to arrests.

truant: youth who cuts classes or skips school altogether, possibly to engage in further delinquent activity.

undercover buy: purchase of illegal drugs by an undercover police officer as part of an effort to arrest a dealer or build a case for a subsequent arrest.

REPORTING FORMS USED IN THE SAN DIEGO PROGRAM

Problem-Orienting Policing Data Sheet

_____ Date

Initiating Officer(s) _____

Type of Problem _____

Location _____ Beat _____

Type of Structure/Lot/Etc. _____

Objectives _____

Ownership	Name	Address	Phone (Home)	(Work)	Beeper
Owner					
Lienholder					
Manager					

Tenant's Name	Apt. #	Phone	D.O.B.	Other Key Players	D.O.B.

Other Information _____

Problem-Oriented Policing Status Sheet

This form is optional, to be used in the Problem-Oriented Policing files at the officer's discretion.

It is designed to record what outside resources have been explored.

'N/A' is checked if that agency's services are not applicable to the project.

'WORKING' is checked if use of the agency is being explored.

'FINISHED' is checked after an agency's usefulness has been explored and a determination has been made.

Under 'VIOLATIONS,' comment 'YES' or 'NO.' Violations should be listed in the journal.

Under 'CONTACT,' write the name of the person from the agency.

* San Diego City Information *

	N/A	WORKING	FINISHED	VIOLATIONS	CONTACT	PHONE NO.
Building Inspector	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Building permits	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
City Attorney	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Fire Marshal	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Housing Commission (Section 8)	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Abatement detective	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Street maintenance	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Trash (sanitation)	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Water/sewage	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Zoning	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
_____	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
_____	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____

* San Diego County Information *

	N/A	WORKING	FINISHED	VIOLATIONS	CONTACT	PHONE NO.
Building Inspector	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Dog license	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Health Inspector	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Hillcrest Receiving Home	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Juvenile Hall	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Marshals—Civil Division	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Probation	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Senior citizen service	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
Social service (welfare)	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
_____	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____
_____	—	—	—	_____	_____	_____

*** Federal Information ***

	N/A	WORKING	FINISHED	VIOLATIONS	CONTACT	PHONE NO.
Border Patrol	—	—	—	—	—	—
Housing/Urban Development	—	—	—	—	—	—
Social Security Admin.	—	—	—	—	—	—
U.S. Naval Intelligence Service	—	—	—	—	—	—
U.S. Postal Inspector	—	—	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—

*** California State Information ***

	N/A	WORKING	FINISHED	VIOLATIONS	CONTACT	PHONE NO.
Alcoholic Beverage Control	—	—	—	—	—	—
California Youth Authority	—	—	—	—	—	—
Department of Corrections	—	—	—	—	—	—
Department of Motor Vehicles	—	—	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—

*** Specialized Units ***

	N/A	WORKING	FINISHED	VIOLATIONS	CONTACT	PHONE NO.
Street teams	—	—	—	—	—	—
Abatement task force	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vehicle abatement	—	—	—	—	—	—
Crime analysis	—	—	—	—	—	—
Communications	—	—	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—

*** Other ***

	N/A	WORKING	FINISHED	VIOLATIONS	CONTACT	PHONE NO.
Survey instrument	—	—	—	—	—	—
Criminal history	—	—	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—

**Guide for Filing
Problem-Solving Reports**

Complainant or community of interest—Who brought this problem to the Department's attention?

Originator of Complaint—Citizen, civic group, elected official, crime analysis, officer, other city agency

Address

Telephone

Scanning—Problem(s) identified

Crime problem (drugs, theft, burglary, robbery, auto theft, vice, gangs)

Environmental factors (litter, trash, abandoned autos, abandoned buildings, poor lighting)

Location and time

Participants involved

Immediate action taken (emergency response)

Reasons for concern and immediate action

Analysis—Verifying the problem by collecting data

Complainant/victim/defendant/witness interviews

Formal/informal survey of area residents

Personal observations

Confer with other officers

Interview social service agencies

Interview private agencies

Attend community/business association meetings

Crime analyses/recap analysis

Arrest reports—229's

Criminal extracts and photos for a defendant book

Problem clarification—What did your analysis reveal about the problem?

Did the nature of the problem change as a result of your analysis?

Is there a need for additional data collection?

Before initiating a response (action plan), make sure all parties involved are in agreement about the problem.

Response—Actions taken

High-visibility patrol
Conduct a community meeting
Conduct a crime prevention meeting
Storefront referral
Conduct a confrontational problem-solving meeting
Form a block or neighborhood watch
Obtain assistance from social service and governmental agencies
The mayor's office
The court system
The District Attorney's office
The City Attorney's office
The school system
Department of Human Services
Department of Health
Department of Public Welfare
Department of Recreation
Better Business Bureau
Licenses and Inspection
Utility companies
Obtain assistance from the private sector
Obtain assistance from the media
Obtain assistance from the housing commission
Obtain assistance from other police division units
Arrest
Initiate an eviction process
Asset forfeiture (DEA)

Assessment—How effective was the response?

Compare crime and calls for service statistics for the time periods before, during, and after intervention.

Compare resident or complainant attitudes and perceptions before and after intervention for positive change.

Maintain rapport with the community of interest to keep abreast of any further problems.

Maintain contact with those agencies providing assistance.

Results: Were the desired goals and objectives outlined in the action plan achieved?

Status of the problem

Solved (case closed)

Ongoing (case open—still doing an analysis, response, or action plan)

Needs monitoring (response has been initiated and the problem needs further assessment)

Officer: _____ Date: _____

Approved by supervisor: _____

**PROBLEM-ORIENTING POLICING STATUS REPORT
 SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT
 EASTERN PATROL
 NOVEMBER 1990**

<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>BEAT</u>	<u>PROBLEM LOCATION</u>	<u>PROBLEM DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>ID. DATE</u>	<u>LAST ACTIVITY</u>
PECORARO ALBERS	311	4555 Marlborough	Narcotics/Theft	Analysis	02-90	11-02-90
J. SMITH Narcotics	311	5095 Mansfield	Narcotics/Theft	Response	04-90	11-02-90
GRAHAM	321	8620 Navajo	Transients/Hazard	Response	06-90	08-90
CASTRO FINLEY	324	3439 Stellar	Vandalism/Narc/5150	Monitoring	02-90	09-24-90
GOEDE	324	8921 Earhart	Property Crimes/Drugs	Analysis	02-90	10-31-90
CASTRO FINLEY	324	9132 Fermi	415's/Narcotics	Monitoring	02-90	10-31-90
STONE	324	2531 Moonstone	Narcotics	Analysis	08-90	09-90
T. CLARK SWEETSER	325	4259 Dellwood	Narcotics/Zoning/5150	Analysis	08-90	10-31-90
D. CORNEL	325	4154 Dellwood	Narcotics/Zoning/5150	Analysis	08-90	10-31-90
SOUSA	312	4050 38th Street	Narcotics	Analysis	?	08-90

**POP STATUS REPORT
NOVEMBER 1990
PAGE 2**

<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>BEAT</u>	<u>PROBLEM LOCATION</u>	<u>PROBLEM DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>ID. DATE</u>	<u>LAST ACTIVITY</u>
HERSHMAN LUCAS	311	805 Adams	Transients	Analysis	06-90	08-90
MASSEY	312	3820 University La Posta Restaurant	Fights/Narcotics/Crowds	Analysis	09-01-90	09-27-90
POUND HEADLEY	311	3538 Madison	Gangs/Violence/Graffiti	Analysis	08-90	09-27-90
LARSON LOFFTUS	315	4367 50th Street	Narcotics	Scanning	09-01-90	09-27-90
SCHENKELBERG HEADLEY	314	6505 El Cajon	Abandoned Structure/Narc	Analysis	09-01-90	09-27-90
SANTI HEADLEY	313	4765 Trojan Autobody shop	Parking/Hazard	Analysis	09-01-90	09-27-90 10-31-90
K. STEWART M. SPETTER	317	4849 1/2 Auburn	Meth Dealing	Scanning	10-28-90	10-28-90
CLARK SWEETSER CORNELL	325	4154 Dellwood	Drugs & Public Nuisance	Analysis	10-20-90	10-28-90
MORRISON	321	Highwood & Lake Murray	Traffic Problem	Scanning	10-31-90	10-31-90
GOEDE	324	2892 Murray Ridge Road	Drug Sales	Scanning	10-01-90	10-31-90

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<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>BEAT</u>	<u>PROBLEM LOCATION</u>	<u>PROBLEM DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>ID DATE</u>	<u>LAST ACTIVITY</u>
GOEDE	324	2961 Chenault	Nuisance/Zoning	Scanning	10-31-90	10-31-90
SWEETSER CLARK	324	2568 Murray Ridge Road	Drug Sales	Scanning	10-31-90	10-31-90
FOWLER SANTIAGO	315	Imperial Motel	Prostitution	Scanning	10-31-90	10-31-90
WASKIEWICZ	311	3227 Madison	Nuisance/Drugs/459's	Scanning	11-02-90	11-02-90
HARRIS KNIGHT	321	6523 Eldridge	Narcotics/415's	Scanning	10-31-90	10-31-90
SAUNDERS DIAZ	321	4200 Euclid	Narcotics	Scanning	10-31-90	10-31-90
HEADLEY	313	4048 Menlo	Narcotics	Scanning	09-01-90	09-27-90
SCHENKELBERG HEADLEY	314	5000 College Place	Parking	Analysis	09-01-90	09-27-90
HEADLEY	317	3246 44th Street	Gangs/Narcotics/Fights	Monitoring	09-01-90	09-27-90
M. WHITE A. GUADERRAMA	317	4363 Lantana	Narcotics/1035	Scanning	11-02-90	————
SOUSA MAUZY	316	4033 Myrtle	Gangs/Violence/Prop Crimes	Unknown	06-01-90	06-05-90

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STEVENS STACHNIK	317	Highland/Landis Park	Narcotics/Gangs	Scanning	09-25-90	09-30-90
HEADLEY	312	4050-4074 Marlborough	Graffiti/Narcotics	Scanning	10-01-90	———
ALBREKTSEN	317	4888 Auburn	Narcotics	Closed	02-25-90	04-02-90
SANTI	317	3527 47th Street	Stolen Property	Closed	04-17-90	06-08-90
SORBIE	314	6949 El Cajon	Vandalism/Fights	Closed	06-06-90	06-24-90
TOWNSEND	317	5164 Landis	Narcotics/Transients	Closed	04-13-90	05-05-90
HEADLEY	311	4117 Monroe	Transients/Abandoned House	Closed	10-05-90	———
SPEPPER STEWART	313	4587 University	Transients/Narcotics	Closed	06-90	07-90
SPEPPER STEWART	313	4033 45th Street	Narcotics	Closed	07-11-90	07-26-90
WHITE STOVAL	313	4175 Menlo #1	Narcotics	Closed	04-11-90	07-06-90
COLEMAN	311	4307 36th Street	Narcotics	Closed	06-12-90	06-24-90

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COLEMAN	312	3138 41st #4 and #6	Narcotics	Closed	03-03-90	06-03-90
POUND BROOKS	312	3902 El Cajon Radio Shack	Commercial Burglaries	Closed	09-01-90	10-31-90
VERDUZCO	311	4951 34th Street	Narcotics/Gangs	Closed	09-01-90	09-27-90
FARR HEADLEY	318	3475 Audrey	Noise/Zoning	Closed	09-01-90	10-31-90
HEADLEY	315	4122 52nd Street	Noise	Closed	09-01-90	09-27-90
STEWART SPETTER	313	4073 47th Street	Narcotics	Closed	07-90	10-31-90
MCVICAR	312	4100 Marlborough	5150	Closed	06-90	10-31-90