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DRCNet Library | Schaffer Library | Major Studies
The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge
The Marijuana Conviction
by Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread
U. of VA Press 1974
CHAPTER V
Marihuana Becomes a "National Monster"
Pp 92 thru 117
Illustrations: pp 93, 96, 99, 102, 105, 107, 110, 113, 1/2 of 115 (map), and 116
Page 92
AT THE BEGINNING of the campaign for passage of the Uniform Act In the several states
1933, marihuana use was not widespread or very much noticed. As we have seen, marihuana
use was pretty much confined to the Mexican communities of the southwestern states
throughout the twenties. Sometime around 1926, however, use among the black and
lower-class white elements of New Orleans emerged along with the propensity toward use by
youth in these communities. Later in the decade it appears that use had appeared in the
major urban areas, particularly in Chicagp Denver, Tulsa, Detroit, San Francisco, and
Baltimore. There is little evidence, however, that the habit was widespread in New York
City. Apart from those in the Mexican communities, it appears that the urban users were
artists, musicians,' medical students, and blacks.2 It is also possible, of course, that
white high school students, primarily from the lower class, had been attracted to the drug
in communities where it was available.
Despite the propaganda released by the law enforcement community in the early thirties,
the general public was probably largely unaware of the drug, its use, or its alleged
effects. Contrary to the picture of a marihuana epidemic conveyed by the propagandists in
the early thirties, use at this time probably had stabilized both geographically and
demographically. It was still a regional, ethnic phenomenon. Commissioner Anslinger
himself observed in late 1937 that "ten years ago we only heard about [marihuana]
throughout the Southwest. . . . it has only become a national menace in the last three
years." 3
As Anslinger's comment suggests, there seems to have been a change around the end of 1934.
It is hard to determine whether use increased or whether opinion makers-including the
press, the FBN, and various other groups-succeeded in increasing public awareness.
Whatever its cause, this increased awareness played a
Page 93: Cartoon from Washington Herald, Nov.4, 1932
Page 94:
significant role in passage of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act by the states and in the
decision of national politicians to seek federal legislation.
The Role of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
Critics of existing marihuana legislation have frequently attributed the illegal status of
marihuana solely to the crusading zeal of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and especially
of its long-time head, Harry J. Anslinger. Some observers have suggested that the bureau's
activity was produced by bureaucratic exigencies and the need to expand;4 others have said
that theBureau was on a moral crusade,5 still otherg have asserted that the bureau
believed its own propaganda about the link between criminality and marihuana.6 While each
of these factors may have played some role, it is clear that the bureau did not singlr
handedly conjure up the idea of banning marihuana use.Since twenty-four states had already
undertaken the prohibition of marihuana before the creation of the bureau in 1930, the
bureau alone cannot be credited with the pressure to outlaw the drug.
The bureau did, however, play a pivotal part. Although Anslinger suffered a setback during
the drafting of the Uniform Act, he set to work at once to secure its enactment by the
states, including the optional marihuana provision. There can be little doubt that the
bureau's activity hastened the passage of the act by state legisla-tures and increased
public awareness of marihuana. The bureau's primary objective, of course, was adoption of
the entire Uniform Act; of particular interest here is its activity regarding marihuana.
Immediately after the commissioners approved the act, the bureau began a comprehensive
campaign in the press, in legislative chambers, and in any other forum it could find to
gain public sup-port for the act's passage. Perceiving the absence of public aware-ness of
marihuana and wanting to encourage positive action to overcome the drug's optional status,
the bureau sought to arouse public interest in marihuana through "an educational
campaign describing the drug, its identifications and its evil effects."7 That the
FBN had a difficult task is illustrated by the fact that as late as 1936 it was necessary
to show marihuana to the New York police so that they could recognize the growing plant
and its dried, smokable form.8
Page 95:
A large part of the bureau's activity consisted of intensive lobbying in each
legislature before which the
act was pending. Anslinger instructed his district supervisors and local agents to
campaign actively with state legislators for the passage of the act, urging them to make
as many speeches and public appearances as possible to marshal public support. On 19
February 1934, for ex-ample, Isabelle Ahern O'Neill, a former Rhode Island state
legislator and then New England representative of the FBN, delivered a major address over
a Providence radio station calling for that state's legislature to be among the first to
pass the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.9 Anslinger made numerous speeches and several radio
broad-casts throughout the country in an effort to encourage public support for the
legislation. In an important strategic decision, the commissioner suggested that his three
hundred agents work directly with legislators. They were to discuss in detail the
provisions of the act with any legislator who voiced objections and seek to convince him
to support the act. Agents were also assigned to assist the floor managers and sponsors of
the act in each state's legislature.'0
Elizabeth Bass, a Chicago agent, was a particularly effective lobbyist and opinion maker.
Her sustained activity before such groups as women's clubs and the Women's Christian
Temperance Union enlisted a great deal of support. Over and above direct personal appeals
to civic groups and legislators by FBN personnel, Anslinger conducted a press campaign
across the country to gain the support of different constituencies. He sought editorial
support in newspapers11 and assisted in the drafting of articles for popular magazines12.
To mobilize the Bar, Anslinger and Tennyson wrote
an article for law journals explaining the need for the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.13
Despite all these FBN efforts, the Uniform Act did not fare well in state legislatures at
first. By 26 April 1933 only two states had enacted it in full. Twenty months later only
seven additional states were in the fold. The state of Indiana so badly mutilated the
Uni-form Act that the commissioner and the bureau were greatly disappointed with the
legislation.'4 As late as March 1935 only ten states had enacted the Uniform Narcotic Drug
law. This lack of success led Anslinger to complain: "The representatives of this
Page 95: Cartoon from Washing ton Herald, Nov.23, 1932
Page 97:
Bureau have persistently and patiently worked to overcome the apathy or hostility to
the proposed legislation and so far as I have been able to determine the Bureau has been
working alone in its nationwide attempt to stimulate interest in bringing about favorable
action upon the Uniform State Narcotic Law, at least until very recently." 15
A number of significant objections emerged in the state legislatures considering the
passage of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. First among these was the potential cost to the
state of enforcing the act. Second, a widely held belief that the Uniform Act would
require special licensing of doctors, dentists, and veterinarians provoked concern about
the amount of red tape involved. Third, the limit on the amount of exempt preparations
which could be sold caused a great deal of technical difficulty with the act. Fourth, many
objected to the power of the courts to revoke or suspend licenses to practice medicine or
pharmacy. Finally, there seemed to be widespread misunderstanding of the record-keeping
requirements of the act. Although these objections were largely administrative, and may
well have emanated from the American Medical Association and the Pharmaceutical
Association, they nevertheless posed what appeared to the bureau to be serious stumbling
blocks to the successful passage of the Uniform Act in most of the states. 16
The combination of public apathy and administrative resistance dictated a new strategy.
The bureau needed to arouse public interest so that the professional objections would seem
inconsequential beside a "felt need" of the legislatures. The "marihuana
menace" was an ideal concept for such a campaign. Thus, beginning in late 1934,
Commissioner Anslinger gradually shifted the focus of the FBN's publicity campaign away
from the inability of federal law enforcement agencies to deal effectively with local drug
problems toward the need to cope with a new drug menace-marihuana.
>From 1932 through most of 1934 very little of the bureau's propaganda was directed
toward the supplemental marihuana provision. But by late 1934 the Narcotics Bureau had
begun to use the specter of widespread marihuana addiction as a means of calling attention
to and gaining support for the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. When Commissioner Anslinger was
asked in 1934 what would be the best way of dealing with the marihuana problem, he
replied: "The confusion among the States' narcotic laws today is one of the
Page 98: \
greatest aids of the illicit traffic in every dangerous drug. It clogs all the
machinery of detection, impedes all the processes of preven-tion and punishment. Put a
Uniform State Narcotics Act through every legislature. That will not only cure the worst
of the hashish evil; it will help reduce the whole drug evil to a minimum."17
The change in bureau strategy is apparent in a comparison of two official statements of
Commissioner Anslinger-one made in 1933, the other in 1936. The 1933 statement explained
the need for a Uniform Narcotic Drug law and emphasized international obligations of the
United States, the need for more effective coordination in law enforcement, and the impact
the law would have on the incidence of morphine, cocaine, and opium addiction.18 In his
later statement, however, the commissioner devoted more than half his time to a discussion
of the "worst evil of all," the marihuana problem. In the commissioner's words:
Another urgent reason for the early enactment of the Uniform State Narcotic Act is to be
found in the fact that it is THE ONL Y UNIFORM LEGISLA TION yet devised to deal
effectively with MARIHUANA....
There is no Federal law against the production and use of Marihuana in this country. The
legal fight against its abuse is largely a problem of state and municipal legislation and
law enforcement.
All public spirited citizens should enlist in the campaign to demand and to get adequate
state laws and efficient state en-forcement on Marihuana.19
In the new strategy Anslinger discarded his previous policy of not officially associating
himself or the FBN with the coterie of propagandists on the marihuana issue. Instead, he
too tried to popularize the issue through speeches and articles. Indicative of his efforts
was "Marihuana: Assassin of Youth," which appeared in the widely circulated American
Magazine in July 1937.20 The FBN files contain over fifty letters addressed to the
commissioner which say, "your article was the first time I ever heard of
marihuana."
In addition to its own attempts to impress the public with the scope of the marihuana
menace, the bureau stood ready to assist others in writing about the new evil, whether the
intended product was factual reporting or literary fiction. Indeed, in the depression
Page 99: Cartoon; Evening Herald & Express, Feb.21, 1924
Page100:
era when sensational journalism was a competitive necessity, it was very hard to tell
the two apart. One author requested "information as background material for literary
fiction which will, in effect, further the fight against the evil. Any facts regarding the
narcotic plant marihuana is tsic] especially desired."~1 In response the bureau
asserted: "Police officials in cities of those states where it is most widely used
estimate that fifty per cent of the violent crimes committed in districts occupied by
Mexicans, Spaniards, Latin-Americans, Greeks, or Negroes may be traced to this
evil."22 The FBN supported all efforts, fact or fiction, to arouse public interest in
the threat posed by marihuana and its users and to generate support for the otherwise
unglamorous Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.
Anslinger's Army
Among the most effective proponents of the Uniform Act was the Hearst newspaper chain.
These papers began editorializing in favor of enactment within days after the act was
approved by the American Bar Association in October 1932. Dr. Woodward then observed that
"the support of the Hearst papers should contribute materially toward procuring
enactment of legislation."23 From then on, the editorial pages of the Hearst
newspapers across the country periodically carried declarations of support for the
fledg-ling act. Especially after a combination of hostility and apathy began to bog down
the bureau's efforts in the legislatures, Hearst frequently published cartoons and
editorials to incite public pressure. And the content of Hearst editorials clearly
reflects the bureau's decision to emphasize marihuana. This one appeared on 11 September
1935:
Much of the opposition to the Uniform State Narcotic Law must be imputed to the selfish
and often unscrupulous opposi-tion of racketeering interests.
But more than half the states have not acted favorably and Commissioner Anslinger has
announced that an intensified drive will be made at once to bring the rest into line.
One thing that the indolent legislatures should be made to understand is that the
"dope" traffic does not stand still./fontfamily>
Page 101:
/fontfamily>In recent years, the insidious and insanity producing marihuana has become among the
worst of the narcotic banes, invading even the school houses of the country, and the
Uniform State Narcotic Law is ThE ONLY LEGISLATION yet devised to deal effectively
with this horrid menace.24
One indication of the influence of these articles is a 1937 resolution of a narcotics
conference of lawyers, judges, and civic leaders commending William Randolph Hearst and
his newspapers "for pioneering the national fight against dope."25
The Hearst chain was not alone. A Birmingham, Alabama, paper on 22 August 1935 emphasized
the need to control marihuana as a reason for adopting the act.26 A Washington Post columnist
in September 1934 devoted three quarters of a column to marihuana with quotes from
Anslinger and New Orleans' Stanley urging adoption of the Uniform Act.27
Where this newspaper propaganda was heavy, the legislatures usually became, in time, aware
of the so-called marihuana problem. In Colorado, for example, the Denver News and
other papers had been reporting marihuana honor stories since the late twenties. This
newspaper interest and repeated activity on the legislative front strongly suggest a
public antipathy, which continued unabated into the thirties, toward the Mexicans and
their weed. On 4 September 1936 the bureau received a letter from the city editor of the
Alamosa Daily Courier, describing an attack by a Mexican-American, allegedly under
the influence of marihuana, on a girl of his region. It went on to say: "I wish I
could show you what a small marihuana cigarette can do to one of our degenerate
Spanish-speaking residents. That's why our problem is so great; the greatest percentage of
our population is composed of Spanish-speaking persons, most of whom are low mentally,
because of social and racial conditions."28 The FBN volunteered its own cooperation
at once in the paper's "educational campaign to describe the weed and tell of its
horrible effects."29
Other large-city newspapers such as the Cleveland Plain Dealer30 and the St. Louis Star-Times31
kept a stream of anti marihuana propaganda flowing in the period just before the
passage of the Uniform Act in those areas. In Missouri, especially, local concern
generated by the sensational articles in the Star-Times speedily
Page 102: Cartoon; Atlanta Georgian, March 17, 1934
Page 103:
pushed the legislature to adopt the Uniform Act. Activity by the press, particularly
after 1935 when marihuana "became a menace, played a significant role in generating
legislative awareness and support for adoption of the Uniform Act in a number of states.
Marihuana made better copy than the Uniform Act, and a marl-huana epidemic made better
copy than its isolated use. Thus, it is as unreliable to conclude from increased press
coverage that the use of marihuana mushroomed around 1935 as it is to assume from
newspaper reports that marihuana caused crime. At the same time, it is possible that use
did spread after the publicity cam-paigns, especially among the young. Certainly
use increased in New York City in the l930s, judging from the tremendous expansion in
coverage by the New York Times beginning in 1935, the evidence supplied by the
LaGuardia Commission in its 1944 report, and the leap in enforcement activity.
Another influential participant in the FBN's campaign, especially after the repeal of
prohibition, was the Women's Christian Tem-perance Union. Although the WCTU had
distributed a pamphlet on marihuana as early as 1927, the Union Signal does not
reflect any significant interest either in the Uniform Act or marihuana until 1934. Before
that year the "narcotic" receiving the most attention was nicotine. Then the Signal
contained a plea for passage of the Uniform Act each year from 1934 to 1936 in a
special section of the paper observing Narcotic Education Week. The editorial content
during these years reflects the change in FBN strategy. The theme in 1934 is the Uniform
Act's role in promoting more effective law enforcement. Marihuana is mentioned only once.
By 1936 the act is promoted as a necessary concomitant to an active campaign against the
marihuana menace.
During 1934 and 1935 Elizabeth Bass, the FBN's agent in charge in Chicago, supplied most
of the WCTU's information. Beginning in 1936, however, the Union Signal had a
direct line to the FBN national office, and from then on every issue contained propaganda
on the marihuana menace. Surgeon General Cummings' 1929 re-port was published, as was
every report, statement, interview, or Letter from Anslinger. The Signal continuously
editorialized in 936 and 1937 for adoption of the Uniform Act, with most ittention being
devoted to marihuana.32 Under the auspices of the Norld Narcotic Defense Association, the
president of the WCTU
Page 104:
Ida B. Wise Smith, gave a speech over the CBS radio network urg-ing public support for
adoption of the Uniform Act.33
A recurrent theme in the WCTU publications is an increase in use, especially among the
middle class and among the young. Elizabeth Bass is reported to have stated in 1934 that
"dope parties" were becoming common on Chicago's North Side and that
"smok-ing of marijuana is becoming particularly widespread." The Union Signal
also printed reports from other federal agents:
Marihuana-smoking at women's bridge parties has become frequent, "the parties usually
ending up in wild carousals, some-times with men joining the orgies."
The appalling effects on both body and mind seem no hindrance to its increase of
consumption, particularly in the states where there is a large Spanish-American
population, says a recent news item in the New York Times. In Western and South-western
states, it is being sold more or less openly in pool halls and beer gardens and, according
to some authorities, is being peddled to school children.'
On 20 April 1935 the Signal reported that the use of "love weeds" was
"growing to appalling proportions, especially among young people" many of whom
"come from good homes."35 Almost a year later the Signal noted that
Elizabeth Bass and local educators and police officials agreed that marihuana use in
Chicago high schools was increasing, with the major source of supply being south
,,36
Chicago's "Mexican colony. Then in October of the following year the Signal cited
an article appearing in Hygeia to the effect that, in 1937, there were 100,000
"marihuana addicts in the United States, the majority of whom were of high school and
college age."37
The second major theme of the WCTU literature was that the use of marihuana led to use of
heroin, opium, and cocaine. Although inconsistent with the contention that marihuana was
the "worst" of the drug evils, and contradicted by Commissioner Anslinger in
testimony before Congress in 1937,38 the WCTU con-tinually emphasized this.39 It is not
surprising since their literature often postulated a similar causal relationship between
alcohol and the use of narcotics. Others used the same argument; the safety director of
Denver had stated in 1931 that "from liquor to marihuana is but a step."
Page 105: Cartoon; Minneapolis Star, Dec.11. 1934
Page106:
The WCTU literature also stressed the relation of marihuana to crime. In February 1936
the Union Signal reported that Commis-sioner Anslinger had estimated that
"fifty per cent of the violent crimes committed in districts occupied by Mexicans,
Greeks, Turks, Filipinos, Spaniards, Latin Americans, and Negroes may be traced to the use
of marihuana."41 On 19 September of the same year the Signal printed an
article by Rex Stewart, a Phoenix attorney, which enlarged upon the Stanley thesis in a
manner bearing a striking resemblance to the Mexican "you take it three times"
folklore:
"A man is dangerous after a whiff or two of marihuana. He doesn't need to smoke an
entire cigarette. A few sucking puffs are enough to give him the heart of a lion and make
him as resilient to punishment as a rubber ball. He will commit any crime if he is
mentally so inclined, and he will take chances he would not dare normally."42
Ida B. Wise Smith devoted a major portion of her radio address on the Uniform Act to
marihuana and most of that to the criminal impulse of marihuana users. "It creates
delusions of grandeur and breaks down the will power and makes the addict ready for any
crime, even murder."43
Still another of the dramatis personae in the propaganda campaign directed by the FBN was
the World Narcotic Defense Association. Led by Admiral Richmond P. Hobson, a native
Alabamian and veteran of the Spanish-American War, the association included among its
supporters many former government leaders. It com-manded a position of moral leadership
during the narcotics clean-up campaign, and it had urged adoption of a uniform state
narcotic act since the early 1920s. Despite its well-intentioned proposal and its
respected public image, however, the WNDA had been excluded from the drafting process of
the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. The federal narcotics bureaucracy and the medical
establishment, determined to keep the drafting process out of the public eye, were wary of
the extremism of most of the association's propaganda against the drug trade. When the
association submitted a draft of its own proposed uniform law in 1927 to the surgeon
general, internal hygienic laboratory correspondence noted:
The World Narcotic Defense Association is an outgrowth of two other closely related
associations, the International Nar-
Page 107: Cartoon; Washington Herald, Dec.14, 1934
Page 108:
cotic Education Association and the World Conference on Narcotics Education, and it is
practically under the same management. The [Public Health] Service has had occasion to
call attention before to the propaganda nature of these associations and the gross
exaggerations of the narcotic situation that they have made in the name of education.44
This skepticism was shared by many reputable doctors and govern-mental officials. As late
as 1 July 1932 an influential doctor in the American Medical Association observed:
"There is a rather pernicious group working under the direction of Mr. Hobson on the
adoption of the law which if utilized and passed by the legislatures will postpone and
complicate uniformity later."45
The Federal Bureau of Narcotics did not seem quite so concerned about the bad reputation
of the WNDA as many of the others involved in the drafting process. Nevertheless, the
bureau was eager to quash the draft of the uniform act drawn up by the association because
it feared avid legislators might accept that draft and thereby undermine the efforts of
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. When the time came to campaign for
passage of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act in the various state legislatures, however,
Commissioner Anslinger was willing to seek help anywhere it was offered. The bureau was
not above utilizing the tremendous lobbying network and prestige offered by the World
Narcotic Defense Association.
The association was continually in postal contact with almost every state legislator in
the country.46 Hobson's name constituted a stamp of moral approval for the operation.
Newspapers editorial-izing in favor of the act continually noted his leadership in the
narcotics field.47
The Hobson group was among the well-financed divisions of Anslinger's army. In addition to
underwriting national broadcasts, such as that by Ida Smith over CBS, the association
distributed widely a lengthy pamphlet on marihuana in 1936. The following excerpt reflects
the kind of exaggeration the FBN had once dis-claimed but now embraced:
The narcotic content in Marihuana decreases the rate of heart beat and causes irregularity
of the pulse. Death may result from the effect upon the heart.
Page 109:
Prolonged use of Marihuana frequently develops a delirious rage which sometimes leads
to high crimes, such as assault and murder. Hence Marihuana has been called the
"killer drug." The habitual use of this narcotic poison always causes a very
marked mental deterioration and sometimes produces insanity. Hence Marihuana is frequently
called "loco weed" (loco is the Spanish word for crazy).
While the Marihuana habit leads to physical wreckage and mental decay, its effects upon
character and morality are even more devastating. The victim frequently undergoes such
moral degeneracy that he will lie and steal without scruple; he becomes utterly
untrustworthy and often drifts into the underworld where, with his degenerate companions,
he commits high crimes and misdemeanors. Marihuana sometimes gives man the lust to kill,
unreasonably and without motive. Many cases of assault, rape, robbery, and murder are
traced to the use of Marihuana.48
The General Federation of Women's Clubs also contributed energetically to the bureau's
cause. Support of the national organization was enlisted by Helen Howell Moorehead, head
of the Foreign Policy Association and one of the most respected leaders of the
international drug control movement. In January 1936 Act-ing Commissioner Wood sent the
president of the federation a list of states which had not yet passed the Uniform Act and
a list of states without marihuana legislation. Following current FBN prac-tice, Wood
emphasized marihuana, noting the success of the propaganda campaign which had begun late
in 1934: "Public opinion generally is being aroused by the steady accumulation of
reports showing the evils attendant upon the abuse of marihuana and of atrocities
committed by persons under its influence, and this office looks forward to increased state
control over the growth and distribution of cannabis, or marihuana."49
The federation wasted no time in educating its membership about the need for the Uniform
Act and about the evils of marihuana in particular. A lengthy article appeared in Clubwoman,
the group's magazine.50 The chairman of the federation's department of legislation
noted: "The situation concerning club women par-ticularly is the accessibility of the
frightening, degenerating, marihuana weed, which is rolled in cigarettes . . . and has
been playing such havoc with young high school boys and girls."51 The state and local
clubs immediately began to write local legislators
/fontfamily>
Page 110: Cartoon; New York American, 1934
Page111:
/fontfamily>and to conduct educational campaigns for parents, teachers, and children.
Narcotics agents worked closely with the Federation of Women's Clubs in an effort to
instill the fear of marihuana among the middle-class women of America. To them, the
marihuana "menace" was an unfamiliar abstraction which had to be tied to
reality. For example, an FBN agent appeared at a New York meeting with two marihuana
plants. They were exhibited at a local flower show:
Marihuana Plant exhibit at Flower Show of Katrina Trask Garden Club
Tomorrow, 3 P.M. on at the Casino
This plant is the cause of a dread menace which is being fought by the State Department of
Health.
Public Invited to Show . . . 25 cents52
Other groups such as the YWCA, the National PTA, and the rational Councils of Catholic Men
and Women were all in touch rith the bureau, and they were made aware of the bureau's dual
ims of "influencing and creating public opinion in favor of the assage of the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act, and awaken [sic] the arents of this country to the increasing danger of
the use of .arihuana... . Typical of Anslinger's approach to such groups, is perhaps of
his own thinking, is his letter to the general secretary of the National Catholic Welfare
Council:
The Act has been and is being opposed in some of the legislatures in session this year by
certain "groups" who wage their campaigns under cover. These cliques think that
their interest may be negatived by passage of this legislation. Many of the legislatures
in session this year will not convene again until 1937. It is, therefore, of the greatest
importance to concentrate activities in these commonwealths now. There is no more
important or far reaching problem affecting health and morals before the world today than
that of narcotic drug control.
Within the past three years there has been an alarming and almost unbelievable spread of
the use of Marihuana, known botanically as cannabis. A cigarette is compounded from the
dried, flowering pistillate tops of Marihuana or Indian Hemp, and sold illicitly and
insidiously by peddlers to adolescent youths, children in high and grammar school grades.
This statement is not exaggerated but is unfortunately true, as the Bureau has legal proof
of such malpractice.
Page 112:
When an opium or cocaine habitue has been made, it is extremely difficult to effect a
cure, although this has been done by scientific medical hospitalization. The case of
Marihuana addicts is well nigh hopeless as the Hasheesh or Marihuana smoker becomes
insane. Favorable action must be taken to prevent the spread of this pernicious weed
because its evil consequences are irremediable.
In behalf of the intensive campaign which we are waging for the adoption of the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act in the 35 state legislatures, I respectfully request the endorsement of
the National Catholic Welfare Councils of Men and Women for this necessary and vital
legislation.54
Marihuana: the Campaign and Public Opinion
The FBN wanted to arouse public opinion against marihuana, and Commissioner Anslinger
enlisted an army of public opinion makers and legislative pressure groups to accomplish
this task. How deeply into the general public consciousness all these efforts spread the
fear of marihuana is a moot point. But what Anslinger really wanted was enactment of the
Uniform Act along with prohibitory marihuana legislation in all the states. From this
point of view the campaign was a success, and the adoption of the marihuana strategy in
1935 was the turning point.
Whether or not widespread public interest actually existed, public opinion makers
influenced legislative opinion and created a "felt need" for legislation.
Because there was rarely any substantive opposition to the legislation, the job was
usually not difficult. When the marihuana strategy was instituted early in 1935, only ten
states had adopted the Uniform Act. And three of these states had not included marihuana.
Within the next year eighteen more states adopted the act, and each that had no previous
legislation included inarlhuana. Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Missouri even enacted
special legislation on marihuana without adopting the Uniform Act. Certainly the
precipitating factor in Missouri was the campaign waged against the drug by the St. Louis
Star-Times.
The ease with which legislation was passed once the opinion makers got started is
reflected in the Virginia experience. One of the first states to pass the Uniform Act, in
1934, Virginia did not include the marihuana provision.55 A year later, however, rumors
Page 113: Cartoon; Atlanta Georgian, Feb. 27, 1935
Page:114:
began to circulate in Roanoke that school children were using the weed. With the
assistance of FBN Agent L. C. Rocchiccioli, the commonwealth's attorney of Roanoke secured
a local ordinance against the drug. 56 Rocchiccioli then turned his attention to Richmond,
hoping to use the Roanoke experience as a wedge to remedy the deficiency in Virginia's
narcotics legislation. He quickly succeeded. A bill, prohibiting sale, possession, and
cultivation and providing harsher penalties than did the 1934 act, passed both houses
unanimously. 57 After the state senate passed the measure on 29 February 1936, the
Richmond Times-Dispatch noted:
Among the bills passed by the Senate was the Apperson measure prohibiting the cultivation,
sale or distribution of derivatives of the plant cannabis sativa, introduced as an
outgrowth of alleged traffic in marihuana cigarettes in Roanoke. It fixes punishment for
violation of its provisions at from one to 10 years in the penitentiary, or by confinement
in jail for 12 months and a fine of not more than $1,000 or both.
Charges that school children were being induced to become addicts of marihuana cigarettes
and that the weed was being cultivated in and near the city on a wide scale were laid
before the Roanoke City Council last year. A youth who said he was a former addict of the
drug testified before the Council that inhalation of one of the cigarettes would produce
a'cheap drunk' of several days' duration.58
In some respects Colorado, Missouri, and Virginia reflect the typical levels of public
awareness and legislative reaction on the marihuana "issue." In Colorado, use by
Mexicans had been discussed for many years, and the legislature acted three different
times on marihuana before adopting the Uniform Act in 1935. In Missouri, a sudden
newspaper campaign precipitated legislation in 1935, and then the "issue"
quickly receded. In Virginia, a single story from a single city generated state
legislation with no public interest. Of course, there is another point on the continuum
alsono use, no interest. When New Jersey, Rhode Island, Oregon, and West Virginia passed
the Uniform Act in 1934 and 1935, including the cannabis provision, the major newspapers
of Newark, Providence, Salem, and Charleston referred to the Uniform Act only once and to
marihuana not at all.59 Typical of both legislative and newspaper concern about the new
law is the following Charleston Daily Mail comment:
Page 115: (top 1/2 of page is illustration-map of US)
A Narcotic Bill
Inconspicuously upon the special calendar of the delegates- rather far down upon it-is
Engrossed S.B. No. 230, lodging specific powers in the hands of state authorities for the
control of the traffic in narcotics. It has passed the Senate unanimously. It should pass
the House, and its only danger of defeat there is the very real one that it will become
lost in the shuffle of adjournment now but a few hours away. The bill goes under the name
of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and it is just that.
Identical measures for the control bv the states of illicit traffic in drugs have been
passed by other states, notably the Southern qoup. Its passage here would result in a
broad territory in which
there are corresponding laws . . . . 60
All in all, neither narcotic drugs in general nor marihuana in particular were major
public issues during the thirties. After the bureau initiated the marilluana strategy in
late 1934, sufficient
Page 116: Cartoon; Washington Herald, Aug 3, 1935
Page 117:
attention was aroused among organized moralist groups to incite legislative adoption
of the Uniform Act. Interest in marihuana was still regional, although transient interest
had now been aroused elsewhere. Viewed nationally, apathy was the norm. In a sensc,
however, there was nothing to be concerned about. Use was confined and there was no
substantive opposition to overcome. Usually if a person had heard of marihuana, he could
be counted on to favor prohibition of this grave evil. In one of the few dissents
triggered by the FBN's campaign, a Chicago judge, addressing a women's club meeting, tried
to place marihuana in perspective: "My own personal opinion is that the 'Home
Medicine Chest' (pain killers and sleep producers) as found in homes such as yours is a
greater menace than marihuana. One percent to two percent of cases coming through our
Court are 'drug' cases, 20% - 25% are alcoholic. Why don't you Clubwomen frown on such a
social evil. ,61 Such heresy was atypical. Most of the public which had heard at all of
marihuana would have concurred in Anslinger's own characterization of the drug in April
1937: "If the hideous monster Frankenstein came face to face with the monster
Marihuana, he would drop dead of fright."62
End of Ch V
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