States of Consciousness
Charles T. Tart
13. Strategies in Using the Systems Approach
The systems approach generates a number of strategies for studying
states of consciousness. Some of these are unique consequences
of using a system approach, some are just good-sense strategies
that could come from other approaches. Many of these methodological
strategies have been touched on in previous chapters; some are
brought out in later chapters. Here I bring together most of these
methodological points and introduce some new ones.
The Constructed Nature of Consciousness
Realizing that the ordinary d-SoC is not natural and given, but
constructed according to semiarbitrary cultural constraints,
gives us the freedom to ask some basic questions that might not
otherwise occur to us. And it should make us more cautious about
labeling other states as "pathological" and other cultures
as "primitive." The Australian bushmen, for example,
are almost universally considered one of the world's most primitive
cultures because of their nomadic life and their paucity of material
possessions. Yet Pearce {49} argues that, from another point of
view, these people are among the most sophisticated in the world,
for they have organized their entire culture around achieving
a certain d-ASC, which they refer to as the experience of "Dream
Time." Our bias toward material possessions, however, makes
us unable to see this.
Recognizing the semiarbitrary nature of the system of the ordinary
d-SoC that has been constructed in our culture should make us
especially aware of the implicit assumptions built into it, assumptions
were so taken for granted that it never occurs to us to question
them. In Transpersonal Psychologies {128}, nine expert
practitioners of various spiritual disciplines wrote about their
disciplines not as religions, but as psychologies. In the course
of editing these contributions, I was increasingly struck by the
way certain assumptions are made in various spiritual psychologies
that are different from or contrary to those made in Western psychology.
As a result, I wrote a chapter outlining several dozen assumptions
that have become implicit for Western psychologies and that, by
virtue of being implicit, have great control over us.
I have found that when asked what some of these assumptions are,
I have great difficulty recalling them: I have to go back and
look at what I wrote! Although my study of systems that make different
assumptions brought these implicit assumptions to mind, they have
already sunk back to the implicit assumptions to mind, they have
already sunk back to the implicit level. We should not underestimate
the power of culturally given assumptions in controlling us, and
we cannot overestimate the importance of trying to come to grips
with them.
We should also recognize that the enculturation process, discussed
earlier, ties the reward and punishment subsystems to the maintenance
and defense of ordinary consensus reality. We are afraid of experiencing
d-ASCs that are foreign to us and this fear strengthens our tendency
to classify them as abnormal or pathological and to avoid them.
It also further strengthens our resolve to deal with all reality
from the point of view of the ordinary d-SoC, using only the tool
or coping function of the ordinary d-SoC. But since the ordinary
d-SoC is a limited tool, good for some things but not for others,
we invariable distort parts of reality. The tendency to ignore
or fight what we do not consider valuable and to distort our perceptions
to make them fit is good for maintaining a cohesive social system,
but poor for promoting scientific inquiry. A possible solution
is the proposal for establishing state-specific sciences, discussed
in Chapter 16.
The Importance of Awareness
The systems approach stresses the importance of attention/awareness
as an activating energy within any d-SoC. Yet if we ask what awareness
is or how we direct it and so call it attention, we cannot supply
satisfactory answers.
We may deal with this problem simply by taking basic awareness
for granted, as we are forced to do at this level of development
of the systems approach, and work with it even though we do not
know what it is. After all, we do not really know what gravity
is in any ultimate sense, but we can measure what it does and
from that information develop, for example, a science of ballistics.
We can learn much about d-SoCs in the systems approach if we just
take basic awareness and attention/awareness energy for granted,
but we must eventually focus on questions about the nature of
awareness. We will have to consider the conservative and radical
views of the mind to determine whether awareness is simply the
product of brain and nervous system functioning or whether it
is something more.
System Qualities
The systems approach emphasizes that even though a d-SoC is made
up of components, the overall system has gestalt qualities that
cannot be predicted from knowledge of the components alone. Thus,
while investigation of the components, the subsystems and structures,
is important, such investigative emphasis must be balanced by
studies of the overall system's functioning. We must become familiar
with the pattern of the overall system's functioning so we can
avoid wasting energy on researching components that turn out to
be relatively unimportant in the overall system. We might, for
example, avoid spending excessive research effort and money, as
is now being done, on investigating physiological effects of marijuana
intoxication, as we have seen, indicates that psychological factors
are at least as important as the drug factor in determining the
nature of the d-ASC produced.
The systems approach also emphasizes the need to examine the system's
functioning under the conditions in which it was designed to function.
We are not yet sure what, if anything, d-ASCs are particularly
designed for, what particular they have. We must find this out.
On the other hand, we should try not to waste effort studying
d-ASCs under conditions they were clearly not designed for. For
example, conducting studies that show a slight decrement in arithmetical
skills under marijuana intoxication is of some interest, but since
no record exists of anyone using marijuana in order to solve arithmetical
problems, such studies are somewhat irrelevant. This emphasizes
a point made earlier: that it is generally useless to characterize
any d-ASC as "better" or "worse" than any
other d-SoC. The question should always be, "Better or worse
for what particular task?" All d-ASCs we know of seem to
associated with improved functioning for certain kinds of tasks
and worsened functioning for others.[1] An
important research aim, then, is to find out what d-ASCs are optimal
for particular tasks and how to train people to enter efficiently
into that d-ASC when they need to perform that task. This runs
counter to a strong, implicit assumption in our culture that the
ordinary d-SoC is the best one for all tasks; that assumption
is highly questionable when it is made explicit. Remember that
in any d-SoC there is a limited selection from the full range
of human potential. While some of these latent human potentials
may be developable in the ordinary d-SoC, some are more available
in a d-ASC. Insofar as we consider some of these potentials valuable,
we must learn what d-SoCs they are operable in and how to train
them for good functioning within those d-SoCs.
This last point is not an academic issue: enormous numbers of
people are now personally experimenting with d-ASCs to attain
some of these potentials. While much gain will undoubtedly come
out of this personal experimentation, we should also expect much
loss.
Individual Differences
As we have seen, what for one individual is a d-ASC may, for another
individual, be merely part of the region of his ordinary d-SoC,
one continuous experiential space. By following the common experimental
procedure of using group data rather than data from individual
subjects, we can (Chapter 9) get the impression of continuity
(one d-SoC) when two or more d-SoCs actually occurred within the
experimental procedure. We should indeed search for general laws
of the mind that hold across individuals, but we must beware of
enunciating such laws prematurely without first understanding
the behavior and experiences of the individuals within our experiments.
Recognizing the importance of individual differences has many
application outside the laboratory. If a friend tries some spiritual
technique and has a marvelous experience as a result, and you
try the same technique with no result, there is not necessarily
something wrong with you. Rather, because of differences in the
structures of your ordinary d-SoCs, that particular technique
mobilizes attention/awareness energy in an effective way to produce
a certain experience for him, but is not an effective techniques
for you.
Operationalism, Relevant and Irrelevant
Operationalism is a way of rigorously defining some concept by
describing the actual operations required to produce it. Thus
an operational definition of the concept of "nailing"
is defined by the operations (1) pick up a hammer in your right
hand; (2) pick up a nail in your left hand; (3) put the point
of the nail on a wood surface and hold the nail perpendicular
to the wood surface; (4) strike the head of the nail with the
hammer and then lift the hammer again; and (5) repeat step 4 until
the head of the nail is flush with the surface of the wood. An
operational definition is a precise definition, allowing total
reproducibility.
Some claim that whatever cannot be defined operationally is not
a legitimate subject for scientific investigation. That is silly.
No one can precisely specify all the steps necessary to experience
"being in love," but that is hardly justification for
ignoring the state of being in love as an important human situation
worthy of study. A further problem is that in psychology, operationalism
implicitly means physical operationalism, specifying the
overt, physically observable steps in a process in order to define
it. In the search for an objectivity like that of the physical
sciences, psychologists emphasize aspects of their discipline
that can be physically measured, but often at the cost of irrelevant
studies.
An example is the equating of the hypnotic state, the d-ASC of
hypnosis, with the performance of the hypnotic induction procedure.
The hypnotic state is a psychological construct or, if induction
has been successful, an experiential reality to the hypnotized
person. It is not defined by external measurements. There are
no obvious behavioral manifestations that clearly indicate hypnosis
has occurred and no known physiological changes that invariably
accompany hypnosis. The hypnotic procedure, on the other had,
the words that they hypnotist says aloud, is highly amenable to
physical measurement. An investigator can film the hypnotic procedure,
tape-record the hypnotist's voice, measure the sound intensity
of the hypnotist's voice, and accumulate a variety of precise,
reproducible physical measurements. But that investigator makes
a serious mistake if he then describes the responses of the "hypnotized
subject" and means by "hypnotized subject" the
person to whom the hypnotist said the words. The fact that the
hypnotist performs the procedure does not guarantee that the subject
enters the d-ASC of hypnosis. As discussed earlier, a person's
b-SoC is multiply stabilized, and no single induction procedure
or combination of induction procedures will, with certainty, destabilize
the ordinary state and produce a particular d-ASC.
I stress that the concept of the d-SoC is a psychological, experiential
construct. Thus, the ultimate criterion for determining whether
a person is in a d-ASC is a map of his experiences that shows
him to be in a region of psychological space we have termed a
d-ASC. The external performance of an induction technique is not
the same as achievement of the desired d-ASC. A hypnotic induction
procedure does not necessarily induce hypnosis; lying down in
bed does not necessarily induce sleeping or dreaming; performing
a meditation exercise does not necessarily induce a meditative
state.
When an induction procedure is physiological, as when a drug is
used, the temptation to equate the induction procedure with the
altered state is especially great. But the two are not the same,
even in this case. As discussed in Chapter 10, smoking marijuana
does not necessarily cause a transition out of the b-SoC. Nor,
as is shown in Chapter 14, is knowledge of the dose of the drug
an adequate specification of depth.
We do need to describe techniques in detail in our reports of
d-ASCs, but we must also specify the degree to which these techniques
were actually effective in altering a subject's state of
consciousness, and we must specify this for each individual
subject. In practice, physiological criteria may be sometimes
so highly correlated with experiential reports indicating a d-ASC
that those criteria can be considered an indicator that the d-ASC
has occurred. This is the case with stage 1 REM dreaming. Behavioral
criteria may be similarly correlated with experiential data, though
I am not sure any such criteria are well correlated at present.
But the primary criteria are well correlated at present. But the
primary criterion is an actual assessment of the kind of experiential
space the subject is in that indicates the induction procedure
was effective.
Operationalism, then, which uses external, physical, and behavioral
criteria, is inadequate for dealing with many of the most important
phenomena of d-ASCs. Most of the phenomena that define d-ASCs
are internal and may never show obvious behavioral or physiological[2]
manifestations.
Ultimately we need an experiential operationalism, a set
of statements such as (1) if you stop all evaluation processes
for at least three minutes, (2) and you concurrently invest no
attention/awareness energy into the Interoception subsystem for
perceiving the body, (3) so that all perception of the body fades
out, then (4) you will experience a mental phenomenon of such
and such a type. Our present language is not well suited to this,
as discussed earlier, so we are a long way from a good experiential
operationalism. The level of precision of understanding and communication
that an experiential operationalism will bring is very high; nevertheless,
we should not overvalue operationalism and abandon hope of understanding
a phenomenon we cannot define operationally.
Predictive Capabilities of the Systems Approach
In Chapter 8 I briefly describe some basic subsystems we can recognize
in terms of current knowledge. We can now see how the systems
approach can be used to make testable predictions about d-SoCs.
The basic predictive operation is cyclical. The first step is
to observe the properties of structures/subsystems as well as
you can from the current state of knowledge. You ask questions
in terms of what you already know. Then you take the second step
of organizing the observations to make better theoretical models
of the structures/subsystems you have observed. The third step
is to predict, on the basis of the models, how the structures/subsystems
can and cannot interact with each other under various conditions.
Fourth, you test these predictions by looking for or attempting
to create d-SoCs that fit or do not fit these improved structure/subsystem
models and seeing how well the models work. This takes you back
to the first step, starting the cycle again, further altering
or refining your models, etc.
The systems approach providers a conceptual framework for organizing
knowledge about states of consciousness and a process for continually
improving knowledge about the structures/subsystems. The ten subsystems
sketched in Chapter 8 are crude concepts at this stage of our
knowledge and should eventually be replaced with more precise
concepts about the exact nature of a larger number of more basic
subsystems and about their possibilities for interaction to form
systems.
I have given little thought so far to making predictions based
on the present state of the systems approach. The far more urgent
need at this current, chaotic stage of the new science of consciousness
is to organize the mass of unrelated data we have into manageable
form. I believe that most of the data now available can be usefully
organized in the systems approach and that to do so will be a
clear step forward. The precise fitting of the available
mass of data into this approach will, however, take years of work.
One obvious prediction of the systems theory is that because the
differing properties of structures restrict their interaction,
there is a definite limit to the number of stable d-SoCs. Ignoring
enculturation, we can say that the number is large but limited
by the biological/neurological/psychical endowment of man in general,
by humanness. The number of possible states for a particular individual
is even smaller because enculturation further limits the qualities
of structures.
My systems approach to consciousness appears to differ from Lilly's
approach {34, 35} to consciousness as a human biocomputer. I predict
that only certain configurations can occur and constitute stable
states of consciousness, d-SoCs. Lilly's model seems to treat
the mind as a general-purpose computer, capable of being programmed
in any way one can conceive of: "In the province of the mind,
what one believes to true either is true or becomes true within
certain limits." Personal conversations between Lilly and
I suggest that our positions actually do not differ that much.
The phrase "within certain limits" is important here.
I agree entirely with Lilly's belief that what we currently believe
to be the limits, the "basic" structures limiting
the mind are probably mostly arbitrary, programmed structures
peculiar to our culture and personal history. It is the discovery
of the really basic structures behind these arbitrary cultural/personal
ones that will tell us about the basic nature of the human mind.
The earlier discussion of individual differences is highly relevant
here, for it can applied across cultures: two regions of experiential
space that are d-SoCs for many or all individuals in a particular
culture may be simply parts of one large region of experiential
space for many or all individuals in another culture.
I stress again, however, that our need today, and the primary
value of the systems approach, is useful organization of data
and guidance in asking questions, not prediction. Prediction and
hypothesis-testing will come into their own in a few years as
our understanding of structures/subsystems sharpens.
Stability and Growth
Implicit in the act of mapping an individual's psychological experiences
is the assumption of a reasonable degree of stability of the individual's
structure and functioning over time. The work necessary to obtain
a map would be wasted if the map had to be changed before it had
been used.
Ordinarily we assume that an individual's personality or ordinary
d-SoC is reasonably stable over quite long periods, generally
over a lifetime once his basic personality has been formed by
late adolescence. Exceptions to this assumption occur when individuals
are exposed to severe, abnormal conditions, such as disasters,
which may radically alter parts of their personality structure,
or to psychotherapy and related psychological growth techniques.
Although the personality change following psychotherapy is often
rather small, leaving the former map of the individual's personality
relatively useful, it is sometimes quite large.
The validity of assuming this kind of stability in relation to
research on d-SoCs is questionable. The people who are most interested
in experiencing d-ASCs are dissatisfied with the ordinary d-SoC
and so may be actively trying to change it. But studies confined
to people not very interested in d-ASCs (so-called naive subjects)
may be dealing with an unusual group who are afraid of d-ASCs.
Stability of the b-SoC or of repeatedly induced d-ASCs is something
to be assessed, not assumed. This is particularly true
for a person's early experiences with a d-ASC, where he is learning
how to function in the d-ASC with each new occurrence. In my study
of the experiences of marijuana intoxication {103, 105}. I deliberately
excluded users who had had less than a dozen experiences of being
stoned on marijuana. The experience of these naive users would
have mainly reflect learning to cope with a new state, rather
than the common, stable characteristics of the d-ASC of being
stoned.
An individual may eventually learn to merge two d-SoCs into one.
The merger may be a matter of transferring some state-specific
experiences and potentials back into the ordinary state, so that
eventually most or many state-specific experiences are available
in the ordinary state. The ordinary state, in turn, undergoes
certain changes in its configuration. Or, growth or therapeutic
work at the extremes of functioning of two d-SoCs may gradually
bring the two closer until experiences are possible all through
the former "forbidden region."
Pseudomerging of two d-SoCs may also be possible. As an individual
more and more frequently makes the transitions between the two
states, he may automate the transition process to the point where
he no longer has any awareness of it, and/or efficient routes
through the transition process are so thoroughly learned that
the transition takes almost no tie or effort. Then, unless the
individual or an observer was examining his whole pattern of functioning,
his state of consciousness might appear to be single simply because
transitions were not noticed. This latter case would be like the
rapid, automated transitions between identity states within the
ordinary state of consciousness.
Since a greater number of human potentials are available in two
states than in one, such merging or learning of rapid transitions
can be seen as growth. Whether the individual or his culture sees
it as growth depends on cultural valuations of the added potentials
and the individual's own intelligence in actual utilization of
the two states. The availability of more potentials does not guarantee
their wise or adaptive use.
Sequential Strategies in Studying d-SoCs
The sequential strategies for investigating d-SoCs that follow
from the systems approach are outlined below. These strategies
are idealistic and subject to modification in practice.
First, the general experiential, behavioral or physiological components
of a rough concept of a particular d-ASC are mapped. The data
may come from informal interviews with a number of people who
have experienced that state, from personal experiences in that
d-ASC. This exercise supplies a feeling for the overall territory
and its main features.
Then the experiential space of various individuals is mapped to
determine whether their experiences show the distinctive clusterings
and patternings that constitute d-SoCs. This step overlaps somewhat
with the first, for the investigator assumes or has data to indicate
a distinctness about the d-ASC for at least some individuals as
a start of his interest.
For individuals who show this discreteness, the third step of
more detailed individual investigation is carried out. For those
who do not, studies are begun across individuals to ascertain
why some show various discrete states and others do not: in addition
to recognizing the existence of individual differences, the researcher
must find out why they exist and what function they serve.
The third step is to map the various d-SoCs of particular individuals
in detail. What are the main features of each state? What
induction procedures produce the state? What deinduction procedures
cause a person to transit out of it? What are the limits of stability
of the state? What uses, advantages does the state have? What
disadvantages or dangers? How is the depth measured? What are
the convenient marker phenomena to rapidly measure depth?
With this background, the investigator can profitable ask questions
about interindividual similarities of the various discrete states.
Are they really enough alike across individuals to warrant a common
state name? If so, does this relate mainly to cultural background
similarities of the individuals studied or to some more fundamental
aspect of the nature of the human mind?
Finally, even more detailed studies can be done on the nature
of particular discrete states and the structures/subsystems comprising
them. This sort of investigation should come at a late stage to
avoid premature reductionism: we must not repeat psychology's
early mistake of trying to find the universal Laws of the Mind
before we have good empirical maps of the territory.
Footnotes
[1] Objectivity is hard to maintain here,
for functions that are improved in a particular d-SoC may not
be valued functions for the culture of the investigator. The first
thing we can do is be explicit about our value judgments,
rather than pretending we do not make them. (back)
[2] I refer to present-day levels of physiological
measurement: in principle, if we could measure the microstructures
of the brain finely enough, we could distinguish d-ASCs that are
presently not distinguishable from scalp recordings of brain activity.
(back)