States of Consciousness
Charles T. Tart
16. State-Specific Sciences
In previous chapters I argue that the ordinary (or any) d-SoC
is a semiarbitrary construction, a specialized tool, useful
for some things but not for others. A consequence of this is that
science is specialized, because it is a one-d-SoC science. As
a method of learning science has been applied only in a limited
way because it has been used in only one of many possible d-SoCs.
This chapter works out the consequences of this idea in detail
and proposes that if we are to understand d-ASCs adequately, as
well as ourselves as human beings, we must develop state-specific
sciences.[1]
Disaffection with Science
Blackburn {7} recently noted that many of our most talented young
people are "turned off" from science: as a solution,
he proposed that we recognize the validity of a more sensuous-intuitive
approach to nature, treating it as complementary to the classical
intellectual approach.
I have seen the same rejection of science by many of the brightest
students in California, and the problem is indeed serious Blackburn's
analysis is valid, but not deep enough. A more fundamental source
of alienation is the widespread experience of d-ASCs by the young,
coupled with the almost total rejection by the scientific establishment
of the knowledge gained during the experiencing of d-ASCs. Blackburn
himself exemplifies this rejection when he says: "Perhaps
science has much to learn along this line from the disciplines,
as distinct from the context, of Oriental religions"
(my italics).
To illustrate, a 1971 Gallup poll {41} indicated that approximately
half of American college students have tried marijuana and that
a large number of them use it fairly regularly. They do this at
the risk of having their careers ruined and going to jail for
several years. Why? Conventional research on the nature of marijuana
intoxication tells us that the primary effects are a slight increase
in heart rate, reddening of the eyes, some difficulty with memory,
and small decrements in performance on complex psychomotor tests.
Would you risk going to jail to experience these?
A young marijuana smoker who hears a scientist or physician refer
to these findings as the basic nature of marijuana intoxication
will simply sneer and have his antiscientific attitude further
reinforced. It is clear to him that the scientist has no real
understanding of what marijuana intoxication is all about (see
{105} for a comprehensive description of this d-ASC).
More formally, an increasingly significant number of people are
experimenting with d-ASCs in themselves and finding the experiences
thus gained of extreme importance in their philosophy and style
of life. The conflict between experiences in these d-ASCs and
the attitudes and intellectual-emotional systems that have evolved
in the ordinary d-SoC is a major factor behind the increased alienation
of many people from conventional science. Experiences of ecstasy,
mystical union, other dimensions, rapture, beauty, space-and-time
transcendence, and transpersonal knowledge, all common in d-ASCs,
are simply not treated adequately in conventional scientific approaches.
These experiences will not go away if we crack down more on psychedelic
drugs, for immense numbers of people now practice carious nondrug
techniques for producing d-ASCs, such as meditation {39} and yoga.
My purpose here is to show that it is possible to investigate
and work with the important phenomena of d-ASCs in a manner that
is perfectly compatible with the essence of scientific method.
The conflict discussed above is not necessary.
States of Consciousness
To review briefly, a d-ASC is defined as a qualitative alteration
in the overall pattern of mental functioning, such that the experiencer
feels his consciousness is radically different from the way it
functions ordinarily. A d-SoC is defined not in terms of any particular
content of consciousness or specific behavior or physiological
change, but in terms of the overall patterning of psychological
functioning.
An analogy with computer functioning can clarify this definition.
A computer has a complex program of many subroutines. If we reprogram
it quite differently, the same sorts of input data may be handled
in quite different ways; we can predict little from our knowledge
of the old program about the effects of varying the input, even
though old and new programs have some subroutines in common. The
new program with its input-output interactions must be studied
in and of itself. A d-ASC is analogous to a temporary change in
the program of a computer.
The d-ASCs experienced by almost all ordinary people are dreaming
states and the hypnagogic and hypnopompic states, the transitional
states between sleeping and waking. Many others experience another
d-ASC, alcohol intoxication.
The relatively new (to our culture) d-ASCs that are now having
such an impact are those produced by marijuana, more powerful
psychedelic drugs such as LSD, meditative states, so-called possession
states, and autohypnotic states.[2]
States of Consciousness and Paradigms
It is useful to compare this concept of a d-SoC, a qualitatively
distinct organization of the pattern of mental functioning, with
Kuhn's {32} concept of paradigms in science. A paradigm is an intellectual
achievement that underlies normal science and attracts and guides
the work of an enduring number of adherents in their scientific
activity. It is a "super" theory, a formulation wide
enough in scope to affect the organization of most or all of the
major known phenomena of its field. Yet it is sufficiently open-ended
that there still remain important problems to be solved within
that framework. Examples of important paradigms in the history
of science have been Copernican astronomy and Newtonian dynamics.
Because of their tremendous success, paradigms undergo a change
which, in principle, ordinary scientific theories do not undergo.
An ordinary scientific theory is always subject to further questioning
and testing as it is extended. A paradigm becomes an implicit
framework for most scientists working within it; it is the
natural way of looking at things and doing things. It does not
seriously occur to the adherents of a paradigm to question it
(we may ignore, for the moment, the occurrence of scientific revolutions).
Theories become referred to as laws: people talk of the
law of gravity, not the theory of gravity, for example.
A paradigm serves to concentrate the attention of a researcher
on sensible problem areas and to prevent him from wasting his
time on what might be trivia. On the other hand, by implicitly
defining some lines of research as trivial or nonsensical, a paradigm
acts as a blinder. Kuhn has discussed this blinding function as
a key factory in the lack of effective communications during paradigm
clashes.
The concept of a paradigm and a d-SoC are quite similar. Both
constitute complex, interlocking sets of rules and theories that
enable a person to interact with and interpret experiences within
an environment. In both cases, the rules are largely implicit.
They are not recognized as tentative working hypotheses; they
operate automatically and the person feels he is doing the obvious
or natural thing.
Paradigm Clash Between Straight and Hip
Human beings become emotionally attached to the things that give
them success and pleasure, and a scientist making important progress
within a particular paradigm becomes emotionally attached to it.
When data that make not sense in terms of the (implicit) paradigm
are brought to his attention, the usual result is not a reevaluation
of the paradigm, but a rejection or misperception of the data.
This rejection seems rational to others sharing that paradigm
and irrational or rationalizing to those committed to a different
paradigm.
The conflict now existing between those who have experienced certain
d-ASCs (whose ranks include many young scientists) and those who
have not is a paradigmatic conflict. For example, a subject takes
LSD and tells his investigator, "You and I, we are all one,
there are no separate selves." The investigator reports that
his subject showed a "confused sense of identity and distorted
thinking process." The subject is reporting what is obvious
to him; the investigator is reporting what is obvious to him.
The investigator's (implicit) paradigm, based on his scientific
training, his cultural background, and his normal d-SoC, indicates
that a literal interpretation of the subject's statement cannot
be true and therefore the statement must be interpreted as mental
dysfunction on the part of the subject. The subject, his paradigms
radically changed for the moment by being in a d-ASC, not only
reports what is obviously true to him, but perceives the investigator
as showing mental dysfunction because he is incapable of perceiving
the obvious!
Historically, paradigm clashes have been characterized by bitter
emotional antagonisms and total rejection of the opponent. Currently
we see the same sort of process: the respectable psychiatrist,
who would not take any of those "psychotomimetic" drugs
himself or experience that crazy meditation process, carries out
research to show that drug-takers and those who practice meditation
are escapists. The drug-taker or meditater views the same investigator
as narrow-minded, prejudiced, and repressive, and as a result
drops out of the university. Communication between the two factions
is almost nil.
Must the experiencers of d-ASCs continue to see the scientists
as concentrating on the irrelevant, and scientists see the experiencers
as confused[3] or mentally
ill? Or can science deal adequately with the experiencers of these
people? The thesis I present is that we can deal with the important
aspects of d-ASCs using the essence of scientific method, even
though a variety of non-essentials, unfortunately identified with
current science, hinder such an effort.
The Nature of Knowledge
Science deals with knowledge. Knowledge may be defined as an immediately
given experiential feeling of congruence between two different
kinds of experience, a matching. One set of experiences may be
regarded as perceptions of the external world, of others, of oneself;
the second set may be regarded as a theory, a scheme, a system
of understanding. The feeling of congruence is something immediately
given in experience, although many refinements have been worked
out for judging degrees of congruence.
All knowledge, then, is basically experiential knowledge. Even
my knowledge of the physical world can be reduced to this: given
certain sets of experiences, which I (by assumption) attribute
to activation of my sensory apparatus by the external world, I
can compare them with purely internal experiences (memories, previous
knowledge) and predict with a high degree of reliability other
kinds of experiences, which I again attribute to the external
world.
Because science has been highly successful in dealing with the
physical world, it has been historically associated with a philosophy
of physicalism, the belief that reality is all reducible to certain
kinds of physical entities. The vast majority of phenomena of
d-ASCs have no known physical manifestations: thus to physicalistic
philosophy they are epiphenomena, not worthy of study. But since
science deals with knowledge, it need not restrict itself to physical
kinds of knowledge.
The Essence of Scientific Method
As satisfying as the feeling of knowing can be, we are
often wrong: what seems like congruence at first, later does not
match or has no generality. Man has learned that his reasoning
is often faulty, his observations often incomplete or mistaken,
and that emotional or other nonconscious factors can seriously
distort both reasoning and observational processes. His reliance
on authorities, "rationality," or elegance," are
no sure criteria for achieving truth. The development of scientific
method may be seen as a determined effort to systematize the process
of acquiring knowledge in such a way as to minimize the pitfalls
of observation and reasoning.
There are four basic rules of scientific method to which an investigator
is committed: (1) good observation, (2) the public nature of observation,
(3) the necessity to theorize logically, and (4) the testing of
theory by observable consequences. These constitute the scientific
enterprise. I consider below the wider application of each rule
to d-ASCs and indicate how unnecessary physicalistic restrictions
may be dropped. I also show that all these commitments or rules
can be accommodated in the development of state-specific sciences.
Observation
The scientist is committed to observe as well as possible the
phenomena of interest and to search constantly for better ways
of making these observations. But his paradigmatic commitments,
his d-SoCs, make him likely to observe certain parts of reality
and to ignore or observe with error certain other parts of it.
Many of the most important phenomena of d-ASCs have been observed
poorly or not at all because of the physicalistic labeling of
them as epiphenomena, so that they have been called "subjective,"
"ephemeral," "unreliable," or "unscientific."
Observations of internal processes are probably much more difficult
than those of external physical processes, because of their inherently
greater complexity. The essence of science, however, is to observe
what there is to observed, whether or not it is difficult.
Furthermore, most of what is known about the phenomena of d-ASCs
has been obtained from untrained people, almost none of whom have
shared the scientist's commitment to constantly reexamine observations
in greater and greater detail. This does not imply that internal
phenomena are inherently unobservable or unstable; we are comparing
the first observations of internal phenomena with observations
of physical sciences that have undergone centuries of refinement.
We must consider one other problem of observation. One of the
traditional idols of science, the "detached observer,"
has no place in dealing with many internal phenomena of d-SoCs.
Not only are the observer's perceptions selective, he may also
affect the things he observes. We must try to understand the characteristics
of each individual observer in order to compensate for them.
A recognition of the unreality of the detached observer in the
psychological sciences is becoming widespread, under the topics
of experimenter bias {55} and demand characteristics {45}. A similar
recognition long ago occurred in physics when it was realized
that he observed was altered by the process of observation at
subatomic levels. When we deal with d-ASCs where the observer
is the experiencer of the d-ASC, this factor is of paramount importance.
Not knowing the characteristics of the observer can also confound
the process of consensual validation.
Public Nature of Observation
Observations must be public in that they must be replicable by
any properly trained observer. The experienced conditions
that led to the report of certain experiences must be described
in sufficient detail that others can duplicate them and consequently
have experiences that meet criteria of identicality. That
someone else may set up similar conditions but not have the same
experiences proves that the original investigator gave an incorrect
description of the conditions and observations, or that he was
not aware of certain essential aspects of the conditions.
The physicalistic accretion to this rule of consensual validation
is that, physical data being the only "real" data, internal
phenomena must be reduced to physiological or behavioral data
to become reliable or they will be ignored entirely. I believe
most physical observations to be much more readily replicable
by any trained observer because they are inherently simpler phenomena
than internal ones. In principle, however, consensual validation
of internal phenomena by a trained observer is possible.
The emphasis on public observations in science has had a misleading
quality insofar as it implies that any intelligent man can replicate
a scientists observations. This may have been true early in the
history of science, but nowadays only the trained observer can
replicate many observations. I cannot go into a modern physicist's
laboratory and confirm his observations. Indeed, his talk of what
he has found in his experiments (physicists seem to talk about
innumerable invisible entities) would probably seem mystical to
me, just as descriptions of internal states sound mystical to
those with a background in the physical sciences.[4]
Given the high complexity of the phenomena associated with d-ASCs,
the need for replication by trained observers is exceptionally
important. Since it generally takes four to ten years of intensive
training to produce a scientist in any of the conventional disciplines,
we should not be surprised that there has been little reliability
of observations by untrained observers of d-ASC phenomena.
Further, for the state-specific sciences I propose, we cannot
specify the requirements that constitute adequate training. These
can only be determined after considerable trial and error. We
should also recognize that very few people may complete the training
successfully. Some people do not have the necessary innate characteristics
to become physicists, and some probably do not have the innate
characteristics to become scientific investigators of meditative
states.
Public observation, then, always refers to a limited, specially
trained public. It is only by basic agreement among those specially
trained people that data become accepted as a foundation for the
development of a science. That laymen cannot replicate the observations
is of little relevance.
A second problem in consensual validation arises from a phenomenon
predicted by my concept of d-ASCs, but not yet empirically investigated:
state-specific communication. Given that a d-ASC is an
overall qualitative and quantitative shift in the complex functioning
of consciousness, producing new logics and perceptions (which
constitute a paradigm shift), it is quite reasonable to hypothesize
that communication may take a different pattern. For two observers,
both of whom, we assume, are fluent in communicating with each
other in a given d-SoC, communication about some new observations
may seem adequate or may be improved or deteriorated in specific
ways. To an outside observer, an observer in a different d-SoC,
the communication between these two observers may seem deteriorated.
Practically all investigations of communication by persons in
d-ASCs have resulted in reports of deterioration of communication
abilities. In designing their studies, however, these investigators
have not taken into account the fact that the pattern of communication
may have changed. If I am listening to two people speaking in
English, and they suddenly begin to intersperse words and phrases
in Polish, I, as an outside (non-Polish-speaking) observer, note
a gross deterioration in communication. Adequacy of communication
between people in the same d-SoC and across d-SoCs must be empirically
determined. This is discussed in Chapter 15.
Thus consensual validation may be restricted by the fact that
only observers in the same d-ASC are able to communicate adequately
to each other. Someone in a different d-SoC, say normal consciousness,
might find their communication incomprehensible.[5]
Theorizing
A scientist may theorize about his observations as much as he
wishes, but the theory he develops must consistently account for
all he has observed and should have a logical structure that other
scientists comprehend (but not necessarily accept).
The requirement to theorize logically and consistently with the
data is not as simply as it looks, however. Any logic consists
of a basic set of assumptions and a set of rules for manipulating
information based on these assumptions. Change the assumptions,
or change the rules, and there may be entirely different outcomes
from the same data. A paradigm, too, is a logic: it has certain
assumptions and rules for working within these assumptions. By
changing the paradigms, altering the d-SoC, the nature of theory-building
may change radically. Thus a person in d-SoC 2 might come to a
very different conclusions about the nature of the same events
that he observed in d-SoC 1. An investigator in d-SoC 1 can comment
on the comprehensibility of the second person's ideas form the
point of view (paradigm) of d-SoC 1, but can say nothing about
their inherent validity. A scientist who could enter either d-SoC
1 or d-SoC 2, however, could evaluate the comprehensibility of
the other's theory and the adherence of that theory to the rules
and logic of d-SoC 2. Thus, scientist trained to work in the same
d-SoC can check on the logical validity of each other's theorizing.
So we can have inter-observer validation of the state-specific
logic underlying theorizing in various d-SoCs.
Observable Consequences
Any theory a scientist develops must have observable consequences,
it must be possible to make predictions that can be verified by
observation. If such verification is not obtained, the theory
must be considered invalid, regardless of its elegance, logic
or other appeal.
Ordinarily we think of empirical validation, validation
in terms of testable consequences that produce physical effects,
but this is misleading. Any effect, whether interpreted as physical
or nonphysical, is ultimately an experience in the observer's
mind. All that is essentially required to validate a theory is
that it predict that when a certain experience (observed condition)
has occurred, another (predicted) kind of experience will follow,
under specified experiential conditions. Thus a perfectly scientific
theory may be based on data that have no physical existence.
State-Specific Sciences
We tend to envision the practice of science like this: centered
around interest in some particular range of subject matter, a
small number of highly selected, talented, and rigorously trained
people spend considerable time making detailed observations on
the subject matter of interest. They may or may not have special
places (laboratories) or instruments or methods to assist them
in making finer observations. They speak to one another in a special
language that they feel conveys precisely the important facts
of their field. Using this language, they confirm and extend each
other's knowledge of certain data basic to the field. They theorize
about their basic data and construct elaborate systems. They validate
these by recourse to further observation. These trained people
all have a long-term commitment to the constant refinement of
observation and extension of theory. Their activity is frequently
incomprehensible to laymen.
This general description is equally applicable to a variety of
sciences or areas that could become sciences, whether we called
such areas biology, physics, chemistry, psychology, understanding
of mystical states, or drug-induced enhancement of cognitive processes.
The particulars of research look different, but the basic scientific
method is the same.
I propose the creation of various state-specific sciences. If
such sciences can be created we will have a group of highly skilled,
dedicated, and trained practitioners able to achieve certain d-SoCs,
and able to agree with one another that they have attained a common
state. While in that d-SoC, they can investigate other areas of
interest—totally internal phenomena of that given state, the
interaction of that state with external physical reality, or people
in other d-SoCs.
The fact that the experimenter can function skillfully in the
d-SoC itself for a state-specific science does not necessarily
mean he must always be the subject. While he may often be the
subject, observer, and experimenter simultaneously, it is quite
possible for him to collect data from experimental manipulations
of other subjects in the d-SoC, and either be in that d-SoC himself
at the time of data collection or be in that d-SoC himself for
data reduction and theorizing.
Examples of some observations made and theorizing done by a scientist
in a specific d-ASC would illustrate the nature of a proposed
state-specific science. But this is not possible because no state-specific
sciences have yet been established.[6] Also,
any example that would make good sense to the readers of this
chapter (who are, presumably, all in an ordinary d-SoC) would
not really illustrate the uniqueness of state-specific science.
If it did make sense, it would be an example of a problem that
could be approached adequately from both the d-ASC and our ordinary
terms of accepted scientific procedures for our ordinary d-SoC
and miss the point about the necessity for developing state-specific
sciences.
State-Specific Sciences and Religion
Some aspects of organized religion appear to resemble state-specific
sciences. There are techniques that allow that believer to enter
a d-ASC and then have religious experiences in that d-ASC that
are proof of his religious belief. People who have had such experiences
usually describe them as ineffable, not fully comprehensible
in an ordinary d-SoC. Conversions at revival meetings are the
most common examples of religious experiences occurring in d-ASCs
induced by an intensely emotional atmosphere.
The esoteric training systems of some religions seem to have even
more resemblance to state-specific sciences. Often there are devoted
specialists, complex techniques, and repeated experiencing of
the d-ASCs in order to further religious knowledge.
Nevertheless, the proposed state-specific sciences are not simply
religion in a new guise. The use of d-ASCs in religion may
involve the kind of commitment to searching for truth that
is need for developing a state-specific science, but practically
all the religions we know can mainly be defined as state-specific
technologies, operated in the service of a prior belief
systems. The experiencers of d-ASCs in most religious contexts
have already been thoroughly indoctrinated in a particular belief
system. This belief system may then mold the content of the d-ASCs
to create specific experiences that reinforce or validate the
belief system.
The crucial distinction between a religion utilizing d-ASCs and
a state-specific science is the commitment of the scientist to
reexamine constantly his own belief system and to question the
"obvious," in spite of its intellectual or emotional
appeal to him. Investigators of d-ASCs will certainly encounter
an immense variety of phenomena labeled religious experience or
mystical revelation during the development of state-specific sciences,
but they must remain committed to examining these phenomena more
carefully, sharing their observations and techniques with colleagues,
and subjecting the beliefs (hypotheses, theories) that result
from such experiences to the requirement of leading to testable
predictions. In practice, because we are aware of the immense
emotional power of mystical experiences, this is a difficult task,
but it is one that must be undertaken by disciplined investigators
if we are to understand various d-ASCs.[7]
Relationship Between State-Specific Sciences
Any (state-specific) science may be considered as consisting of
two parts: observations and theories. The observations are what
can be experienced relatively directly: the theories are the inferences
about what nonobservable factors account for the observations.
For example, the phenomenon of synesthesia (seeing colors as a
result of hearing sounds) is a theoretical proposition for me
in my ordinary d-SoC; I do not experience it and can only generate
theories about what other people report about it. If I were under
the influence of psychedelic drug such as LSD or marijuana {105},
I could probably experience synesthesia directly, and my descriptions
of the experience would become data.
Figure 16-1 (reprinted from C. Tart, Science, 1972, 176
1203-1210, by permission of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science) demonstrates some possible relationships
between three state-specific sciences. State-specific sciences
1 and 2 show considerable overlap.
The area labeled O1O2 permits direct observation in both sciences.
Area T1T2 permits theoretical inferences about common subject
matter from the two perspectives. In area O1T2, by contrast, the
theoretical propositions of state-specific science 2 are matters
of direct observation for the scientist in d-SoC 1, and vice versa
for the area T1O2. State-specific science 3 consists of a body
of observation and theory exclusive to that science and has no
overlap with the two other sciences: it does not confirm, contradict,
or complement them.
It would be naively reductionistic to say that the work in one
state-specific science validates or invalidates the
work in a second state-specific science; I prefer to say that
two different state-specific sciences, where they overlap, provide
quite different points of view with respect to certain kinds of
theories and data, and thus complement[8]
each other. The proposed creation state-specific sciences
neither validates nor invalidates the activities or normal consciousness
sciences. The possibility of developing certain state-specific
sciences means only that certain kinds of phenomena may be handled
more adequately within these potential new sciences.
Interrelationships more complex than these illustrated in Fig.
16-1 are possible.
The possibility of stimulating interactions between different state-specific
sciences is very real. Creative breakthroughs in normal consciousness
sciences have frequently been made by scientists temporarily in
a d-ASC {18}. In such instances, the scientists concerned saw
quite different views of their problems and performed different
kinds of reasoning, conscious or nonconscious, which led to results
that could be tested within their normal consciousness science.
A current example of such interaction is the finding that in Zen
meditation (a highly developed discipline in Japan) there are
physiological correlates of meditative experiences, such as decreased
frequency of alpha-rhythm, which can also be produced by means
of instrumentally aided feedback-learning techniques {23}. This
finding may elucidate some of the processes peculiar to each discipline.
Individual Differences
A widespread and misleading assumption that hinders the development
of state-specific sciences and confuses their interrelationships
is the assumption that because two people are "normal"
(not certified insane), their ordinary d-SoCs are essentially
the same. In reality I suspect that there are enormous differences
between the d-SoCs of some normal people. Because societies train
people to behave and communicate along socially approved lines,
these differences are obscured.
For example, some people think in images, others in words. Some
can voluntarily anesthetize parts of their body, most cannot.
Some recall past events by imaging the scene and looking at the
relevant details; others use complex verbal processes with no
images.
This means that person A may be able to observe certain kinds
of experiential data that person B cannot experience in his ordinary
d-SoC, no matter how hard B tries. There may be several consequences.
Person B may think A is insane, too imaginative, or a liar, or
he may feel inferior to A. Person A may also feel himself odd,
if he takes B as a standard of normality.
B may be able to enter a d-ASC and there experience the sorts
of things A has reported to him. A realm of knowledge that is
ordinary for A is then specific for a d-ASC for B. Similarly,
some of the experiences of B in his d-ASC may not be available
for direct observation by A in his ordinary d-SoC.
The phenomenon of synesthesia can again serve as an example. Some
individuals possess this ability in their ordinary d-SoC, most
do not. Yet 56 percent of a sample of experienced marijuana users
experienced synesthesia at least occasionally {105} while in the
drug-induced d-ASC.
Thus bits of knowledge that are specific for a d-ASC for one individual
may be part of ordinary consciousness for another. Arguments over
the usefulness of the concept of states of consciousness may reflect
differences in the structure of the ordinary d-SoC of various
investigators, as we discussed in Chapter 9.
Another important source of individual differences, little understood
at present, is the degree to which an individual can first make
an observation or form a concept in one d-SoC and then reexperience
or comprehend it in another d-SoC. Many items of information hat
were state-specific when observed initially may be learned and
somehow transferred (fully or partially) to another d-SoC. Differences
across individuals, various combinations of d-SoCs, and types
of experience are probably enormous.
I have outlined only the complexities created by individuals differences
in normal d-SoCs and have used the normal d-SoC as a baseline
for comparison with d-ASCs, but it is evident that every d-SoC
must eventually be compared against every other d-SoC.
Problems, Pitfalls, and Personal Perils
If we use the practical experience of Western man with d-ASCs
as a guide, the development of state-specific sciences will be
beset by a number of difficulties. These difficulties will be
of two kinds: general methodological problems stemming from the
inherent nature of some d-ASCs, and those concerned with personal
perils to the investigator.
State-Related Problems
The first important problem in the proposed development of state-specific
sciences is the "obvious" perception of truth. In many
d-ASCs, one's experience is what one is obviously and lucidly
experiencing truth directly without question. An immediate result
of this may be an extinction of the desire for further questioning.
Further, this experience of "obvious" truth, while not
necessarily preventing the investigator from further examining
his data, may not arouse his desire for consensual validation.
Since one of the greatest strengths of science is its insistence
on consensual validation of basic data, this can be a serious
drawback. Investigators attempting to develop state-specific sciences
must learn to distrust the obvious.
A second major problem in developing state-specific sciences is
that in some d-ASCs one's abilities to visualize and imagine are
immensely enhanced, so that whatever one imagines seems perfectly
real. Thus one can imagine that something is being observed and
experience it as datum. If the scientist can conjure up anything
he wishes, how can he ever get at truth?
One approach to this problem is to consider any such vivid imaginings
as potential effects: they are data in the sense that what can
be vividly imagined in a d-SoC is important to know. It may be
that not everything can be imagined with equal facility and relationships
between what can be imagined may show a lawful pattern.
Another approach is to realize that this problem is not unique
to d-ASCs. One can have illusions and misperceptions in the ordinary
d-SoC. Before the rise of modern physical science, all sorts of
things were imagined about the nature of the physical world that
could not be directly refuted. The same techniques that eliminated
these illusions in the physical sciences can also eliminate them
in state-specific sciences dealing with nonphysical data. All
observations must be subjected to consensual validation and all
their theoretical consequences must be examined. Those that do
not show consistent patterns and cannot be replicated can be distinguished
from those phenomena that do show general lawfulness across individuals.
The effects of this enhanced vividness of imagination in some
d-ASCs will be complicated further by two other problems: experimenter
bias {45, 55} and the fact that one person's illusion in a given
d-ASC can sometimes be communicated to another person in the same
d-ASC so that a false consensual validation results. Again, the
only long-term solution is the requirements that predictions based
on concepts arising from various experiences be verified experientially.
A third major problem is that state-specific sciences probably
cannot be developed for all d-ASCs: some d-ASCs may depend or
result from genuine deterioration of observational and reasoning
abilities or from a deterioration of volition. But the development
of each state-specific science should result from trial and error,
and not from a priori decisions based on reasoning in the ordinary
d-SoC that would rule out attempts to develop a science for some
particular state.
A fourth major problem is that of ineffability. Some experiences
are ineffable in the sense that (1) a person may experience them,
but be unable to express or conceptualize them adequately to himself.;
(2) while a person may be able to conceptualize an experiencer
to himself he may not be able to communicate it adequately to
anyone else. Certain phenomena of the first type may simply be
inaccessible to scientific investigation. Phenomena of the second
type may be accessible to scientific investigation only insofar
as we are willing to recognize that a science, in the sense of
following most of the basic rules, may exist only for a single
person. Since such a solitary science lacks all the advantages
gained by consensual validation, we cannot expect it to have as
much power and rigor as conventional scientific endeavor.
Many phenomena that are now considered ineffable may not be so
in reality. Their apparent ineffability may be a function of general
lack of experience with d-ASCs and the lack of an adequate language
for communicating about d-ASC phenomena. In most well-developed
languages the major part of the vocabulary was developed primarily
in adaptation to survival in the physical world.[9]
Finally, various phenomena of d-ASCs may be too complex for human
beings to understand. The phenomena may depend on or be affected
by so many variables that we can never understand them. In the
history of science, however, many phenomena that appeared too
complex at first eventually became comprehensible.
Personal Perils
The personal perils an investigator faces in attempting develop
a state-specific science are of two kinds: those associated with
reactions colloquially called a bad trip and a good trip.
Bad trips, in which an extremely unpleasant emotional reaction
is experienced in a d-ASC, and from which there are possible one-term
adverse consequences on personal adjustment, often occur because
upbringing has not prepared us to undergo radical alterations
in our ordinary d-SoC. We depend on stability, we fear the unknown,
and we develop personal rigidities and various kinds of personal
and social taboos. It is traditional in our society to consider
d-ASCs as signs of insanity; d-ASCs therefore can cause great
fear in those who experience them.
In many d-ASCs, defenses against unacceptable personal impulses
become partially or wholly ineffective, so that the person feels
flooded with traumatic material he cannot handle. All these things
result in fear and avoidance of d-ASCs, and make it difficult
or impossible for some individuals to function in a d-ASC in a
way that is consistent without he development of state-specific
science. Maslow {36} discusses these as pathologies of cognition
that seriously interfere without the scientific enterprise in
general, as well ordinary life. In principle, adequate selection
and training can minimize these hazards for at least some people.
Good trips may also endanger an investigator. A trip may produce
experiences so rewarding that they interfere with the scientific
activity of the investigator. The perception of "obvious"
truth and its effect of eliminating the need for further investigation
or consensual validation have already been mentioned. Another
peril comes from the ability to imagine or create vivid experiences.
They may be so highly rewarding that the investigator does not
follow the rule of investigating the obvious regardless of his
personal satisfaction with results. Similarly, his attachment
to good feelings, ecstasy, and the like, and his refusal to consider
alternative conceptualizations of these, can stifle the progress
of investigation.
These personal perils emphasize the necessity of developing adequate
training programs for scientists who wish to develop state-specific
sciences. Although such a training program is difficult to envision,
it is evident that much conventional scientific training is contrary
to what is needed to develop a state-specific science, because
it tends to produce rigidity and avoidance of personal involvement
with subject matter, rather than open-mindedness and flexibility.
Much of the training program must be devoted to the scientist's
understanding of himself so that the (unconscious) effects of
his personal biases are minimized during his investigations of
a d-ASC.
There are scientists who, after becoming personally involved with
d-ASCs, have subsequently become poor scientists or have experienced
personal psychological crises. It is premature, however, to conclude
that such unfortunate consequences cannot be avoid by proper training
and discipline. In the early history of the physical sciences
many scientist were fanatics who were nonobjective about their
investigations. Not all experiencers of d-ASCs develop pathology
as a result: indeed, many seem to become considerably more mature.
Given the current social climate, we hear of the failures, but
not the successes. Only from actual attempts to develop state-specific
sciences can we determine the actual d-SoCs that are suitable
for development and the kinds of people best suited to such work.[10]
Prospects
I believe that an examination of human history and our current
situation provides the strongest argument for the need to develop
state-specific sciences. Throughout history man has been influenced
by the spiritual and mystical factors expressed (usually in watered-down
form) in the religions that attract the masses. Spiritual and
mystical experiences are primary phenomena of various d-ASCs:
because of such experiences, untold numbers of both the noblest
and most horrible acts of which men are capable have been committed.
Yet in all the time that Western science as existed, no concerted
attempt has been made to understand these d-ASC phenomena in scientific
terms.
Many hoped that religions were simply a form of superstition that
would be left behind in our "rational" age. Not only
has this hope failed, but our own understanding of the nature
of reasoning now makes it clear that it can never be fulfilled.
Reason is a tool, a tool that is yielded in the service
of assumptions, beliefs and needs that are not themselves subject
to reason. The irrational, or better, the arational, will not
disappear from the human situation. Our immense success in the
development of the physical sciences has not been particularly
successful in formulating better philosophies of life or increasing
our real knowledge of ourselves. The sciences we have developed
to date are not very human sciences. They tell us how to
do things, but give us no scientific insights on questions of
what to do, what not to do, or why to do
things.
The youth of today and mature scientists are turning to meditation,
Oriental religions, and personal use of psychedelic drugs in increasing
numbers. The phenomena encountered in these d-ASCs provide more
satisfaction and are more relevant to the formulation of philosophies
of life and decisions about appropriate ways of living, than "pure
reason" {40}. My own impressions are that large numbers of
scientists are now personally exploring d-ASCs, but few have begun
to connect this personal exploration with their scientific activities.
It is difficult to predict the chances of delving state-specific
sciences. Our knowledge is still to diffuse ad dependent on the
normal d-SoC. Yet I think it is probable that state-specific sciences
can be developed for such d-ASCs as autohypnosis, meditative states,
lucid dreaming, marijuana intoxication, LSD intoxication, self-remembering,
reverie, and biofeedback-induced states {88 or 115}. In all these
d-ASCs, volition seems to be retained, so that the observer can
indeed carry out experiments on himself or others or both. Some
d-ASCs, in which the volition to experiment during the state may
disappear, but in which some experimentation can be carried out
if special conditions are prepared before the state is entered,
are alcohol intoxication, ordinary dreaming, hypnagogic and hypnopompic
states, and high dreams {88 or 115}. It is not clear whether other
d-ASCs are suitable for developing state-specific sciences or
whether mental deterioration is too great. Such questions can
only be answered by experiment.
I have nothing against religious and mystical groups. Yet I suspect
that the vast majority of them have developed compelling belief
systems rather than state-specific sciences. Will scientific method
be extended to the development of state-specific sciences to improve
our human situation? Or will the immense power of d-ASCs be left
in the hands of many cults and sects?
Footnotes
[1] I originally presented the proposal for
state-specific sciences in an article in Science {119}.
Most of it is reprinted here with the permission of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science. I have updated the
text and terminology to fit the rest of this book. (back)
[2] Note that a d-SoC is defined by the stable
parameters of the pattern that constitute it, not by the
particular technique of inducing that pattern. (back)
[3] States of confusion and impaired functioning
may certainly be aspects of some drug-induced d-ASCs for some
people, but are not of primary interest here. (back)
[4] The degree to which a science can seem
incomprehensible, even ridiculous, to someone not specializing
in it never ceases to astound me. I have always thought I had
a good general background in science. So much so that, for example,
I was able to appreciate some of the in-group humor in an article
I read in Science some years ago about quarks. Quarks?
Yes, quarks. To me, the article was obviously a put-on, about
how physicists were hunting for particles no one had ever seen,
called quarks. Much of the humor was too technical for me to understand,
but I was pleased that a staid journal like Science could unbend
enough to publish humor. Of course, it was not humor. Physicists
are very serious about quarks, even though no one has ever detected
one with certainty (at least not yet, despite an awful lot of
research). (back)
[5] A state-specific scientist might find
his own work somewhat incomprehensible when he was not in his
work d-ASC because of the phenomenon of state-specific memory.
Not enough of his work would transfer to his ordinary d-SoC
to make it comprehensible, even though it would again make perfect
sense when he was again in the d-ASC in which he did his scientific
work. (back)
[6] "Ordinary consciousness science"
is not a good example of a pure state-specific science because
many important discoveries have occurred during d-ASCs such as
reverie, dreaming, and meditative states. (back)
[7] The idea of state-specific knowledge,
introduced earlier, casts some light on an aspect of organized
religions, the "dryness" of theology. Consider the feeling
so many, both inside and outside organized religion, have had
that theology is intellectual hair-splitting, an activity irrelevant
to what religion is all about. I believe this is true in many
cases, and the reason is that the essence of much religion is
state-specific knowledge, knowledge that can really be known only
in a d-ASC. The original founders of the religion know certain
things in a d-ASC, they talk about them in the ordinary d-SoC.
They realize the words are a poor reflection of the direct experiential
knowledge, but the words are all they have to talk with. As the
generations pass, more and more theologians who have no direct
knowledge of what the words are about discuss the meaning of the
words at greater and greater length, and the divergence of the
words from the original state-specific knowledge becomes greater
and greater.
There are warnings in some religious literature {128} not to take
the words literally, to use them only as pointers of the direction
experience must go, but our culture is so fascinated with words
that we seldom heed such warnings.
So perhaps ideas like "we are all one" or "love
pervades the entire universe" cannot be adequately comprehended
in the ordinary d-SoC, no matter how hard we try, although they
may appropriately affect our thoughts and actions in the ordinary
d-SoC if we have first experienced them, understood them,
in the appropriate d-ASC. (back)
[8] The term complement is used in
a technical sense here, as it is in physics, meaning that each
of two explanatory systems deals well with overlapping data areas,
but neither disproves the other and neither can be incorporated
into some more comprehensive theoretical system as a special case.
For example, the electron can be treated adequately as a wave
or as a particle. The wave theory handles some kinds of data better
than the particle theory, and vice versa. (back)
[9] Note too that we are a hyperverbal culture,
so ineffable essentially means not communicable in words. But
there are other forms of communication. Riding a bicycle or swimming
are both ineffable, in the sense that I have never seen a good
verbal description of either, but they can be taught. Ornstein
{47} presents convincing data that the right hemisphere of the
brain specializes in nonverbal functioning, and argues that many
of the seemingly exotic techniques of Eastern spiritual disciplines
are actually ways of communicating and teaching in the nonverbal
mode. (back)
[10] The d-ASCs resulting from very dangerous
drugs may be scientifically interesting, but the risk may be too
high to warrant developing state-specific sciences for them. The
personal and social issues involved in evaluating this kind of
risk are beyond the scope of this book. (back)